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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Aircrew Adaptive Decision Making: A Cross-Case Analysis

Although the accident rate for military aviation has declined significantly
from earlier decades, during the i990's it reached a plateau. Human error in the
cockpit still accounts for over 80% o f the aircraft mishaps resulting in loss o f life or
over one million dollars in damage. Decision error has been a contributing factor for
approximately 60% o f these mishaps.

The purpose o f this research was to

investigate aircrew process performance variables as predictors o f decision-making
outcomes.
This study was modeled on elements o f previous research in naturalistic
decision making. Data were collected for cross-case analysis o f the role experience
plays in efficient decision strategy selection and use in an uncertain, dynamic high
stakes environment. Multiple raters evaluated eight novice and eight experienced
military aircrews at seven decision points in a 20-minute flight scenario conducted in
a full motion flight simulator. Other raters independently rank ordered the quality o f
the final outcome.

A comprehensive approach to collecting and analyzing data

included: (1) development and use o f a behaviorally-anchored assessment
instrument, (2) use o f a digitally integrated presentation o f audio/video and flight
data, and (3) development o f context-specific analytical frameworks and models of
observed behaviors and metacognitive processes. Results included inferential and
descriptive statistics o f process/outcome scores, instructor comments, excerpts o f
cockpit recordings, participant interviews, and field notes.
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The study findings were: (1) high individual and collective crew experience
had a significant positive effect on process and outcome scores, (2) there was no
statistically reliable difference in process scores between experience levels in the
three procedurally-based events, (3) experienced crews performed better than novice
crews in the four less structured events, (4) novice crews' process/ outcome
correlation did not approach significance, (S) a strong positive correlation o f
process/outcome scores was found for experienced crews in the two most
challenging (i.e., unstructured) scenario events, (6) qualitative analysis revealed
strong relationships between performance and crew interactions/attributes, and (7) in
dynamic, time critical situations, the use o f adaptive decision-making strategies led
to better performance outcomes.
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CHAPTER ONE
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Introduction
Time critical, adaptive decision making used to rapidly assess non-routine
dynamic situations underpins success in the dynamic aviation environment. This study
explored decision-making approaches o f Navy faced with recognizing and controlling
unplanned and emergency situations within seconds or minutes given conflicts and gaps
in critical information. Research was conducted to investigate the use o f adaptive
decision-making approaches by novice and experienced aircrews in a specific simulator
context representative o f their decision-making domain.
The decision-making process explored lies on a decision making continuum
between the time consuming, linear, analytical approach at one extreme, and a reactive,
procedurally-based approach on the other end. The focal point on this continuum for this
study is an adaptation to these decision strategies. Somewhere in the center o f this
continuum is an intuitive adaptive decision making approach that synthesizes domain
experience with insightful knowledge for use in atypical contexts that require immediate
problem resolution.
In order to better understand the relationship o f the use o f adaptive decision
strategies and aircrew performance under stressful conditions data were collected in a
simulated flight event along with the aircrews’ self-reported cognitive processes in the

1
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event debrief. Data analyses were performed to determine if: (a) previous “like-kind” or
transferable experiences in the aircraft are critical to how aircrews remember and report
their interpretations o f vague and concurrent cues, (b) aircrew experience levels
determine the differences in thought patterns o f aircrews, and (c) a correlation exists
between aircrew situational assessment, decision-making processes and related decision
process outcomes.
Background
In 1996, the U.S. Navy's most senior aviators chartered a Human Factors Quality
Management Board to discover best practices worldwide and conceive interventions to
forestall human error from the proximate (cockpit) level to the resource (organizational)
level. After a year o f military and commercial aviation program reviews o f safety and
operational readiness strategies, several initiatives were adopted. One o f these initiatives
by the Naval Safety Center created a Human Factors Analysis Classification System
(HFACS) utilizing Reason’s Model ofHuman Error (Reason, 1990). This mishap
causal factor taxonomy was created and populated with discrete behaviors and conditions
proven to cause aircraft mishaps. Using the HFACS taxonomy, an analysis was
conducted by the o f 110 (81 Tactical Air/ 29 Helicopter) Navy/Marine Corps Class “A”
(those involving one million dollars or more and loss o f life) aviation mishaps that
occurred from 1990 through 1996.
The results o f this analysis o f tactical fixed wing aircraft Class “A” mishaps
found that 63 % o f the mishaps included decision errors. These decision errors were
categorized to include one o r multiple decision errors per mishap as follows: (a) wrong
response in an emergency (16 mishaps), (b) improper use o f flight controls (12 mishaps),
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(c) poor decision (7 mishaps), (d) exceeded pilot/aircrew ability (5 mishaps), (e)
misdiagnosed emergency (5 mishaps), (f) misinterpreted/misused instruments (5
mishaps), (g) inappropriate maneuver (4 mishaps), (h) failed to recognize extremis (3
mishaps), (i) improper approach/landing (3 mishaps), (j) improper takeoff (1 mishap),
and (k) used incorrect data (1 mishap).
Meeting the goal o f eliminating human error mishaps demands the adoption o f
more effective instructional strategies, along with better organization climate, increased
supervision and accountability across the span o f naval aviation aircraft platforms and
functional areas. The need for improved shore-based and shipboard-training capabilities
has become increasingly critical as the Navy increases its operational commitments with
fewer, less experienced personnel. This need created a triad o f powerful training
initiatives from the operational level for training aircrews: (a) use advanced technology
and software applications to systematically capture and measure aircrew performance,
(b) inclusion o f human factors and performance measurement and analysis in instructor
training, and (c) employment o f advanced curriculum development methodologies to
integrate critical thinking and problem solving applications throughout the aviation
training continuum.
Statement o f the Issue
While the military aviation accident rate has declined significantly from earlier
decades, it has reached a plateau since 1991. Human error still accounts for over 80% o f
incidences in both military and civilian flight mishaps. United States Naval Safety
Center analysis o f military aircrew accidents in 1998 revealed in significan t change over
time in the percent o f mishaps attributed at least in part to decision-making errors and
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lapses o f judgment by aircrews. In 1998, aircrew decision-making errors contributed to
almost 60% o f all Class “A” mishaps. Since current policy and levels o f technology
restrict data collection during actual flight environments (i.e., most military aircraft are
not equipped with cockpit voice recorders or “black boxes” nor do they always operate in
environments observed by radar which makes for comparatively easy flight
reconstruction) it is difficult to observe aviators under stressful conditions o f uncertainty
in their natural decision making environments. Modeling the most proficient decision
makers in a particular domain requires access to their cognitive and behavioral data. The
best available setting to this researcher for collecting aircrew performance data and
providing decision-making experiences to aircrews is currently in the fiill-motion flight
simulator. To date, there has been little progress in the approach to improve the
decision-making capabilities o f aviators beyond assessment o f overt decision making
capabilities. Much o f the research used to support aviation training has been done
largely with novices in non-flight environments (e.g., Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988;
Prince, Hartel, & Salas, 1992; Stokes, Kemper & Kite, 1997).
Several problem areas impede decision making data collection in realistic
aviation environments for practical as well as theoretical use. First, most research in
decision making thought processing patterns related to probabilities and outcomes has
been highly structured using content impoverished stimuli (e.g., use o f gambling
simulations by Payne et al., 1988). Second, Bowers, Jentsch, and Salas (2000) point out
that there is a misconception that that a universal skill set is appropriate for all aviation
platforms and operational contexts. Third, without the use o f sophisticated data
collection and analysis tools it is difficult to collect and replicate detailed flight data to
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support metacognitive recall o f processes reflecting considerations and actions by
aircrews in time-critical processes. Fourth, limitations in obtaining time and access to
experts in realistic work environments have made field research with any experts, much
less aviators, difficult (Shanteau, 1988).
In aviation contexts, investigations must begin to include methodologies that
produce data that capture how aviators adapt their decision-making processes as they
gain flight experience to effectively manage uncertainty and risk in the cockpit.
Shanteau (1986) found that expert (I.e., more experienced) decision-makers make
decisions differently than non-experts (i.e., novices). More experienced aviators are
more likely to have an experiential knowledge base that is used to identify exceptions to
rules, to assess situations quickly and define how much time to allot to problem solving.
They take more calculated risks to manage outcomes. These differences are important;
they open an area o f research that can better definition o f training requirements for
aviators at all levels o f experience.
Previous practical investigation o f experienced aircrews’ implicit decision
making processes as proposed in this study has been limited to cognitive task interviews.
Designed to elicit decision-making thought protocols based on past experience and “what
if?” paper-based scenarios, these analyses have been extremely valuable; however, they
lack the real-time, detailed data that can be observed and collected in a flight simulator or
actual flight event (e.g., verbal protocols, information-acquisition behavior, task
shedding, and response times). Since content influences psychological processes
(Tetlock, 1985), an actual flight event in a high fidelity aircraft simulator would produce
a more realistic context for the study o f collective expert and novice aircrew decision
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making especially under conditions in which aircrews, as teams, face uncertain
conditions.
Study Purpose
The purpose o f study was to collect observational and metacognitive data from
aircrews to identify adaptations to decision making strategies as articulated by better
performing crews. Furthermore, data was sought that would illuminate the relationship
between aircrew characteristics and aircrew functioning processes relative to multi
crewed cockpit performance.
This study addressed the utility o f multi-method data collection and analysis to
capture aircrew decision-making considerations and flexibility in assessing and planning
approaches to resolve flight related problems in time critical situations. Technical and
crew coordination data were collected to measure aircrew processes; latency and quality
o f decision outcome data were studied to discover possible relationships between these
study variables. Consequently, results were reviewed to determine and clarify essential
skills, procedures, and strategies required to train more effective aircrews facing similar
situations.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
This study proposed three hypotheses and three research questions that form a
starting point o f the cumulative process to explore and identify variables in an
environmentally valid situation (i.e., a realistic scenario representative o f a natural
situation). In this context, potentially relevant variables were observed and considered
by both the research team and the participants. The study hypotheses were tested using
inferential statistics to explore possible relationships between the performance process
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variables and outcome variables and aircrew experience level. Combined analysis and
interpretation o f quantitative and qualitative data served as the basis for a possible
integrative theoretical and training approach that may have relevance beyond the one
naturalistic situation represented by the study scenario.
The research hypotheses and questions related to a single flight scenario were:

Hypothesis I : Experienced aircrews will receive better process ratings (i.e., technical
skill, workflow, information sharing, consensus building, operational risk assessment and
management and back-up routines) than novices in handling a specific in-flight
emergency situation involving uncertainty.
Hypothesis 2: Decisions (i.e., outcome rankings) made by experienced aircrews in an
uncertain situation involving a specific in-flight emergency are rated as being o f higher
quality than those made by novice aircrews.
Hypothesis 3: Aircrew process ratings are correlated with the decision outcome ratings
for a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty.

Research Question 1: What adaptive recognitional/metacognitive decision-making
strategies emerge from aircrews in a specific in-flight emergency situation involving
uncertainty?
Research Question 2: In what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns
differ among successful and less than successful aircrews challenged with a specific in
flight emergency involving uncertainty?
Research Question 3: What characteristics/factors seem to define the most successfiil
aircrew outcomes in a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty?
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This research study investigated whether experienced military aircrews from the
fleet with at least 700 hours o f flight experience in a particular aircraft had different
metacognitive approaches to identify, assess and resolve airborne problems than less
experienced crews in the same aircraft. The 700-flight hour level is the total amount
o f flight time accumulated by an S-3 aviator with at least one year in a fleet
squadron. The hypotheses aimed at investigating possible relationships between
experience level and various aspects o f specific aircrew behaviors and skills that
might correlate with approaches and biases in judgments and decision-making.
Aspects o f aircrew performance (e.g., technical skills, procedural skills, inter
personal skills, higher level cognitive skills, crew coordination, etc.) within and
among the two different experience levels studied were rated by expert observers and
analyzed for statistically significant correlation with final mission outcome.
Qualitative analysis methodology was used to create situational awareness and
decision taxonomies representing aircrew actions and thought processes during
critical decision points in the scenario.
Methodology
This field-based comparative case study o f aircrew decision making under
conditions o f uncertainty was conducted at a United States naval aviation training facility
in San Diego. Aircrews flying the S-3B model aircraft in routine training syllabi at the
basic (i.e., novice) and advanced (i.e., experienced) levels o f naval aviation carrier-based
training were asked to volunteer as study participants.
A case study approach was designed and adopted to explore the relationship
between aircrew situational awareness and decision-making processes and the outcomes

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

o f experienced and novice aircrews. A flight scenario in a full-motion simulator was
used to trigger two dangerous event conditions in an ambiguous, information-limited
context that gave the aircrews little to immediate response time. Unexpected changes in
the flight and landing environment were followed with greater instability and novelty to
assess whether aircrews would change their information gathering/use and decision
making strategies. Data were analyzed to determine i f there was a meaningful or
statistically significant correlation between aircrew flight experience and the successful
handling o f sequentially more problematical emergency situations.
Study data consisted o f quantitative performance assessments during the realistic
20-minute simulator scenario followed by participant interviews related to crew decision
processes and outcomes. Process variables were comprised o f technical and crew
resource management tasks; decision outcome data consisted o f aircraft configuration
and position at the end o f the scenario. Up to five subject matter experts that collected
observational data used a behaviorally-anchored Likert scale instrument designed for the
study. Evaluation criteria reflected both general team process and event-specific
standards o f performance. These subject matter experts served as independent
observers/assessors. They were senior instructors at the training command for the model
aircraft flown by the participant crews.
Immediately following the 20-minute scenario, semi-structured, recorded
debrief/interviews between 40 and 60 minutes m duration were conducted with aircrews
to collect data related to the research questions. To enhance recall o f cues and decisions
in the scenario for both participants and independent observers, a stimulated recall
strategy was employed during the post-scenario debrief/interview. A computerized
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digital replay o f selected instruments in the aircraft instrument panel, aircraft aspect, as
well as audio and video o f the aircrew over every minute o f the scenario event was
available and used during portions o f the debrief/interview to initiate recall o f technical
data as well as the participants’ reactions to events and their situational awareness and
decision making during the study scenario.
Conceptual Framework
Over the last 15 years, studies involving complex decision-making style adaptations
in response to uncertain, dynamic conditions with various populations in real-world
domains have contributed to the movement away from the classic “rational” model o f
decision making. There is now a new focus on the type o f decision making built on an
individual’s intuitive recognition and resolution o f atypical situations using his
experience base. This recognitional approach to decision making is known as naturalistic
decision making (Klein, 1993, 1998; Zsambock, 1997). The decision making process in
uncertain situations can be generally categorized by assigning it to one o f three groups
with strategy shifts occurring with the number o f options (Payne, 1982) and time
constraints: (a) procedural or rule-based (e.g., use o f standard operating procedures,
checklists, etc.) typically used to for automatic, rapid responses, (b) analytical which
consumes much time in an attempt to gather all available information in various
combinations and assigns a fixed set o f possible meanings to cues/information to weight
all possible outcomes, and (c) adaptive or creative problem solving which is a process
that attempts to deal with limitations in information gathering and processing in time
critical situations.
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In adaptive problem solving the first available action that satisfies the immediate
need for a desired outcome or “end game” is selected to meet the situations time
constraints. Adaptive decision-making processes often synthesize intuition, experience,
and a tailored application o f the normal procedures and/or techniques to obtain the
desired objective. Early indications in work using the Recognition-Primed Decision
(RPD) Model (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Klein, 1989,1993) has
provided evidence through deep interview techniques and field observations that there are
differences in the way experienced and inexperienced people working as teams recognize
and respond to problems in high stress environments. In general, research has found that
experienced persons rely on their long-term memory and make time-critical, high stakes
decisions in potentially volatile situations by using sophisticated strategies based on
recognition and reactions to trends and patterns from their experiences. Inexperienced
people, by contrast, tend to rely on various recalled preferences and ignore or
prematurely discount alternative hypotheses or options. An extension o f the Klein et al
(1986). RPD model is the Recognition/Metacognition (R/M) model that describes a set o f
critical thinking strategies to verify results o f recognition and problem correction in novel
situations through metacognitive processes (Cohen, Adelman, Tolcott, Bresnick, &
Marvin, 1993; Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996). This model was developed using critical
incident interviews with U.S. Army infantry personnel and U.S. Navy shipboard
personnel. Both the RPD and R/M models o f naturalistic decision making along with
Zsambok’s (1997) Aviation Decision Process Model, which specifies cognitive processes
involved in aviation decision making, were o f primary importance in conceptually
framing this research.
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Definition o f Terms
For the purposes of this study, variables were operationally defined as follows:
Adaptive Decision Making
Adaptive decision making involves a shift in decision-making strategy from procedural
or analytical approaches to meet the demands o f a time-critical, threatening, dynamic
situation with an undefined structure. This shift in decision strategy is utilized because
procedural or analytic approaches are too time consuming in a real-time, dynamic
situation. The requirement to accelerate the decision making process is typically brought
about by a need to trade accuracy for speed, shifting decision criteria, and task shedding.
Naturalistic Decision Making
This type o f decision making is concerned with how individuals use their
knowledge to make decisions in the face o f unruly problems embedded in dynamic task
contests. Eight factors characterize decision making in naturalistic settings: ill-structured
problems, uncertain dynamic environments, shifting, ill defined or competing goals,
action/feedback loops, time stress, high stakes, multiple players, and organizational goals
and norms. It is not likely that all eight factors will be at their most difficult levels in any
one situation or setting but often several o f these factors will complicate the decision task
(Orasanu & Connolly, 1993).
Creative problem solving
This process requires the use of critical thinking skills when no response is
readily available as a standard operating procedure, there is no guidance for dealing with
the malfunction in the aircraft: operating manuals, and when the crew has not been trained
to assess or manage the situation. “ In these cases they must invent a candidate solution
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to meet their goals and evaluate its adequacy in the light o f existing constraints”
(Orasanu, 1997, p.54).
Metacognition
This term bridges the areas between (a) decision making and memory, (b)
learning and motivation, and (c) learning and cognitive development. It describes our
“knowledge about how we perceive, remember, think, and act - - that is, what we know
about what we know" (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1996, p. xi). It is the ability o f a person
to reflect on his or her conscious awareness o f judgments and experiences. It is a
supplemental recognition process used to verify and improve recognition o f a situation.
Meta-recognition
Meta-recognitional skills probe for flaws in recognized assessments and plans, try
to patch up any weaknesses found, and evaluate the results. Meta-recognitional
processes include: (a) identification o f evidence-conclusion relationships (or arguments)
within the evolving situation or plan, (b) processes o f critiquing that identifying problem
in the arguments that support the situation model or plan which can result in the
discovery o f problems o f incompleteness, unreliability, or conflict, (c) processes o f
correcting that respond to these problems, and (d) a control process called quick test,
which regulates critiquing and correcting. The quick test considers the available time, the
costs o f error, and the degree o f uncertainty or novelty in the situation (Cohen &
Freeman, 1996).
Limitations o f the Study
The findings o f this study are limited to identification, description, and analysis
o f participant aircrews’ decision-makingprocesses and outcomes in a single case
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scenario. This study did not attempt to predict the success o f various decision-making
styles found to be used in the study scenario to other situations or domains. The case
study approach was used to focus on the patterns o f aircrew experiences in a particular
naturalistic situation. Each case may provide data to expand the cognitive schema but
there is no attempt to generalize findings to other flight situations or populations.
Additionally, because the study participants may not be representative o f the S-3B
aircraft population there is also no attempt to generalize study findings to the S-3B
aircraft aircrew population. However, the relevancy o f the findings may be useful to
enhance specific cognitive skill training approaches and naturalistic decision making
theories.
Significance o f the Study
Results o f the study are useful to practical aircrew and instructor training
applications. The larger issues addressed in this research are those o f when and how
adaptive decision making employment has been successful in meeting immediate
operational needs in an unstable environment. Study data collected via combined
qualitative and quantitative approaches resulted in g aining more details of various
aircrew problem recognition and problem solving approaches than either method
employed separately. Advanced levels o f description that emerged from the study
provide details that will assist training practitioners in extending the depth o f process and
performance feedback to aircrews and instructors. Evidence presented serves as a
summary delineating aircrews’ behavior and functioning used to assimilate, process and
investigate various information (cues) with particular attention being paid to methods for
dealing with uncertainty. Practical aircrew and instructor training applications could be
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designed to provide models and discussion points for training in operational best
practices to include risk assessment and management.
Significant advances in aircrew training require domain-specific information that
is used to predict, explain, and understand aircrew decision-making biases in their
problem solving strategies under conditions o f uncertainty and limited response time.
Recent U.S. Air Force aircrew studies (Spiker, Tourville, Silverman & Nullmeyer, 1996;
Spiker, Silverman, Tourville & Nullmeyer, 1998; Nullmeyer & Spiker, 1999) have
shown that there is variability in performance processes and outcomes among even the
most experienced aircrews. The data analysis from the present study provides more data
on experienced/novice decision-making processes and also extends the analysis to
provide additional metacognitive and inferential data on several variables not targeted in
similar combinations in other studies with military aviators. The findings o f this study
may shed more light on why some aircrews succeed in a given situation while others do
not. Additionally, the study research design, methodology and results could be useful in
complementing other specific measures o f performance, measures o f effectiveness
research, and training applications that have only used explicit data. Finally,
interpretations from analyzed data captured in this domain-specific case study could be
constructive in providing generalizations that contribute to individual and team
behavioral decision theory. Results o f the study were also used as feedback to the
training command and squadrons.
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Summary
Current administrative and training approaches do not routinely address aircrew
deficiencies in decision making. Improvements in training critical thinking skills will
most certainly lead to improvements in mission performance, saved equipment, and
ultimately, saved lives. Investigations that capture effective cognitive approaches,
thought protocols, and performance behaviors o f the most successful aircrews in timecritical decision making situations require combined data collection and analysis
methodologies. This research study integrated three naturalistic decision making models
(i.e., Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model, the Recognition/Metacognition (R/M)
model, and the Aviation Decision Process model) that allowed an in-depth examination
o f a single situation across and between novice and more experienced aircrews. This
framework assisted in the discovery o f rich, thematic connections between aircrew
experience levels and decision processes and outcomes.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction
Despite training military personnel in analytical and procedural approaches to
decision making, these strategies do not consistently result in optimal performance under
varying dynamic conditions with variable degrees o f complexity and stress. Emerging
analyses from recent research studies (Pounds & Fallesen, 1995; Pascual & Henderson,
1997; Zsambok, 1997; Bainbridge, 1999) have found that military personnel are using a
recognitional approach to find solutions when they have had an experience with a similar
problem type. Although other decision-making strategies are commonly used, the
recognitional, or adaptive, naturalistic decision-making style has been found to dominate
in dynamic environments. Findings from these decision-making studies have determined
that expert decision-makers naturally leaned toward using experienced-based approaches
rather than time consuming, concurrent comparisons o f options. Using the perspective
that risky decision making is highly sensitive to variations in the task environment,
Payne (1985) suggests that an approach for studying risky choice involves examining
several stages o f information processing behavior that are highly contingent upon task
and context variables.

17
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Cognitive approaches to decision making that focus on information processing
have become a more dominant force over normative decision theory in recent years as
reported by Maule (1985). The focus for much o f the research has been, and continues to
be, along two paths. First, an information processing focus to identify the separate stages
o f information processing and explain how each operates. Second, a bigger picture focus
on “complex cognitive skills like problem solving and considering how stages operate
and interact in the execution o f these skills” (p. 62).
Humphreys and Berkeley (1985) point out that one area that has received little
attention is the motivation behind preferred decision-making strategies o f individuals
within a team that may affect team performance. They suggest it is important to
investigate “where uncertainty enters into the process o f conceptualizing a decision
problem, thus enabling discussions on how it is handled by the decision maker at each
point” (p.258). In real life decision problems, individuals conceptualize decision
problems and then gage their ability to act upon an uncertain situation. To manage the
inherent uncertainty, individuals select from coping mechanisms such as trial and error,
use o f feedback, and treating uncertain parts o f the decision problem as certain to attempt
to manage a resolution.
Theoretical Framework
Within the literature examined, four processes underpin the theoretical
framework o f the research: adaptive decision-making strategies, situational awareness,
and effects o f experience on aircrew performance, and team performance and evaluation.
These four areas will be discussed as they relate to the research proposed to examine the
influence o f experience in situational assessment and decision making with experienced
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and novice aircrews in a situation involving uncertainty, high stakes, and time constraints
in a representative naturalistic setting.
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) is the study o f how people use their
experience to make decisions in field settings (Zsambok, 1997) and this approach is
“often informed by practical problems as opposed to testing hypotheses derived from
theories” (p. 12). There are several features that distinguish the descriptive theories
associated with naturalistic decision making from analytical or procedural approaches to
problem solving or decision making under conditions o f risk. In time-critical situations
where information is uncertain, a simplified task-shedding strategy that includes
tradeoffs between speed and accuracy is often used. The variation in decision-making
strategy used by experienced decision makers results in selection o f the first option that
satisfies immediate requirements as compared to more analytical or procedural decision
making approaches (Klein, 1993; Orasanu, 1999). The NDM approach calls for this
phenomenon to be studied within meaningful contexts using participants with a range o f
experience in the domain studied as distinguished from normative models o f decision
making that originated for use in economics and statistics.
The naturalistic, or adaptive, decision-making strategy is a more useful approach
to studying decision making under stress in aviation than traditional research offered
with normative analytical strategies (e.g., Baysian probability theory). NDM provides a
framework for meaningful, relevant research structure and interpretation o f study results.
The following criteria have been established for using the NDM approach for research:
(a) context rich circumstances, (b) the use o f expert participants, (c) the purpose o f
research is to discover strategies rather than trying to detect deviations from rational
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standard, and (d) the locus o f interest within decision episode includes situational
awareness rather than a restriction to the choice alone (Zsambock 1993, 1997).
A number o f NDM theories have been examined in military and aircrew settings.
Decision making analyses (Cohen & Freeman, 1996; Lipshitz 1995; Sarter & Woods,
1997; Kuperman, 1998; Leedom, Adelman, Murphy, 1998) have been conducted to gain
insight into how military decision makers reacted to situations and generated responses,
and to determine what kind o f information was seen as significant to the decisions.
Several models o f naturalistic decision making strategy have been advanced in the last
decade that assist in explaining real-world decision-making. Naturalistic decision
making models and theories maintain that the decision maker’s expertise plays a central
role in recognizing that a problem exists, in shaping the problem and in responding to the
problem (Zsambok, 1997).
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) Models
Naturalistic decision models are used to investigate, describe, and predict
decision-making styles across domains and provide the theoretical framework for this
study. O f primary interest is work by Klein (1989,1993,1997) that acknowledges use o f
other decision styles, such as analytic or option comparison, but emphasizes that these
are less effective in time critical or high stress situations. As Klein points out, the issue
is "how people develop and use experience, and the types o f strategies that are adapted to
take advantage o f experience" (2000, p.165). Klein (1997) found that people tend to
follow what appears to be their “instincts” or their “gut reaction” in time-critical,
unfamiliar situations in order to save tune and effort in situational assessment and in
comparing options when time is short and stakes are high.
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Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model. The dominant model used to
examine naturalistic decision making is the Recognition-Primed (RPD) model (Klein et
al., 1986) that underscores the importance o f domain-specific knowledge or experience
required to generate and evaluate an effective course o f action in a time-critical situation.
This three step descriptive model o f naturalistic decision making focuses on situational
assessment required to accurately classify an unfamiliar situation rather than trying to
determine which option will most likely result in a successful outcome. In the first step,
once the problem has been appropriately classified the problem solver can then look for
patterns or similarities to other situations in which he or she was able to negotiate a
successful outcome.
The RPD model traces the use o f the decision maker’s experience in guiding this
initial step and focuses on the decision maker’s expertise o f domain knowledge (i.e.,
critical cues and causal factors). This model differs from the approach taken in the
classical model o f decision making which requires the decision maker to “decompose the
situation into basic elements and perform analyses and calculations on the elements. The
model departs most sharply from the majority o f classical models o f decision making in
its attempt to trace the use o f experience” (Beach, Chi, Klein, Smith & Vicente, 1997, p.
30).
The adaptation by the decision-maker to a naturalistic approach serves to reduce
information overload, confusion, and assists in establishing accurate expectations. The
second step o f the RPD model is to select from a serial presentation a solution that will
work. The final step in the model requires a mental rehearsal o f the action to identify
potential problems (Lipshitz, 1995). In. this model, rule-based decisions require the least
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amount o f cognitive work while multiple responses that must be evaluated in light o f
constraints and outcomes require more work (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). The
greatest amounts o f cognitive work are required i f no response options are available and
a response must be invented and evaluated for accuracy. This RPD model provides a
frame for identifying weak links and biases in aviation decision-making processes.
Recognitional/Metacognitive (R/M) model. Another area o f analysis in decision
making is concerned with the way people characterize circumstances or assess situations.
Cohen, Freeman, & W olf (1996) argue that the standard normative approaches o f
assessing outcomes on the dimensions o f its subjected value or utility and its perceived
likelihood o f occurrence or subjective probability, as represented by the subjective utility
theory or Baysian probability theory, miss the capability o f decision makers to construct
stories to use their experience to consider pieces o f evidence in context. Rather, the
assessment o f information is weighed in the context o f the plausibility o f a selfconstructed “story” rather than taking the average o f the weighted items to construct
probability estimates that are problematical and time consuming to use. The
Recognitional/Metacognitive (R/M) model serves as an extension o f the descriptive RPD
model by adding another framework in which to study naturalistic decision making,
“metarecognition is a cluster o f skills that support and go beyond the recognitional
processes in situational assessment...” (Cohen, Freeman & Thompson, 1997, p. 258).
The R/M model integrates meta-level controlled recognitional schemas used by decision
makers to self critique then mental processes (i.e., assess response for

p ro b le m s

of

incompleteness, unreliability, or conflict), correct, and apply a “quick test” to give
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insight into adjustments they may need to make to take advantage o f available resources
and opportunities (Cohen & Freeman, 1996; Cohen et al., 1997).
Aviation Decision Process (ADP) model. Orasanu and Fischer (1997) developed
an Aviation Decision Process (ADP) model, is also based on RPD model, which served
as a frame for analyzing crew performance in the simulator. The ADP model is a
conceptual framework that allows “for the prediction o f which decisions demand the
greatest amount o f cognitive work, and where decision errors are most likely” (Orasanu,
1997, p.49). This model consists o f two major components: ambiguity in situational
assessment and uncertainty in choosing a course o f action.
Using a combination o f observations o f flight crews performing in high fidelity
simulators and the Aviation Safety Reporting System database, Orasanu and Fischer
(1997) conducted research on the relationship between stressors, decision errors, and
accidents. The investigation integrated decision event data from major commercial
airline mishap analyses from 1982 through 1997 with decision strategy in context data
from two separate simulator studies. The result o f this effort was the creation o f a
decision event taxonomy that includes only components that are observable in crew
performance. Orasanu (1997) concludes that the combined study analysis discovered
that more effective crews were more flexible in their “application o f a varied repertoire
o f strategies” while less effective crews “did not appear to distinguish among the various
types o f decisions, applying the same strategies in all cases regardless o f variations in
their demands” (p. 356). The Aviation Decision model is tailored to this taxonomy and
includes a range o f decision-making strategies from “rapid intuitive decisions to
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analytic, option comparison, and creation o f novel solutions for unfamiliar problems”
(Flin, p. 2, 1998).
Experience and Performance Differences
Research has indicated a need to identify the effect o f different experience levels
on team behavior and performance because studies done to extract training needs from
individual members has been unreliable depending on the experience level a team
member has with a particular behavior. “Research grounded in normative decision
models tends to ignore the enormous power conferred by domain expertise” (Orasanu,
1993, p. 152) that is critical in crew time and workload reduction. This finding is
supported by Cohen & Freeman (1996) who discovered related evidence that experience
in efficient encoding and retrieval o f domain-specific information is critical to
interpretation o f vague/nondiagnostic cues along with cues that may also be conflicting
or difficult to interpret in context. Additionally, research has shown that metacognitive
skills o f experts are superior to novices. These skills include self-monitoring skills,
better structure o f domain knowledge (Patel & Groen, 1991) as well as the superior
ability to perceive meaningful patterns and to retrieve domain-relevant facts (Glaser &
Chi, 1988). Experts are more likely to terminate a problem solving strategy that is not
meeting situational requirements (Larkin, 1983) because they are using their highly
developed metacognitive skills.
Comparing Expert and Novice Performance
Orasanu and Fischer (1992) found that more effective commercial airline crews
reduced communications as their workload demand increased and when commands were
issued the content o f the communication was directed towards future events. In another
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study on the effect o f experience level on decision outcomes o f commercial airline pilots
Stokes, Kemper and Kite (1997) used desktop flight simulation and cognitive testing to
test the adequacy o f traditional views o f decision making in aviation. This research
found that although experienced commercial pilots generated 30% more action
alternatives than novice pilots and were far more likely (71% o f the time) to carry out the
first option that satisfied the circumstance, the experience level o f the pilot was not the
best predictor o f decision-making performance in the scenario; rather it was the number
o f relevant cues detected.
Prince, Hartel, and Salas (1992) conducted an empirical study using military
aviators. Thirty crews o f undergraduate Naval aviators, o f different experience levels,
were used to investigate the relationship between team decision making-strategies and
performance. There were two major findings o f this investigation that are most relevant
to this study. First, some crews tended to use the same strategy for all decisions they had
to make in the cockpit; usually these were the least experienced crews. Second, the same
strategy for decision-making is not equally effective for all decisions.
Team/Aircrew Performance and Evaluation
Although decision-making data is the primary focus o f this study, it cannot be
researched in isolation. Most successful decision-making strategies in organizations are
dependent on assessing the current situation and determining/predicting which
information will prove most useful in meeting immediate goals (Janis, 1989). Similarly,
the interplay between decision-making, situational assessment, and crew coordination are
primary dynamics in safety o f flight, management o f emergencies and critical decisions
in the cockpit, hi aviation contexts it is essential to consider the process o f team

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

coordination as it affects cockpit situational awareness, shared problem models, decision
making processes and decision outcomes. Effective crew communication and
coordination are integral to the interpretation, exchange, and use o f situational cues and
are a major focus for the collection and analysis o f the data related to flight crew
performance.
Results o f a meta-analysis (Hartel, Smith & Prince, 1991) o f Navy and Marine
Corps mishaps that occurred between 1980-1990 revealed that decision-making errors
contributed to 188 mishaps, problems in situational awareness contributed to 229
mishaps, and crew coordination errors contributed to 316 mishaps during the 10 year
period covered by the meta analysis are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.
Meta Analysis o f Class “A” Naval Aviation Mishaps (1980-1990)
Type of Error
Contributing Factor in Percentage of
Total Class “A” Mishaps

Crew

Situational

Decision

Coordination

Awareness

Making

80%

60%

50%

Additionally, research conducted by the Naval Air Warfare Center examined
these constructs and determined that (a) training in these complex cognitive, advanced
team skills needed to be mission and context specific and that (b) these skills were
perishable, thus requiring refresher training. Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas and
Volpe (1993) conclude that theorizing about team performance and training has not
yielded generalizable principles that have practical application. This is so partly because
o f the complexity o f the team arena and in part because o f the number o f variables and
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constructs that must be considered in the study o f teams in their dynamic work
environments.
Approaches to Team Research
Several empirical approaches to increasing knowledge o f team behavior and
strategies in measuring team performance are briefly discussed below as they relate to
the theme o f understanding and measuring team performance. The first two studies
examined the use cognitive approaches to investigate links between team members’
thinking processes and perceptions o f team behavior importance. The third and fourth
studies addressed the need for further theoretical development through applied research
with a focus on the construct validity o f measures o f teamwork. This research uses
military aircrews in simulated missions to address requirements to clarify and measure
those process variables that are important to team functioning. A similar series o f studies
conducted with United States Air Force aircrews focused on measuring a wide range o f
individual and team processes as they relate to mission outcomes. Other research
methodology and data analyses techniques discussed were employed in investigating
team performance in incident management and modeling experiments that generated and
validated mathematical models to predict optimal fusion o f information for team
performance are presented.
Team member experience levels and teamwork knowledge. A study by Rentsch,
Heffner & Duffy (1994) explored the relationship between teamwork knowledge, or
teamwork schemas, and team experience. This research investigated team members with
varying levels o f experience to determine whether this variable o f experience played a
role in teamwork conceptualization and subsequent team behavior. The methodologies
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used in. this investigation o f teamwork knowledge in relation to teamwork experience
were nontraditional to the organizational science literature. Although the methods used
were “based on methods accepted by cognitive and education scientists who study
schemas” (p. 455) practical implications from this study, which are “consistent with
contemporary expert-novice literature” (Rentsch et al., 1994, p. 450), suggests that team
training should be designed and delivered based on a person’s prior teamwork
knowledge and experiences. Additionally, the authors conclude that organizational
managers and team leaders need to consider potential team members’ experience levels
when making team assignments. These authors deduced that if team members think
about work differently depending on their level o f experience, then team training should
be focused toward team experience level. One o f the limitations o f this study that has
implications for future research is that a median split was used to differentiate higher and
lower self-reported team experience levels o f participants. Researchers may need to
identify other means to measure experience levels o f individuals other than assignment
to, and time spent on, various teams.
The team literature reviewed recognizes an established need to institute metrics
for identifying critical team training needs. The purpose o f the Baker and Salas (1996)
study was to investigate the effects o f experience on perceptions o f team behavior
importance in accomplishing a mission. In their literature review Baker and Salas found
that “the effects o f experience have been documented for individual task s. . . but
research has yet to investigate the extent to which team member experience affects
perceptions o f team behavior importance” (Baker & Salas, 1996, p. 238). In the Baker
and Salas study with aviators, five dimensions o f team behavior commonly used in task
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and team performance analysis (i.e., criticality o f error, difficulty, time spent, difficulty
in learning, and importance for training) were rated by pilots on questionnaires
developed to reflect specific teamwork requirements. These requirements were
previously generated from a series o f critical incident interviews with military pilots.
Respondents included U.S. Navy instructor and student pilots randomly selected from a
primary flight training organization. Pilots with varying degrees o f flight experience
used a seven-point relative rating scale to rate the five dimensions as they related to team
behavior in their aircraft. Data were analyzed by correlating each behavioral dimension
(dependent variables) with the pilot’s overall importance rating. Job experience served
as the independent variable.
In general, results o f the study support the hypothesis that experience level would
factor into team members’ emphasis in the importance o f various team dimensions. Less
experienced crewmembers placed greater emphasis on difficulty on performing a team
behavior while more experienced crewmembers judged time spent performing a behavior
to have more criticality in overall team behavior importance. However, it is important to
note that the less experienced aviators emphasized difficulty in performing a task rather
than learning the task as posited by the first hypothesis in this research. These results
suggest, “different team behaviors should be the target o f training, depending on the
experience level o f the trainees” (Baker & Salas, 1996, p. 243).
Team performance measurement. A study by Reinartz (1993) explored issues in
the development o f methodology and analysis techniques to study how teams cope with
multi-fault incidents. To achieve the aim o f the team behavior research Reinartz
explained that “it was necessary to develop both (a) a methodology to obtain behavioral
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data and (b) analysis techniques to elucidate knowledge about this behavior which could
be applied to the design o f control rooms, procedures, and training systems” (1993, p. I).
In preparing the experimental design, a literature review included identification o f the
methodological approaches to studying complex decision making, procedural tasks, and
protocols for data collection in a nuclear power plant. Actual workplace observations
were used to create complex procedural scenarios for use in the experiment. During the
experiment, scenarios were videotaped to ensure all data were collected. Additionally, to
ensure a robust cognitive process trail, operators verbalized procedures that might have
interfered with task-related interaction and led to confusion among team members. The
verbal protocols collected from the operators as they performed their work greatly
assisted in the analysis o f teams’ cognitive processes (i.e., planning, decision-making and
problem solving) related to coping behavior. However, Reinartz discovered that sub
problem areas (e.g., defining team strategies, information choices and obstacles) were
difficult to define with the data analysis approaches used. So through what the author
describes as “... an iterative process o f becoming more familiar with data, especially
technical aspects o f an incident handling” (1993, p. 7) a clearer direction to analysis
evolved. Determining specific team behaviors o f interest and their levels o f description
were accomplished using an “heuristic strategy o f an ad hoc level o f description and
making use o f all the discernible and recognizably useful information” (p. 7). A
hierarchical task analysis was then developed and used to build up hierarchical team goal
structures. This methodology, in concert with videotaping scenarios, assisted in
examining individual and team activities in a chronological order. Reinartz also
discovered that recording start and end times o f operator behavior that added a
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significant cognitive contribution to the team’s subgoal/goal revealed differences in
operators’ strategies in handling a complex problem. This unconventional approach was
found more useful than previous methodologies in documenting team behavior in
complex non-procedural situations.
The same concern for the precision required in understanding the nature o f
effective team performance was addressed in a series o f experiments designed and
carried out by Kleinman, Luh, Pattipati, and Serfaty (1992). A major objective o f this
endeavor was to show that the normative-descriptive modeling approach to decision
making, previously used in static situations, is a valid and powerful method for building
quantitative models for team performance.
The first o f a series o f experiments was designed using two independent variables
that the normative model predicted would affect the information-combining processing.
U.S. Navy shipboard tactical teams were used to record activities that included the
blending and integration o f different internal and external sources o f information. Data
analysis by Kleinman et al. (1992) identified four cognitive biases in the team
information fusion process that are useful in accurately predicting how team members
weigh and combine sequential information from distributed sources o f varying quality.
Using mathematical models team member biases were quantified and integrated into a
normative-descriptive model that predicted the actual experimental data far better than
the normative model did. As the researchers concluded, there was a significant amount
o f knowledge gained in the insight into the human decision-making process by altering
the normative model to capture human behavior. The subject’s information sources,
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including other team members, were received by the subjects with varying degrees o f
bias.
The findings o f this research indicate a need to make team members aware o f
their potential to use poor decision-making strategies through faulty information
integration. As reported by Kleinman, et al. (1992), subjects in groups o f two and three
in these studies had a pattern of: (a) consistently overweighing the most recent
information; (b) continually placing some weight on prior knowledge; (c) not
discounting common prior knowledge in communication updates; and (d) undervaluing
the information received from their partner(s). These findings are important in providing
a framework for further research in studying limitations and biases that may limit
decision-makers.
Although data collection on team performance is usually restricted to simulated
environments and controlled settings, this has not been as much o f a restraint to research
in team performance as the lack o f measurements available to validate applicable teamrelated theories and models and decision strategies. According to Fowlkes, Lane, Salas,
Franz and Oser (1994) the “slow headway made in understanding team performance may
be attributed in large part to the lack o f sound measurement approaches. Significant
advancement requires theoretically based and psychometrically sound methods of
observing and quantifying team performance” (p. 48).
The purpose o f the team process measurement experiment by Brannick, Prince,
Prince, and Salas (1995) was to document an approach used to develop and evaluate a set
o f tools to measure team process. Process was chosen over outcomes because, “in
theory, process variables can be altered or effectively managed more easily than outcome
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variables” (p. 642). In effect, process variables may present a “truer, richer picture o f
team functioning than outcome variables and they show promise for improving team
functioning” (p. 641). The three central questions o f this study were: (a) can judges
provide psychometrically sound evaluations o f teamwork (b) can those evaluations be
correlated with more traditional expert evaluation, and (c) do such evaluations show
good convergent and discriminant validity over occasions (i.e., scenarios)?
Participants in this study were 51 teams o f Navy instructor and student pilots who
were assigned randomly to one o f 18 graduate student judges who evaluated crew
coordination in each team in two simulated flight scenarios. The process indices used in
this research were communication, cooperation (cohesion) and coordination as they are
related to team effectiveness. In addition to subject matter expert scores two other
methods o f data collection were used. Two forms were also created and used in an
attempt to attain a high degree o f convergent and discriminant validity across judges.
These forms were used to assign observable behaviors to specific dimensions and link
behaviors in a dimension to evaluations o f the behavior.
Data analysis was conducted to compare instructor and student pilot performance
in the two scenarios using individual two-sample independent r-tests. Results o f aircrew
scores showed the means o f instructor pilot ratings were generally larger than the mean
ratings given to the student pilots in the same scenario and between scenarios. Although
researchers refer to the rating difference as “significant”, they did not report the
magnitude o f the statistic o f difference between the two sample means that would justify
rejecting the null hypothesis.
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Data-based training. Evaluation o f aircrews in a simulator by experts using
evaluative criteria has been validated in many aviation-related studies. Most recently,
this methodology has assisted in finding major effects between aircrew coordination and
performance processes and mission outcomes in several aircrew studies in the United
States Air Force (Spiker, et al, 1996; Nullmeyer et al., 1999).
Several U. S. Air Force-sponsored studies using a behavior-based and data driven
approach have begun to pay major dividends for tactical military aircrew training. An
Air Force sponsored experimental study conducted by Thompson, Tourville, Spiker, and
Nullmeyer (1999) observed mission qualified crews as they planned and executed a
mission in a high fidelity simulator. The purpose o f this study was to examine the
relationship between Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) skills (which include
situational awareness and decision-making) and successful mission performance.
Findings o f this study using sixteen experienced MH-53J special operations aircrews
were consistent with previous U.S. Air Force studies in various platforms such as the C-5
(Spiker, Tourville, Bragger, Dowdy, & Nullmeyer; 1999) and B-52 (Thorton, Kaempf,
Zeller, & McAnulty, 1992) that represented an advancement in a practical descriptive
approach to investigating and documenting aircrew behavior and performance. In the
Thompson et al. study (1999), sixteen fleet crews’ CRM behaviors and mission
performance were independently rated by two Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) during
specific mission phases using behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS). Overall
CRM ratings were then correlated with overall mission performance ratings to assess the
role o f CRM in mission performance. This study adds to the previous work that
identified relevant crew CRM behaviors as different for diverse aircraft and mission
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performance. Although the research methodology was weakened by lack o f inter-rater
reliability since only one rater was used for each criterion within the CRM and
performance variables, the data collection instruments used are a valuable addition to
both training and research methodology. Evaluation instruments defined specific aircrew
behaviors at different phases o f flight/the mission that consistently and reliably predict
effective flight and mission accomplishment. The findings in this study were consistent
with previous research using military aviators as study subjects. The conclusions o f the
study that have training and operational importance are: (a) CRM can be measured and
analyzed when defined in terms o f measurable behaviors, (b) CRM and mission
performance are highly related (75% o f variance accounted for and statistically reliable
(p <. 001), (c) the quality o f the mission preparation predicts performance during mission
execution, and (d) the specific behaviors associated with high or low CRM ratings were
typically not covered in traditional Air Force training programs.
Summary
As discussed, the literature review describes a wide range o f perspectives on
designing and conducting decision making research in a team environment. The
combination o f theoretical frameworks and methodologies for studying the effect o f
experience on performance has been advanced but has only begun to meet the challenges
o f studying individuals and teams in their dynamic work environments. It is apparent
that data collection methodologies and analytical techniques need to be improved and
new ones generated to meet further research requirements as well as to generate effective
training in adaptive decision making.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to describe in more detail than Chapter I the data
collection and analytical strategies for this mixed design comparative case study. The
study design participants, procedures, instruments, and data analyses are discussed.
Techniques o f data management are described, as are statistical assumptions and
analytical techniques.
Design and Rationale
The design of this study employed both quantitative and qualitative
methodologies to gain insight into themes that emerged in aircrew/team decision-making
strategies and performance. This comparative case study approach integrated data
collection and analysis strategies. Theories o f naturalistic and aviation decision making
processes, expert/novice performance, and team training literature guided the research.
Quantitative data analysis demonstrated the differences in novice and
experienced aircrew process and outcome performance that were then decomposed
descriptively. This strategy provided for a richer understanding o f the data and is used
extensively by behavioral and social scientists (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The focus
o f data analysis was on the effects o f aircrew prior knowledge and experience in the
detection, assessment, and risk management o f atypical situations in-varying degrees o f
uncertainty and time constraints.

36
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This study used a within case analysis, as typical for multiple case treatment, and
provided a thematic description o f each crew group experience. As expected, each
successive case analysis informed a deeper understanding o f subsequent analyses so an
iterative approach was undertaken that guided a thematic cross-case analysis. The
qualitative structure o f this study centered on the use o f an inquiry method that was
distinctively suited to reveal the nature o f the circumstances and the thoughts
experienced by aircrews. The context rich environment forced aircrews to assess risk
and manage non-standard approaches to problem resolution by recognizing and dealing
with ambiguous cues and multiple failures in a series o f dynamic situations.
Data collection and analysis triangulation used a diversity o f sampling and
analytical strategies by multiple observers, interviewers, and analysts. Aircrew
experience level served as the dependent variable for the study. The independent
variables were process ratings in seven observable scenario tasks as well as outcome
performance rankings based on final disposition o f the crew and the aircraft.
The following study hypotheses and research questions framed the relationship
between aircrew experience and phenomena related to effective aircrew situational
assessment and decision making under varying degrees o f uncertainty and time
constraints:
Hypothesis It Experienced aircrews will receive better process ratings (i.e., technical
skills, workflow, information sharing, consensus building, operational risk assessment
and management and back-up routine) than novices in handling a specific in-flight
emergency situation involving uncertainty.
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Hypothesis 2: Decisions (i.e., outcome rankings) made by experienced aircrews in an
uncertain situation involving a specific in-flight emergency are rated as being o f higher
quality than those made by novice aircrews.

Hypothesis 3: Process ratings are correlated with the decision outcome ratings for a
specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty.

Research Question 1: What adaptive recognitional/metacognitive decision-making
strategies emerge from aircrews in a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty?
Research Question 2: In what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns
differ among successful and less than successful aircrews challenged with a specific in
flight emergency involving uncertainty?

Research Question 3: What characteristics/factors seem to define the most successful
aircrew outcomes in a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty?
Participants
This research study was conducted in a field setting at a naval aviation training
facility using active duty aircrews in a high fidelity flight simulator. The target
populations for this study were experienced and novice aviators (pilots and naval flight
officers (NFO’s) who serve as copilot tactical coordinators (COTAC's)). This study was
limited to an S-3B aircraft non-tactical mission using only two o f the three
crewmembers. (The third crewmember serves as a weapons system officer (TACCO) in
tactical environments.) For the purpose o f this study, the non-essential TACCO position
was unoccupied. Since the study scenario did not involve a tactical mission element the
primary responsibility for the Naval Flight Officer, or COTAC, was to serve as the
navigator and to provide safety o f flight back up for the pilot.

i ■
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Sixteen 2-person crews (1 pilot and 1 COT AC) were represented in the final data
set in this study. Eight crews were made up o f students nearing the end o f initial S-3B
qualification training. The other 8 crews were experienced aviators undergoing annual
refresher training. Operational flight trainer and student availability were the prime
considerations for novice crew participation. Trainer availability and annual flight
standardization (i.e., NATOPS check) requirements were the main considerations o f
crews paired and scheduled from fleet squadrons.
Novice pairings o f aviators for the non-syllabus event were in the same class
group and were o f equal military rank with similar flight hour levels. Experienced
participants in the study represented four fleet squadrons and one aircraft carrier ship’s
company staff billet. Fleet squadrons were requested to pair the most experienced pilots
and COT AC’s. Most experienced participants used the study scenario as part o f their
annual NATOPS re-qualification training requirements. Fleet pairings o f aviators
generally had higher ranking, more experienced pilots paired with lower ranking
COTAC’s and all but one crew o f fleet experienced participants were crewed with
members o f their own squadron.
Attrition from the Study
All participants that completed the scenario agreed to remain in the study.
However, two fleet crews that completed the study scenario and the debriefrinterview
were replaced in the data set because instructors allowed them to land on alternate
runways at the home field. This option deviated from the scenario structure and intent to
place the crews in an extremis naturalistic decision environment for the final scenario

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

event. In order to control for unequal sample sizes two additional experienced crews
were obtained.
Participant Demographics
Study participants were drawn from the S-3 aviator population and ranged in age
from 24 to 41 years old. All aircrews consisted o f one pilot and one COTAC who had
completed basic naval aviation flight training between 1983 and 2001. Novices had less
than 100 hours in the S-3B. Experienced crews had between 700 and 5,000 flight hours
in the S-3 A/B. The S-3 A was a previous variant o f the S-3B modified to include
enhanced tactical capabilities in the early 1990’s. Although many o f the “backend”
systems were upgraded, there was little done to change the cockpit, the aircraft handling
characteristics, or the “wings and engines” -related performance capabilities o f the
aircraft Accordingly, senior pilots and COTAC’s with experience in both the A and B
models were considered to simply have a greater number o f hours in the S-3 aircraft.
Combined crew flight hours of crew assignments for the study scenario are
displayed in Table 2. Crews I through 8 were novice crews and crews 9 through 16 were
fleet experienced crews.
Table 2
Paired Pilot and COTAC Crews’ Combined S-3 Flight Time
Assigned
Crew
N um ber
Combined
C rew Flight
H ours

t

90

88

3

4

5

6

T

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

52

70

183

180

130

54

3050

4200

1570

1630

4600

1600

1650

5650

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41
The participants’ total aircraft model flight hours, simulator hours, and recency o f
simulator and flight times are reported in Table Ai, Appendix A. Table 3, below,
presents the range and mean o f S-3 flight time for both novice and experienced groups.
Table 3
Individual (Pilot and COTAC) and Combined Crew S-3 Flight Hours
Crew Level

Novice
Experienced

Pilot
R ange o f
H ours
12-80
650-3700

Pilot Mean
H ours
54
1569

COTAC
Range o f
Hours
24-100
730-2100

COTAC
Mean H ours
53
1425

Combined
Crew Range
52-183
1600-4600

Combined
Total Crew
Mean
52
1497

Representativeness o f the Sample
The representativeness o f both experienced and novice aircrews in the sample
population reflect the general range o f flight time in the S-3 community. The training
command sample o f novice aviators included 16 o f the 75 students that annually
complete the familiarization phase o f instruction at the Fleet Replacement Squadron
(FRS). The sixteen study participants represent approximately 20 % o f novice crews in
the S-3 community. Four of the ten S-3 fleet squadrons were represented in the study
sample and the eight crews o f two represented approximately 10 % o f the total front seat
aircrews (pilots and COTAC’s) assigned to fleet squadrons in the S-3 community.
Instructor/Subject Matter Expert Raters
Observers who were experienced flight and simulator instructors rated pilot and
COTAC crews’ process performance. Subject Matter Experts (SME’s), with at least five
years instructor experience and between 1100 and 2700 hours o f flight time in the S-3 A
and/or S-3B were personally selected to participate in this study based on their
reputations as exceptional, “non-threatening” instructors by both student and peer
evaluations that are conducted routinely at the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS). A
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total o f eight process raters (seven civilian and one military) used scenario-specific rating
instrument to evaluate participants. At least two pilot and two NFO (i.e., COTAC) raters
were used for each crew. Depending on availability, between one and four trained senior
evaluators participated in the actual simulator event and debrief/interview. Other process
raters evaluated aircrews from audio, visual and simulator instrument panel data
collected on the computer debriefing system that recorded the data during the event.
In order to control for experimenter-expectancy bias a group o f at least four
observers (several crews had five observers) rated process and an independent group o f
four outcome raters were used for the final outcome ranking to decrease learning of
influence techniques, to randomize expectancies, and to increase the generality o f results.
A fixed outcome data set for each crew were presented to the second set o f independent
raters (active duty and reserve) that were not involved in the study and were not assigned
to squadrons o f the study participants. Demographics for process raters are contained in
Table A2 o f Appendix A.
Protection o f Human Subjects
Administrative approval for conducting and publishing this study was sought
from cognizant authorities o f eight organizations: (a) the university from which the
doctoral degree will be granted, (b) the commander that oversees United States Pacific
Fleet Air Forces, (c) the administrative authority for S-3B fleet squadrons and training
simulators, and (d) the five squadrons from which participants in the study were
assigned. Appendix B contains the approval to conduct the study from the United States
Navy by the direction o f the Commander o f the Naval Air Force Pacific Fleet as well as
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the approval o f from the S-3 community leadership at North Island Naval air Station.
Appendix C contains the participant consent form.
All participants were told they could opt out o f the formal study after the
simulator event and still obtain an “o ff the record” debrief. All crews that participated in
the scenario agreed to remain in the study. Two crews were disqualified because
instructors during the scenario event used non-standard procedures. The researcher did
not receive any negative feedback: on the conduct o f the study from study participants or
their respective commands. The data collection environment provided a safe, realistic
venue to present and provide aircrews with multiple opportunities to assess and respond
to critical safety o f flight problems both during and after the simulator session.
Scenario Design Elements
Since it is usually optimal to have comparable degrees o f detail and precision in
the scenario design as are experienced in real world flight (Cook & Campbell, 1979) the
study scenario was designed to represent a combination o f actual atypical and emergency
events that have or could occur in the S-3B aircraft. Because “decision making is highly
contingent on the demands o f the task” (Payne, 1982, p. 382) the final study scenario
event design reflects a range o f dynamics associated with task demand to elicit different
types o f problem solving and judgment. A variety o f cues and situations were developed
for the study scenario to reflect elements and factors that are potential issues in the S-3
crews’ operational decision making environment. The naturalistic environment as
described by Orasanu and Connolly (1995) may include several or all o f the following:
(a) ill-structured problems, (b) uncertain dynamics, (c) changing, ill-defined or
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competing goals, (d) crew action/feedback loops, (e) time stress, (0 high risk, multiple
players, and (g) consideration, o f organizational goals and norms.
Using the naturalistic decision making elements as guidance, the specific contexts
for scenario tasks were obtained from a combination o f (a) recent S-3B mishap and
training data, (b) an S-3B cognitive task analysis for decision skills curriculum
development, and (c) the framework developed by Hammond, Hamm, Grassia &
Pearson (1997) that describes the cognitive properties that distinguish intuitive and
analytical approaches to decision making. As recommended by Hammond et al. (1997)
intuition-inducing task conditions were used to set the final decision apart from previous
tasks. The intuition-generating characteristics that set the final decision environment
apart from previous events were as follows:
•

a shorter response period allowed

•

a larger number o f cues required

•

simultaneous cues given

•

perceptual rather than objective measurement o f cues (i.e., ill-structured)

•

a low rather than high decomposition o f the task required

•

no organizing principle available from standard operating procedures (SOP’s),
previous training, or experience (i.e., unstructured)

•

a low rather than high certainty that the task(s) could be accomplished safely and
within established procedures

A synopsis o f the specific naturalistic decision elements and appropriate
procedural, tactical, and strategic crew responses (S. K. Hunt, personal correspondence,
December 10, 2001) associated with each o f the seven scenario trigger cues in the study
scenario is contained in Appendix: D. The elements associated with each o f the seven
process ratings were developed and reviewed by four senior instructors. The review took
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into consideration the instructors’ knowledge o f both experienced and novice aircrews’
time to acknowledge recognition o f problem cues, time to troubleshoot aircraft
indications/respond to cues/information, and manage and coordinate accumulated and
projected tasks.
The prototype scenario design was tested with two novice and two experienced
aircrews to validate data collection categories, criteria, and protocols and included
determination of: (a) the strength o f trigger stimuli in the scenario events, (b)
requirements for performance evaluation criteria, (c) validation o f most pertinent aircrew
and aircraft parameter outcome criteria, (d) post-hoc aircrew interview/debrief protocol
and questions, (e) reliability o f digital playback file capture, and (f) the most robust
multivariate statistic for data analysis.
Based on the initial evaluation o f the scenario, modifications were made to the
scenario brief and instructor protocol guidelines to eliminate aircrews’ selection o f
alternative courses o f action (i.e., land on a different runway). Additionally, adjustments
made in the scenario event stressors forced more rapid rates o f data processing and
decision making by aircrews in each subsequent scenario event.
Process Variable Definitions
The scenario process variables were defined in a joint effort between the
researcher and senior instructors using previous S-3 mishaps, training trends, and prior
cognitive and skill task analysis results used for decision skills integration into the FRS
syllabus. Events were selected that induced or “triggered" procedural, analytical, and/or
an adaptive intuition-inducing cognitive state based on the task: properties and time
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available. Table 4 summarizes task elements related to each o f the seven scenario events
observed for process scores.
Table 4
Scenario Event Trigger Conditions, Problem Structure, and Associated Task
Requirements
Event
Sequence
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Cue /Trigger
Normal flight
instruments
Illumination o f
flashing red
Master Warning
Light and No 1
engine Starter
Light
Checklist

Structure of
Problem

Crew Task

N/A

Takeoff under normal
conditions
Master Caution
Complete emergency
Panel Lights in direct procedure using
Checklist as reference
line o f vision o f
Starter Light. Welldefined procedures
for safety o f flight.
Normal structure
Complete checklist. Dump
interrupted by Tower fuel.
Oil pressure gage
Ill-structured
Retard throttle to IDLE and
indication drops
significant safety o f
monitor engine. Crew unable
significantly in No. flight issue with only to follow procedure that
2 engine
remaining engine.
requires shut down o f engine to
preclude fire and possible loss
o f associated systems.
Deteriorating No.
Ill-structured under
Consider contingencies for
2 engine
extremis
single-engine approach and go(Attempts to re
around profiles.
light No. 1 engine)
Monitor No. 2 engine.
Selectively choose/abbreviate
sections o f checklists to
comply in time available.
Dump fuel if not done.
No arresting gear
Ill-structured under
Contingency planning- Brief
on only available
extremis
loss o f No. 2 engine. Brief
runway
wave-off and hook skip
contingencies.
Fouled deck at
Novel and
Crew must determine i f they
intersection o f
unstructured with
can land and stop by
runway
intersection.
immediate action
required.
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Outcome Variable Definitions
Instructors that assisted with the scenario design defined outcome variables a
priori. The variables that made up the final aircraft position and configuration “snap shot”
data were used to identify priorities in the quality o f the crews’ execution o f the final
event decision. The simulator data sets obtained from the computer debriefing system
display and data analysis software, reported in Appendix E, were used for the outcome
ranking o f all crews. The outcome data sets included: (a) airspeed, (b) altitude, (c) angle
o f attack, (d) flap position, (e) gear position, (f) hook position, (g) fuel remaining, (h)
speed brake position, (i) emergency hydraulics pump (EHP), (j) visual speed indicator
(VSI), (k) heading, and (I) geo position.
Final Scenario Design
The final scenario design established a simple baseline takeoff and departure
procedural decision that could be compared to less structured situations requiring more
complex decision making to resolve unclear and/or unstructured problems as the flight
scenario progressed. The last o f seven scenario events established a novel situation that
required a creative problem-solving decision strategy. The seven process scores are
based on the crews’ recognition o f and reactions to the events as sequenced in the study
scenario. As described earlier, the task condition for the final event was distinguished by
the greatest number o f intuition-generating characteristics (i.e., lack o f structure). The
novelty o f the truck in the runway on final approach leaves the crew with no standard
procedures or rules to guide them in their response. The study scenario events are
depicted on the scenario timeline in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Scenario timeline and event flow.
Sequence o f Procedures
Data were collected over a two-week period for novice crews and five-month
period for fleet crews. Upon reporting for the scheduled simulator event, participants
received a letter from the researcher with a brief explanation as to the nature o f the study
and the selection criteria for participants (i.e., experience level and no previous exposure
to the study scenario). After discussing the consent form with the participants and upon
receiving signed permission to use participant simulator and debrief data for study
purposes, a personal background data form was given to the participants to complete.
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Flight Simulator Scenario Protocol
Participants had 10 minutes to conduct a crewmember brief after the instructor
gave them the conditions for the scenario. The 20-minute scenario event was conducted
as outlined on the evaluation sheet. The study scenario was given under as similar as
possible conditions in the flight simulator for all crews. The instructor/raters used the
scenario event timeline as guidance for event cue initiation and for tower
communications. Instructors used their discretion to respond to crew inquiries and to
manage the seven scenario events within the 20-minute time allocation.
Data Collection and Replav Device
A prototype data collection device, customized for the S-3B operational flight
trainer, digitally captured flight simulator data and is depicted in Figure 2. This system
was used to digitally recall and display data from selected cockpit instruments and
controls, a three-dimensional model o f the aircraft, and an audio/video file o f the aircrew.

Figure 2. Digital debriefing system screen, display.
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Although the entire event was captured on a digital file, instructors were able to
“mark” specific portions o f the flight event for immediate access during the debrief to
aid both instructors and participants in the recall o f events and to support instructional
points. Field notes recorded aircraft geographical position flight path patterns and
served as a back-up to the digitally recorded files. After completion o f the scenario the
participants were escorted back to the briefing room and reminded that the
debrief/interview would be audiotaped. The 40 to 60-minute tape recorded
debrief/interview with the researcher and between one and up to four instructors, and up
to three instructors, was conducted in a debrief room with a debriefing station to replay
digital debrief files.
Debrief/Interview Protocol
During the debrief/interview, semi-structured questions were used to guide the
debrief interview. Crew and crewmember self-assessments were prompted using probe
questions originated (Klein et al., 1986) to elicit specific information about situational
awareness and decision elements. These questions were augmented by task-specific
instructor and researcher queries and comments. Participants’ post scenario
interview/debrief data were recorded and transcribed by the researcher and coded a
posteriori from interpretations o f those data. Content analysis o f decision processes
revealed by the participants in the post-scenario interview/debrief focused on participant
verbalization and self-assessment o f their reconstructed experiences (both apparent and
tacit). Baseline interview questions related to situational awareness issues and decision
strategies are found in the Instructor Guide (Appendix F). There was no mention o f
process ratings during the interview/debrief. Field notes were taken during the debrief
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by the researcher as a back up for the tape recording and to establish the position o f the
crewmember for transcription as their comments were audio taped.
During the debrief/interview relevant portions o f the flight event “marked” by
instructors was used to replay flight information (i.e., flight instrumentation, aircraft
aspect) as well as communications and crew behaviors. The digital files enabled
instructors and aircrews to access marked portions o f the flight for recollection and/or
clarification o f event experiences. The recall o f self-reported situational assessments and
judgments were obtained on a tape recorder for both individual and crew interactions. At
the completion o f the debrief/interview, the tape recorder was turned o ff so comments by
the researcher, instructors, and/or the participants could be made “o ff the record.” The
debrief concluded with delivery o f copies o f the signed consent forms to participants.
Procedures for Raters
Crew process performance data were obtained from operationalized study
variables in the flight scenario. Raters used the criteria established for the process
variables in the scenario instrument to guide their evaluations. Process raters also
independently recorded general observations o f the actual simulated event. Raters not
present for the event watched the digital audio/visual files o f the scenario session and
recorded their process ratings and general comments on the evaluation sheet for each
crew.
At the conclusion o f process data collection for all crews a separate set o f data
related solely to aircraft parameters, configuration, and spatial orientation in the final
“snapshot” o f the event was created. The final outcome data sets for the 12 crews were
de-identified o f crew numbers and replaced with randomly assigned alphabetical
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designators to eliminate a possible source of rater bias. These outcome data sets were
then presented to an independent group o f four outcome raters to rank order using their
expert judgment. The final outcome ranking process took 90 minutes and was facilitated
and observed by the researcher and one instructor. Each o f the four subject matter expert
raters first independently ranked crews on outcome data provided using a ranking sheet
that required written justification for the order o f their rankings. After individual
rankings were completed a discussion o f rating priorities and a multi-voting process was
used to gain rater consensus for a collective judgment o f the final outcome ranking o f all
crews. Outcome rater demographics and their independent and consensus outcome
rankings o f the sixteen aircrews are found in Appendix G.
Process Rating Instrument
Instructors used a scenario-specific evaluation instrument with a five-point
ordinal rating scale to measure process variables. Independent crew process performance
rating by expert observers was guided by criteria based on best practices associated with
crew coordination and diffusion o f tasks in events requiring sensitivity to a configuration
o f an entire profile o f cues, safety o f flight considerations, technical skills and decision
making skills. The study rating instruments reflected the evaluation o f group processes
and outcomes for a multi-crew aircraft. Rating criteria were designed to ensure as much
convergent and discriminant validity as possible across raters.
Process rating criteria were designed to generally capture multiple aspects of
crew behavior and degrees o f satisfactory workload sharing and operational risk
management with consideration o f safety o f flight, adherence to standard operating
procedures when practical, creative problem-solving, technical competency and crew
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coordination in different types o f problem solving contexts. Since group processes “are
not simply a sum o f individual processes (e.g., perception, attention, cognition) but are
categorically different and include communication, information transfer, management
processes, team problem solving and decision making” (Kanki, 1996, p. 136) team
dimensions were incorporated into both the specific and common flight evaluation
criteria.
The Team Dimensional Training (TDT) evaluation instrument validated with
Navy aircrews (Smith-Jentsch, Johnston & Payne, 1998) was modified for use as the
overall guidance for team rating criteria required for all study variables. The six cockpit
resource management (CRM) elements used to measure U.S. Air Force C-5 aircrew
proficiency (Spiker, et al., 1999) were also integrated into the overall aircrew process
performance criteria as well. Additionally, context-specific best practice standards were
identified in the rating instrument (Appendix F) to promote discriminant validity. These
standards were included in the scenario instructor guide timeline to direct raters to
established criteria for standard crew behaviors expected during each o f the seven
decision events.
Analysis o f Reliability o f Instructor Ratings
Snedecor’s analysis o f variance formula, derived from Fisher’s work on intraclass correlation (Ebel, 1951) was used to estimate the reliability for instructors’ averaged
ratings o f aircrew process performance, to validate rater inter-rater reliability, as well as
to validate the measurement instrument designed specifically for the study scenario.
Since individual ratings are less reliable than composite ratings the estimate o f reliability
o f average ratings instead o f individual ratings was used in this study to compute
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statistical significance o f data. The reliability o f those averaged ratings was o f primary
concern. Given that compared averages came from different groups o f four to five raters
the between raters variance was included as part o f the error terms. Appendix H contains
individual scenario event and summed process scores for all crews.
O f the seven process ratings listed in Table 5, it can be seen that in five areas the
averaged agreement coefficient o f raters (N=8) shows a high degree o f agreement within
the groups o f raters. Group averaged ratings are close to or exceed the .80 level o f
significance generally considered the standard for acceptable inter-rater reliability
(Cronbach, 1990). The two variables, take-off/departure and checklists interrupted, do
not meet Cronbach’s criterion for acceptable inter-rater reliability. In the take
off/departure event there was virtually no variability in the ratings across either raters or
crews. For the second variable, checklists interrupted, this scenario component
represented a broad range o f tasks interrelated with checklist discipline specific to this
scenario segment.

Table 5
Inter-rater Reliability Correlations o f Instructor Process Ratings o f Aircrews
Take-off/
Abnornal Checklists
Low Oil
Process
Departure
Engine
Interrupted
#2
Eng.
Evaluated

Approach
Plan

#1

Raters' r

.14

.84

.61

.89

.76

De
rigged
Gear
Plan
.76
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Data Collection
Data collected for this study included: (a) participant and aircrew demographic
information, (b) aircrew process performance ratings during the simulated flight event,
(c) simulator data including aircraft configuration and temporal measures o f aircrew
recognition o f low oil pressure mdication(s), (d) post-scenario participants) self-reported
performance issues and strategies from debrief/interview session, (e) simulator flight data
and audio/video recordings o f crew performance, and (f) researcher and subject maner
expert field notes. These data were analyzed for any significant relationships between
participant crew decision-making strategies and their final crew outcome ranks.
Cross-Case Comparison Analysis Strategy
Analysis o f qualitative data began with a content analysis o f the sixteen aircrews’
debrief/interview transcript data. This content analysis was then merged with instructor
observation comments, researcher field notes, raw and summed process ratings, and
outcome performance rank-ordered data to conduct a secondary concurrent integrated
analysis. This initial exploratory analysis included an “extreme case” comparative
analysis o f the overall highest and lowest performing aircrews in both experienced and
novice groups and identified the emerging constructs or themes associated with
individual and team attributes related to decision-making. As described by Tashakkori
and Teddlie, this type o f analysis strategy results in an initial “identification o f groups of
individuals who are similar to each other in some respect” (1998, p. 133). An additional
strategy for interpreting these data included a comparison o f participant aircrews’
heuristic rules to “optimal” rules provided by subject matter experts since investigation
o f heuristic permits the exam inatio n o f discrepancies between actual and optimal
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behavior which then raises questions regarding why such discrepancies exist (Einhom,
1980).
Statistical Assumptions
The goal o f the statistical tests was to explore for possibly demonstratively
different performance processes and results by comparing the sample means o f data
collected between and among the novice and experienced groups. The goal o f the
statistical tests was to validate the assumption that the crews with the greater number o f
flight hours would obtain better process and outcome ratings than the novice crews. The
alpha level used was at a 95-percent confidence interval to determine if relationships
existed among identified study variables (i.e., crew experience levels, crew process
measurements, and effectiveness measurements o f scenario outcome).
Chronology of Analysis
Inferences from the initial qualitative examination o f data expanded with
statistical analyses and further qualitative investigation. Data patterns and relationships
were explored using several frames o f reference. First, descriptive and inferential
statistical analyses (MANOVA) explored the effects o f crew experience on process
ratings and outcome rankings. The relationship between process and outcome scores
was also assessed. Second, comparative analyses were completed with the data related to
the central propositions of the study: (a) a non-parametric and multivariate analysis
(multiple ANOVA’s) provided construct validation and confirmed and expanded the
relational inferences made from the initial qualitative analysis, and (b) correlational
analysis using the ‘Tearson product momenf ’ explored data to identify process
characteristics that seemed to be related to outcome. Third, further qualitative
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decomposition o f all crew data related to process and outcome was conducted to
investigate supportive descriptive trends to determine if effects were limited to some
subset o f all areas considered m the study (e.g., Were scores uniformly pointing in the
same direction or did some appear more important than others?). Fourth, selected case
studies representing high, mid-range and low performing crews in both process and
outcome ranks were compared for differences in the integrative complexity o f each
aircrews’ decision-related metacognitive activity (i.e., information gathering/processing
and decision making), communications, etc. Participant remarks during debrief
interviews concerning their aviation skills (e.g., procedural, representational, flight
management, decision making, etc.) related to their reconstructed reality o f the scenario
process elements were used to confirm and expand the inferences derived from previous
data analyses.
Fifth, a more in-depth investigation o f the crews receiving the highest, mid-range,
and lowest process and outcome rankings was conducted to seek out differences in crew
decision making characteristics and functioning. A crew transcript o f major decision
points was developed from audio/video files o f each crew’s flight performance and was
then compared to the debrief interview data transcript for a more comprehensive analysis
o f team behaviors in coordination and communication o f strategic, tactical and
procedural decision making. In conclusion, a variety o f reporting techniques were used
to establish the best combination o f exhibits to portray the complexities o f the
participants reactions and interactions during the scenario, the interrelationships among
variables, and the comparison o f study finding s to existing naturalistic decision making
theories and selected aviation decision models.
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Limitations o f the Study
Overall, the process evaluation instrument reflects both real crew differences and
measurement fluctuations, although there was little variability in the takeoff/departure
element o f the process scores. This was due to a lack o f defined measurements to
accurately assess variations in this baseline measurement procedure. As far as the
reliability o f the raters to accurately measure crew performance, the estimated aggregate
internal consistency (mean reliability) for the group o f raters on 6 o f the 7 process ratings
was at or very close to an acceptable level (.80).
Because error variances affect both the reliability and validity o f measures,
scoring methods for the instrument, characteristics o f the participants (lack of
preparation, anxiety), and/or lack o f precision in the data collection instrument may have
contributed to measurement error. Although outcome raters used their individual
judgment for rank ordering crews before a consensus vote, there may have been pressure
to conform their beliefs in line with those aviators who were more senior in the group.
One threat to internal validity m this study may have been the criteria established
for the scoring o f two o f the seven items in scenario the measurement tool. As discussed
previously, there was little variance in the take-offI departure item that served as a
baseline for procedural compliance. Most crews on a normal take-off do not deviate
from standard operating procedure. In another category, checklist interrupt, the construct
was most probably too complex and expanded into more time in the phase o f flight to be
a single category because raters found more to comment on than was originally intended.
Additionally, problems with the instrument may have occurred because instructors are
unfamiliar with using criterion-based evaluation tools. Instructors typically use grade
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sheets that simply list the skill/behavior to be observed without defined evaluation
criteria. An ordinal scale o f unsatisfactory, below average, average, and above average is
used. Grading is generally non-standardized and moves from lenient to higher standards
as the instructor gains an experience base in evaluating a particular event.
Summary
In recognition o f the complexity o f the issues to be studied a cross-case study
comparison approach using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies was
employed. Decision making process performance and execution measurement and
analysis required a decomposed variable-oriented quantitative approach but also called
for an investigation o f individual cases to gain an understanding o f decision process
characteristics and related crew functioning.
A triangulation o f data generation, collection sources, separation o f process and
evaluation criteria and raters, and analytical methodologies supported the reliability and
validity o f the study data and findings. More specifically, the design o f this study
included data generation and collection sources to include: (a) domain-specific tasks
designed to elicit various decision strategies, (b) a criterion-based evaluation instrument
to capture differences in crew process performance, (c) a simulator event process and
outcome data collection and replay tool, (d) an interview protocol to generate crew self
refection and self-assessment on metacognitive and interactive processes, (e)
observations o f participants recorded in researcher and instructor field notes, and (f)
judgment o f outcome by independent raters.
Integration o f the analysis methodologies supported the integrative evaluation o f
the data. Quantitative data was analyzed with descriptive and statistical tests to
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investigate differences in crew process performance, execution o f the final decision in the
scenario (outcome), and the relationship between process performance and outcome
ranking. Qualitative analysis incorporated cross-case meta analysis by flight hour and
performance levels, an in-depth cross-case analysis o f three process and three outcome
levels o f performance from various theoretical and practical perspectives.
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CHAPTER 4
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS
Introduction
Data related to each of the three hypotheses and three research questions are
presented and discussed in five sections of this chapter in the following order: (a) aircrew
process ratings related to Hypothesis 1; (b) aircrew outcome rankings related to Hypothesis
2; (c) the relationship o f process and outcome ratings related to Hypothesis 3; (d) decisionmaking strategies related to the first two research questions, and (e) critical characteristics
and factors that defined the most successful crew outcomes related to the third research
question.
After a brief overview of the study simulator scenario, cross-case analyses o f sixteen
case studies are reported using expert ratings and rankings, instructor/ subject matter expert
comments, instructor observations recorded during the simulator event, participant
interview/debrief transcripts, and simulator flight data files with associated digital
audio/video files of the sixteen aircrews. The quantitative analysis looked at how highly
experienced crews differ from less experienced crews with regard to process performance
and outcome rankings. The qualitative findings are presented collectively in a cross-case
analysis between and among performance levels. The qualitative assessment focused on the
differences in two main areas: the coordination o f the decision making process between the
crewmembers (including leadership, teamwork, information gathering and use), and the
criteria essential to critical thinking processes and strategies associated with evaluating the
situation and dealing with uncertainty (strategic focus, technical skills, risk assessment, etc.).
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The differences in adaptation o f crew behavior in decision-making strategies that emerged at
various levels o f process performance (high, mid-level, low rankings) are included along with
common crew performance characteristics associated with high and low performing groups.
Chapter 5 will interpret the crew data with respect to differing domain experience, cognitive
effort, crew leadership, and crew coordination as considerations for selection of decision
making strategies and the execution of those decisions under conditions involving various
degrees o f uniqueness, uncertainty, and time limitations.
The Scenario
The demands o f the process tasks are related to the task properties and the time
constraints within the scenario. As the scenario progresses from a sequence o f structured
events to a succession o f less structured events and then to a completely unstructured
event, the appropriate response strategies change. The aircrews were exposed to seven
process events in a good weather, nighttime scenario. The first event involved a normal
takeoff and departure from the home field that served as a baseline procedural evolution.
The second event presented a Starter Caution Light on the No. I engine that required a
commonly practiced procedural response involving an intentional engine shutdown and
an expeditious return to the field. The third event required the crew to prioritize
checklists and apportion available time to complete high priority items while being
interrupted by the control tower to be informed o f another inbound emergency aircraft.
The fourth event began a series o f more complex, unstructured situations as
highlighted in Figure 3 below. Process event 4 began with the presentation o f a low oil
pressure indication on the only remaining engine. This cue was not as obvious as the
previously introduced Starter Caution Light due to the ergonomics o f the instrument
panel (i.e., placement o f the engine oil pressure gages, the relatively small size o f the
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engine oil pressure gages, and a conflicting warning light logic sequence which under
certain circumstances does not visually or aurally draw attention to an oil system
malfunction).
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Figure 3. Highlighted unstmctured scenario events starting with low oil pressure indication.

The fifth event involved preparations for a single-engine approach to the field.
This required crewmembers to coordinate more checklists, dump fuel to reduce their
landing weight, monitor the engine condition, work together to restart the previously
secured No. 1 engine as a back-up to the deteriorating No. 2 engine, communicate with
the control tower, plan for contingencies, and make related flight path adjustments under
extremis conditions. During the sixth event, the control tower informs the crew that the
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airfield arresting gear, required by standard operating procedures for a single-engine
landing, is not available. The seventh and final event challenged the crew with an in
close "foul deck" call from the control tower while the crews were under an extremely
high workload. This novel event presented crews with a set o f circumstances that
required them to execute a nearly instantaneous decision to either continue the approach
or initiate a go-around (wave-off).
Quantitative Cross-Case Analysis Findings
Aircrew Process Ratings
Hypothesis 1 predicted that process ratings would be higher for experienced
crews than novice crews. In general, experienced crews had higher process scores than
novice crews. Figure 4 shows the difference between each crew’s summed process score
and the average process score across all 16 crews. Most crews followed the general
pattern in the predicted direction o f performance evaluation. Crews 1-8 are novice crews
and crews 9-18 are fleet experienced crews.

Sum Process Score Comparison to All Crew Average

?

4.0 0

i

2.00

| -2.00

J -6 .0 0

-a.oo
Crew Number

Figure 4. Comparison o f individual crew sum process score to all crew average.
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The mean, differences in scores between novice and experienced crews for the
seven process variables are reported in Table 6 and discussed below.

Table 6
Mean Difference o f Process Scores Between Novice and Experienced Crews

Take-off/Departure

Mean Score
Difference
.0313

Starter Caution Light for No. 1 Engine

.5125

Checklist Discipline

.3125

Low Oil on No. 2 Engine

1.2501

Approach Priorities

1.0000

Game Plan for No Arresting Gear

1.0750

Foul Deck

1.1875

Process Variable

A more comprehensive look at the component process ratings for each o f the
seven scenario events is shown in Figure 5. This figure corresponds to the level o f
granularity upon which statistical analyses were based. A significant main effect for
experience on process ratings was obtained using a multivariate analysis o f variance
(F = 5.974, 7 df, p —.011). Given this overall statistically significant effect, the next
question is to what extent do the processes within individual components contribute? A
between subjects test summary table (Appendix I) reports the statistical significance o f
individual analyses o f variance (ANOVA's) for each o f the seven scenario events rated.
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Figure 5. Mean process ratings o f novice and experienced crews with confidence
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These post-hoc ANOVA's revealed no statistically reliable effect for the simpler
events (takeofffdeparture, Starter Caution Light illumination on No. I engine,
interruption during checklists) in the initial part o f the scenario. Differences in means for
the four remaining process events were significant using a 95% confidence level: (a)
recognition and handling o f low oil pressure, F = 8.61, 1 df; p = 011, (b) determining
appropriate priorities, F= 12.10,1 df; p =. 004, (c) no arresting gear game plan for
landing a multi-engine aircraft with only a single properly functioning engine without the
use o f field arresting gear as required by Standard Operating Procedures (SOP),
F = 10.39,1 df; p = .006, and (d) making an “instantaneous” decision to continue landing
or eject prior to or after the No. 2 engine failed as a result o f low oil pressure, F = 24.12,1
df; p < .001. The results indicated that the means for the experienced groups' process
scores for these four areas were significantly higher than the means for the novice group.
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Aircrew Outcome Rankings
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the execution o f the final decision results (outcome
scores) o f experienced aircrews would be higher than novice aircrews. As predicted, the
superior ratings received by experienced crews, as a group, was statistically significant.
The outcome data used by raters reflected the concluding “snapshot” o f aircraft
configuration and position relative to the landing environment. Raters' determination of
most preferred aircraft and aircrew status was directly related to the aircrews’ final
decision to: (a) take the aircraft around again (in its degraded state) for another attempt to
land, or (b) land immediately on the runway available and stop, or egress via an on-deck
ejection prior to the stalled truck.
A one-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test was conducted to “evaluate
the assumption that the two samples are randomly and independently drawn from
similarly shaped populations with unknown but equal variation” (Berenson and Levine,
p. 430, 1998). With the sum o f outcome rankings o f the novice crews being 45 and the
sum rankings o f the experienced crews being 91 the probability that these outcome
performance scores would have naturally occurred is p = .01. This analysis shows that it
is unlikely that seven o f eight experienced crews would fall in the top 50% o f the
performance scores, while seven o f eight would fall in bottom 50% if they had been
drawn at random from a homogeneous population. Therefore, the superior ranking o f
experienced crews relative to novice crews was statistically significant.
Relationship between Process Scores and Outcome Ratings
The third study hypothesis predicted that aircrew process ratings would be
positively correlated with the decision outcome ratings for a specific in-flight emergency
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involving uncertainty was only partially supported with quantitative analysis. In Figure
6, the composite outcome scores are depicted on the vertical axis and the process ratings
are summed across the seven scenario events and shown on the horizontal axis. Each
symbol represents one o f the sixteen crews, with solid circles representing experienced
crews and open squares representing novice crews. The number above each symbol
represents each crew's combined total S-3A/B flight hours. In this figure, the summed
process ratings for experienced crews are generally clustered to the right o f those from
novice crews. The vertical axis represents outcome ranking scores with the rating o f 1
corresponding to the lowest outcome score and the score o f 16 representing the highest
outcome score.
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The mean rank order for experienced crews was 11.375, and 5.625 for novice
crews. Each crew’s flight hours relative to their process and outcome rank order are
reported in Table 7. Novice crews 1 and 8 show a relatively good performance within
their peer group and experienced crews 9 and 12 had comparatively poor performance
judged against their peers. As can be seen in Table 7, in all but two cases, higher process
scores and better outcome rankings distinguish experienced crews from novice crews.

Table 7
Aircrews' Combined Flight Hour Rank Compared to Process and Outcome Ranks
Crew

1

Flight Hr
Rank

12 13 16

14 9

10

Process
Rank

7

14 11

Outcome
Rank

10 9

12 6

2

3

15 9
13

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

11

15 4

3

7

6

2

8

5

I

13

12

*6 8

2

5

10

4

*6

3

I

16

11

14 5

7

8

15

I

3

4

2

Note. An asterisk denotes that these two crews received identical summed process
scores.
Figure 7 depicts the overall final process and outcome score rank order for all 16
crews by assigned crew number, hi the right column the top half o f the outcome rankings
consist o f seven o f the eight experienced crews (crews 9-16) while 7 o f 8 novice crews
(crews 1-8) fell in the bottom half o f the outcome score rankings. Crew 16 had the
highest process performance while Crew 13 had the highest outcome performance. As
Figure 7 illustrates, there was distinct movement between process and outcome ranks.
Yet, six o f the eight crews who scored in the top 50% o f summed process scores
remained in the top 50% o f outcome rankings. Although four crews shifted between top
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and bottom ratings, there was a fair amount o f stability within the process and outcome
rankings*

Process Rank

Outcome Rank

C^Raw Score

Figure 7* Comparative ranking change between summed process score rankings and final
outcome rankings o f all aircrews*

Analyses for the first two hypotheses clearly show that novice and expert crews
represented two distinct populations with respect to both process and outcome* Due to
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this lack o f comparability, the experienced and novice groups were kept separate for
correlation analyses. For novice crews, the process outcome correlation did not approach
significance ( r = 142, d f = 7, p = .736).
A strong positive correlation (r = .64, p — .088, df = 7) was found within
experienced crews, although the correlation was not statistically significant with the
sample size used. Within the expert crews, notable positive correlations were observed
between outcome rankings and more complex, unstructured decision contexts at the end
o f the scenario. Correlations between outcome and two process scores that approached
significance were found in two events. These were Foul Deck on Final ( r = .663, d f = 7,
p =. 073) and the No Arresting Gear Game Plan ( r = .682, d f = 7, p = .062). The
correlation between process rating sum and the outcome (i.e., decision to eject) was also
statistically significant (r = .695, p = .056, d f = 7).
One o f the more complex situations in terms o f identifying and working with
available information was recognition and handling the low oil pressure in the remaining
engine although there was no statistically significant correlation o f the time it took crews
to recognize the drop in oil and ultimate outcome score. The mean time for novice crews
to recognize a severe oil pressure drop in the No. 2 engine was 248.38 seconds (SD
201.14) compared to the experience crew mean time o f 156.88 seconds (SD 180.82).
Temporal data related to crew recognition o f the low oil pressure is contained in
Appendix J.
One o f the objectives o f this study was to identify and investigate issues related to
sample size. A power analysis using a Fisher Z approximation was conducted to
determine the sample size needed to detect a statistically significant effect “giving
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consideration not only to the level o f significance and the power o f the test, but also to
the effect size” (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Ju ts, 1994, p. 312). If the correlation o f .64
observed for experienced crews in this study reasonably approximates the correlation
existing in the larger population, the probability o f detecting a statistically significant
correlation (p == 05) would be .80 with a sample size o f 16 crews.
The next section presents the findings o f the three research questions associated
with capturing the task specific thought protocols and performance skills o f crews
performing at three different levels (high, mid-range, and low) as defined by the
quantitative analysis process and outcome rankings. Cross-case analysis findings include
comparisons o f process and outcome rankings with differences in decision strategies in
uncertain, extremis circumstances requiring rapid situational and risk assessment.
Qualitative Cross-Case Analysis Findings
Selected naturalistic and aviation decision making theories and models guided the
qualitative analysis. A variety o f data sources describing participants real-time decision
making in a dynamic environment were analyzed to answer the three research questions
for the study. The three research questions sought the reasons for differing quantitative
process and outcome findings o f experienced versus low flight time crews challenged
with identical in-flight emergencies involving uncertainty: (a) What adaptive
recognitional/metacognitive decision-making strategies emerge from aircrews? (b) In
what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns differ among successful
and less than successful aircrews? and (c) What characteristics/factors seem to define the
most successful aircrew outcomes?
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Emergent Adaptive Strategies
Analysis o f data related to the first research question discovered that during the
final three events in the flight, all crews attempted to adapt previous decisions to the
shifting circumstances. Although crew effectiveness in adjusting to changing conditions
and increased uncertainty differed. The crew's ability to meet performance requirements
depended on collective experience, individual cognitive and technical skills, as well as
their overall proficiency in crew coordination. Findings from the available data show that
all crews' decision strategies were reflected in the scenario process performance scores
and the final outcome rankings. It is significant that the ability to successfully recognize
the need to adapt a strategic plan and follow through with an altered plan to successfully
meet the requirements o f a novel situation showed the highest degree o f variation
between experienced and novice crews.
Table 8 represents the range o f decision-making and information processing
constructs that were revealed during data analysis o f the six crews representing high,
mid-range and lowest scoring crews in process and outcome rankings. These decision
strategies reflect a variety o f methods employed by aircrews to attempt to control and/or
transcend uncertainty during the flight scenario. Crews used these tactics to prioritize
and reduce workload and increase focus under severe time constraints. As described in
Table 8, these techniques assisted crews in identifying, sorting and managing limited
and/or ambiguous information as well as assessing risk, and managing their workload. It
Is important to note that the success o f a particular strategy was dependent on the timing
and circumstances in which it was applied in the scenario.
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Table 8
Adaptive Decision and Information Processing Strategies Detected in Study Aircrews
Decision-Making Strategies
Crewmember(s) devises a game plan that
completely negates their need to deal with the
uncertainty
Crewmember(s) adopts a tactic o f “forced
Uncertainty Eliminated
resolution” and takes deliberate action intended
to resolve the uncertainty by eliminating other
options as clarification/solutions
Crewmember(s) recognizes and identifies
Uncertainty Acceptance (or)
elements containing uncertainty factors yet
Uncertainty Carried Forward
chooses to press ahead regardless
Crewmember(s) acknowledges uncertainty
Uncertainty Ignored
factors and then simply ignores them and
presses ahead with a “blinders on” mentality
Crew member(s) accepts situation with no
Situation Acceptance
attempt to resolve uncertainty o r plan around it
Crewmember(s) accelerates the completion o f
routine administrative items in anticipation o f
Activity Acceleration
upcoming periods o f high workloads or entering
into more demanding or dynamic environments
Information Seeking and Use

Uncertainty
Circumnavigated

Info Gathering Expedition

Information Firewalling

Assimilation Avoidance
Curiosity Flat line

Crewmember(s) sets out to find additional cues
to help resolve uncertainty (either visually:
instruments, sight picture, control positioning or
verbally: asking questions o f other
crewmembers and or external resources)
Crewmember(s) intentionally delays or ignores
(compartmentalizes) reception or introduction
o f new information (Relative to external
sources: crew denies the information source the
opportunity to communicate via the radio or
some other means, i.e. “stand-by")
Crewmember(s) acknowledge the presence and
availability o f new or additional information but
simply chooses to “leave it alone” and not
process or act on it
No attempt to gather additional information
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Patterns o f Decision Making and their Relation to Performance Levels
In general, the findings related to the second research question established that
aircrew experience leveL strongly influenced strategies employed to successfully meet
performance requirements under different naturalistic circumstances. The more
successful, high flight hour crewmembers more adeptly processed and shared information
given interrupted routines and insufficient time to support their original strategic goals. The
ability to recognize cues and similarities in patterns, to rapidly assess dynamic and/or
novel situations, and to make the necessary adjustments and achieve a successful result
were demonstratively related to the crews' domain knowledge, experience level, and team
skills.
These findings support the relationship between best possible results (i.e.,
outcome ranking) in the study scenario and the successful use o f metacognitive skills to
continuously self-monitor, critique, and correct thinking strategies to assess and project a
“simulated” course o f action in a situational model to achieve optimum results under
novel, dynamic conditions. This adaptive decision making process applied by individuals
to meet severe decision making requirements was flamed and described in the
recognitional primed decision (RPD) model (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco,
1985; Klein, 1989) and related studies. These studies have shown that under dynamic
conditions o f the naturalistic decision environment, experts use a more intuitive approach
to meet the demands o f rapid troubleshooting and mental simulation to select the first
reasonable course o f action that will satisfy immediate problem requirements. The
optimal cognitive processes used to rapidly gather and assess relevant information for
accurate situational assessment and decision making both consider and surpass the
procedural or more analytical approaches. The routine procedural and analytical decision
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making strategies either do not meet the situation requirements or use more time than is
appropriate (or available) for the circumstances.
Key functions o f recognition/metarecognition processes. The recognition
/metacognition (R/M) model complements the RPD model by addressing the
metacognitive aspects o f the situational assessment and decision-making process. As
defined by Cohen et al. (1996) meta-recognitional processes “determine when it is
worthwhile to think more about a problem; identify evidence-conclusion relationships
within a situational model; critique situational models for incompleteness, conflict, and
unreliability; and prompt collection or retrieval o f new information” (p. 206).
Participant retrospection o f their conscious thinking processes fell into functional
areas associated with adaptive decision making. Time consuming, concurrent option
weighing to achieve an optimum solution was replaced by selection o f the first acceptable
sequential option. Data from crew debriefs were analyzed for "fit" into the three
functional areas o f the meta-recognitional cycle: (a) critiquing or accurately
evaluating/characterizing the problem, (b) monitoring a course o f action to assess
whether the methods and results o f the decision process will be satisfactory, and then (c)
correcting or regulating the plan with a sequential evaluation o f options with a
commitment to the first acceptable alternative rather than trying to optimize by waiting
for analytical results (Cohen et al.,1996).
Aircrew self-reports o f strategies and process content. The study findings support
that the ability o f the aircrew as a whole, not simply individuals in the aircrew, to adapt to
the cognitive requirements for decision tasks m each phase o f the recognitional cycle is
crucial to using adaptation strategies successfully. Because the R/M model goes beyond
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the processes used in situational, assessment, it is valuable in its use here to frame and
describe the aircrews’ meta-recognitional cyclical processes in dealing with uncertain and
novel situations in the three distinct areas described above. This model was adapted to
assist in discovering patterns in team performance by overlaying the cockpit-specific
analytical scheme developed by Orasanu, Dismukes, & Fischer (1993) to predict types o f
errors based on different cognitive requirements for various decision making situations in
a multi-crew cockpit. A sample o f participant quotes that relate to situational assessment,
determination o f a game plan, and crew coordination issues were integrated with the
adaptive decision making described in the R/M cycle described above and analyzed within
the cockpit decision error framework.

These data allowed comparison o f types o f

decision-making strategy used (analytical, option-based, and adaptive/creative) as well as
comparison and analysis o f process errors in the details o f content o f the metacognitive
process reported by the aviators during the debrief/interviews.
Examples o f pilot and COT AC (navigator and co-tactical officer) recall o f
metacognitive activity are presented in the following succession o f quotes and are
characterized as they relate to the three functional areas o f the meta-recognitional cycle
described above. As a reminder, crews 1 through 8 are novices and crews 9 through 16
are fleet experienced crews. Note that Crew 12, an experienced crew, was ranked 15 o f
16 in the final outcome ranking and that Crew 5, a novice crew was ranked 6 o f 16 in the
outcome ranking.
In general, the content o f metacognitive thoughts o f experienced crewmembers as
quoted below reflect that they were frequently searching out information and verifying
their situational assessments. The starter caution light and low oil pressure events
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provided opportunities to observe crews as they worked through the information
gathering and decision-making cycle by recognizing and verifying cues, working together
to make certain that cues were being interpreted correctly, assessing resources, and
setting priorities within time constraints. However, the debrief/interview provided an
opportunity to gain greater insight into the metacognitive/meta-recognitional process as
relayed by experienced and novice aircrews. Samples o f these tacit processes are
provided starting with the first phase o f the R/M cycle.
Critiquing or accurately evaluating/characterizing the problem. The pilot o f Crew
13 as well as the COTAC o f Crew 9 is evaluating the initial cues associated with a
problem while facing a deteriorating situation. They continue to use their critical
information seeking and use skills to further evaluate the problem to look for and ensure
secondary indications are correctly interpreted and evaluated.
“I think once we noticed the oil pressure dropping in the second gage then at that point in
the decision [making process] and once we saw that that’s [field arresting gear] not
engaged then it's get the plane on deck as soon as possible and whatever field [amount o f
available runway] we land with we land with.” (Pilot, Crew 13)
“The first thing you do when you shut down the engine is to make sure all the lights [on
the advisory panel] that you get correspond to what you expect to see. It was also the one
light that can trick you [the Engine Oil Pressure light does not reset to re-illuminate if
there is subsequent loss o f oil pressure on the remaining engine]...” (COTAC, Crew 9)
The quote below from the Crew 12 pilot (crew 12 ranked 10 o f 19 in process and
15 o f 16 in outcome rank) provides insight into several o f the underlying issues related to
this crew's poor performance. The pilot misjudged the level o f risk based on a lack of
knowledge, his oversimplification o f the problem, and his neglecting to consider viable
options. He treated the option to re-start the No. 1 engine as a rule-based decision. By
not moving forward and accepting a calculated risk associated with this somewhat
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unorthodox procedure (restarting a previously secured engine) he accepted the
uncertainty in the situation (time remaining for the No. 2 engine until it stopped
functioning) and lost the opportunity to generate a potential back-up option in case the
No. 2 engine failed (due to loss o f oil pressure) prior to reaching a position from which
either a safe landing or a successful ejection could be accomplished.

“I set myself up to start up theN o.l at the beginning indications that the starter
was having problems. [Pilot seems to indicate that once he recognized the
possibility o f losing the No. 2 engine [due to low oil pressure] he configured the
No. I engine switches so that the crew would be ready to attempt a no. 1 engine
re-start rapidly.] So we had ourselves in the position where all I had to do was
starter switch “engage”. At least I hoped so. So I thought we were ready to clean
up on that. I didn’t see the need to start it though. I sure wasn’t going to
compound the emergency.” (Pilot, Crew 12)
Examples o f uncoordinated task performance are described in the two quotes
from the novice pilot in Crew 2 that follow. Although the pilot was able to retrieve
procedurally prescribed responses normally associated with a failing engine, he did not
keep his COT AC in the information loop. Later in the flight, still uncertain about the
reliability o f the No. 2 engine, the pilot did not take into consideration the coordinated
tasking required to restart the No. 1 engine while simultaneously flying the final
approach. Even under normal circumstances the final approach is a high workload
sequence o f events.
“ ... with one fluctuation and a little bit after I had to figure out a few things. We
did have an engine vibration problem. With the simulator it makes it really hard
to tell that so I was thinking we just did that precautionary aspect treating it that
way because I was already at IDLE. [Indications associated with both engine
vibrations and low oil pressure situations require the throttle to be retarded to the
IDLE position.] You know, slowing down my descent, cycle bleed just in case
that was it. That or T-5 thing [referring to an instructor introduced simulator
malfunction designed to draw the crew to scan near the oil gage.] I didn’t see an
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issue there because I wasn’t revving up on it [the remaining engine]. The next
aspect was pending engine failure. I mention that because I don’t know how well
I verbalized it.” (Pilot, Crew 2)
“I’d rather risk screwing up an engine [identification o f potential problems
associated with restarting the No. 1 engine with a faulty starter indication. The
implication being that the pilot is willing to risk damaging or setting the No. I
engine on fire i f it provides a better chance to save the jet]. All I have to do is
shut it down because it’s going to go bad. I’d rather risk that engine than risk
losing the No. 2 engine and forcing an ejection. Once I bought that turn right
there -the turn away from the runway...that’s it. [Concern he has enough altitude
and airspeed to only make a single turn. I f that turn is away from the airport then
he'll be committed to ejecting from the aircraft over the water.] We have a
certain amount o f minutes before we can make it around again, turn to 29. Okay?
Well, we’re doing that right now—we’re doing that already, we’ve bought
[committed to] that already so we have time to breakout the Checklist, if I say so,
and try to start No. I [engine]. We’ve already bought [committed to] what we
want. That’s the logic o f it-1 mean, trying to start No. 1”. (Pilot, Crew 2)
Monitoring a course o f action. As the crewmembers' quotes below explain, the
experienced COTAC o f Crew 11 continued to monitor and adjust the plan o f action to
keep the crew’s focus on making an expedited landing. The pilot o f Crew 14 also
displayed assertive creative problem solving skills as he considered the requirements to
land in a situation that did not allow the optimal time to complete checklists and to
evaluate and discuss multiple options and contingency plans.
“At that point, when I told you [pilot] to go ahead and don’t worry about the gear
speed limitation [speeds in excess o f the prescribed speed limit run the risk o f
damaging either the aircraft or the field arresting gear equipment, or both] I was
actually just monitoring our progress and the amount o f time that the engine had
left. I was very much interested in getting the airplane back to the runway.”
(COTAC, Crew 11)
“I think that [truck in intersection] was probably the hardest decision... the
runway is semi-clobbered...Do you still want to continue with this knowing there
is no short field gear? [Both NATOPS and SOP's require arrested landings in
single engine landing configurations.] I think we paused fo ra second and then
continued with it. (Pilot, Crew 14)
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In contrast to the aviators in crews 11 and 14, COTAC's in crews 15 and 12 did
not interpret the situation correctly which led to their neglecting relevant information and
delaying the completion o f essential tasks. The inappropriate conclusion by the COTAC
in Crew 15 indicates that even after he was aware o f the low oil pressure indication (an
obvious indication o f the rapidly deteriorating condition o f the only remaining engine),
he lacked sufficient situational awareness to grasp the 'big picture" and recognize the
severity o f the situation. In this scenario, attempting to divert to another field over
populated areas was not a viable option due to: (a) the diminished amount o f thrust that
the No. 2 engine was producing, and (b) the highly questionable amount o f time that the
engine could be expected to continue to operate.
Crew 12 was the only crew not to identify the low oil pressure on the No. 2
engine as indicated by the No. 2 Engine Oil Pressure gage. When the control tower
informed them o f white smoke trailing from their starboard engine this crew chose not to
engage in any additional troubleshooting or information gathering activities. Instead,
they simply acknowledged that the white smoke coming from the engine signaled that
there was a problem that complicated their situation. (In this case, the lack o f awareness
o f the cause o f the problem with the No. 2 engine resulted in the pilot executing a waveo ff without associating throttle advancement with engine failure.) The Crew 12 COTAC
decided that getting the checklists completed should be the priority and therefore he
attempted to delay the approach and landing in order to complete his portion o f the
routine cockpit activities. This COTAC oversimplified the problem and failed to
recognize that any o f the prescribed procedural responses found in NATOPS (the aircraft
operating manual) did not account for the circumstances he was facing. Without
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adjustments to expedite a normal approach profile (and associated COTAC routines)
there was a very high likelihood that the single remaining engine would quit or fail in the
time taken to complete the prescribed "normal" procedures.
“We were below "max trap" [maximum aircraft fuel weight allowed to make an
arrested landing] when I figured dumped fuel is no good to us in case, for some
reason, we need it back at some point even though we had made the decision to
land and I know we’re below max trap. More fuel is better than no fuel.”
(COTAC, Crew 15)
“... I didn’t verbalize it, but I thought briefly about just setting ourselves up for
the final so we could just go land instead of having to deal with the DELTA
pattern [orbiting overhead the field in a prescribed flight path]. But then I was
like, T know we’re single engine and I know we’ve got at least two more
Checklists to do. So, yea, let’s just go ahead and orbit in the DELTA pattern.”
(COTAC, Crew 12)
“So at that point, I’m thinking, hey, we can still make a normal single-engine
landing. The nosewheel steering was functioning. We did eat the arrested
landing. That was just precautionary and I was thinking, Let’s go ahead and
continue per NATOPS and just land.”(COTAC, Crew 12)
Correcting or regulating a plan. The following participant quotes are examples o f
experienced crews describing the retrieval and review o f situational constraints as well as
their generation and evaluation of options that led to successful outcomes in the final
scenario task.
“ I was [high] on purpose because I wanted to keep power back to try to save the
engine as much as I could in case we needed to use It and then I was like, Well,
we’re not going to go around [wave-off] unless something really goofy happens.
So when the Tower said [there was a truck in the runway] at that point I wasn’t
thinking I wasn’t going to go around unless I was actually going to land on top o f
something. I just wanted to land at the end o f the runway then when you told us
all those things. So, instead o f landing a normal trap [field arrestment] and
landing by the gears [field arresting gear], land at the end slow [below normal
approach speed] and just get on the brakes and try to stop.” (Pilot, Crew 10)
" ... one o f the things that I was thinkmg about that i f it’s real —i f the runway Is
completely clobbered and we’re going to need the distance we could go to the
taxiway and land on that. But that never really became an issue. I briefly toyed
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with that idea and then disregarded it for landing on the runway and try and get it
stopped.” (COTAC, Crew 11)
“Just from experience you know you can pretty much normally stop by that point
[the intersection where the truck was located] and if we couldn’t it would be a
fairly low speed taxi clear, maybe depart the runway at a low speed, or maybe a
high speed turn off into a taxiway. It was what was going on through my mind."
(Pilot, Crew 14)
As typical o f many o f the novice crews, Crew I pilot appears to recognize the
urgency o f the situation and makes adjustments to reduce the routine number of
checklists down to just the Landing Checklist. However, he does not project what he will
need to do to get in a "good landing position" and fails to precisely monitor or correct his
approach to land. He lacks the forethought and technical skills to affect his desired
outcome in the time available. This pilot terminated his first approach attempt to make
the runway, used valuable time to come around again and then executed a wave-off on
his second approach.

“Shut Down the No. 1 engine -that’s obligatory. Get plane on deck after low oil
recce [recognition] in No. 2 [engine], that’s when I knew that everything, all the
checklists we really need to do, all we really needed to do was just get the plane
on deck. Really it was just the Landing Checklist. We need to get in a good
landing position.” (Pilot, Crew I)

As illustrated by the preceding quotes from aircrews in the three stages of the
R/M cycle, it appeared that although novice groups were working through portions o f the
cycle associated with adaptive decision making, they were not identifying or using the
higher levels o f cognitive work required to meet the requirements o f the decision tasks
that were facing them. The crews that choose to wave-off were unable to adapt their
decision strategy to correct and adjust their plan for the best possible outcome. As a
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result, the lower performing crews relied on more familiar procedural and analytical
based solutions to a novel problem that required an adaptive strategy for the best possible
outcome. Beyond the selection and use o f an appropriate decision making strategy to
meet unique situational requirements, there are also crew attributes and crew functioning
characteristics that represent distinctions that separate process performance levels and
outcomes. In this scenario crew coordination between crewmembers and effective levels
o f crew communication were crucial in the last minutes o f the flight to correct and refine
the plan o f action.
Novice Crew 6, in particular, provides one o f the clearest illustrations o f the
importance o f crew coordination as part o f the joint situational assessment and decisionmaking cycle in a multi-crew aircraft. This crew’s performance also illuminates the
necessity for maintaining a high degree o f crew coordination throughout the flight. Crew
6 was ranked 14 o f 16 in process performance and was ranked last in the outcome of their
final decision in the scenario. One o f the significant problems in this crew was the pilot
and COTAC had different objectives that led each one to execute contrary game plans.
The pilot had made a determination to eject while the COTAC was still focusing on
continuing the landing. These divergent motivations caused a fair amount o f crew
disconnection in the final seconds prior to the crew abandoning the aircraft. Appendix K
contains significant dialog o f this crew’s interactions during the last portion o f the flight.
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Decision Making Process Pattern Differences among Case Studies at High. Mid-Range
and Low Performance Levels
The second research question o f interest was whether there were differences in
decision strategies between crew process performance levels. Another issue investigated
was whether strategy differences correlated with better or worse outcome ratings. In
order to explore these issues, process related data and metaperceptual data from three
crews with the highest (16), mid-range (3), and low (2) performance levels were analyzed
and sorted by strategies associated with situational awareness and selecting a course of
action.
The qualitative analysis results mirrored the quantitative findings: that the most
prevalent differences in strategy selection occurred in the most novel decision context
(i.e., whether to land or wave-off to attempt another landing). The qualitative
investigation also found that there were distinct differences in the approaches of crews
16, 3, and 2 for resolving the uncertainty in all the increasingly unstructured events.
Figure 8 represents a comparative overview o f the specific procedural, analytical and
adaptive decision strategies employed by these three crews during the final scenario
events. The larger font indicates the type o f strategy that was most pronounced during
that phase o f the flight. The low oil pressure indication and approach events have been
combined. These two events were combined in the comparative analysis o f crew
decision making because the recognition o f the low oil pressure condition occurred at
different points in the approach for each o f these crews. The three event sets depicted in
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Figure 8 are discussed in detail in the next section o f this chapter.

Low OH Prom
PROCEDURAL/ ANALYTICAL
PROCEDURAL/ ANALYTICAL
PROCEDURAL / ANALYTICAL

No Arresting Gear
PROCEDURAL/ ADAPTIVE
PROCEDURAL/ ADAPTIVE

PROCEDURAL/ a n a l y t i c a l

T ruck on Runway

PROCEDURAL I ADAPTIVE
PROCEDURAL I ADAPTIVE
PROCEDURAL/ ANALYTICAL

Figure 8. Decision strategies employed by high, mid-range and low process ranking;
crews (crews 16, 3 and 2)
Tables 9 through 11 present a linear “snapshot” description o f the cyclical crew
procedural, analytical and/or adaptive decision making process represented in Figure 8.
Aircrew activities are categorized by participants' metacognitive self-reports and
observed actions related to the final sequence o f significant events in the study scenario.
In-Depth Case Analysis
Table 9 records the data related to the crews' overt and metacognitive processes
related to the recognition and reactions to low oil pressure in the No. 2 engine (i.e., only
remaining engine). During the low oil pressure and approach event, all three crews
discuss and weight options at this decision point in the scenario; yet there is a marked
difference in the resulting focus and game plan developed by each crew. Since there is
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no distinct adaptive strategy used at this point in the scenario, Table 9 reflects only
procedural and analytical categories. The more experienced, higher performing crew
(16) is clearly focused and able to proceed with the approach to land since they have
accomplished/coordinated the completion o f aircraft configuration changes, checklist
routines, contingency planning, and landing preparations thus far in the flight.
Unfinished cockpit routines and lack o f communication and cooperation in the novice
crews starts to catch up to both Crews 3 and 2.
Table 9
Specific Examples o f Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions o f Uncertainty and
Increasing Time Constraints during Low Oil/Approach Events
Strategies Used

Procedural
SOP/Checklists

Analytical/
Weighing o f
Options
Situational
Awareness
Activity

High
Performance
(Crew 16)
Fuel Dump
Completed in transit.
All Checklists
Completed except no
Before Air Start.
Checklist forNo. 1
re-light attempt
discarded for sake of
expediency.

Mid-Range
Performance
(Crew 3)

Low
Performance (Crew 2)

Trade-off fuel dump
for checklist
completion.
Incomplete Landing
Checklist/No Waveoff Brief

Did not complete SE
Checklist. No Approach
Checklist. Wave-offBrief
conducted at 30 miles out.
Orbited to dump fuel at 20
miles out.

With field in sight (4.3
miles) Pilot requests to
DELTA overhead then
recognizes low oil
pressure

No recognition of low oil
from gage or scan of
engine tape fluctuation.
Tower calls to inform of
smoke from No. 2 engine
(Table continues)
|

.V ■
COTAC recognizes
low oil pressure. Pilot
checks aircraft
position heading for
populated area
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Strateeies Used

Into (cue) use

Weigh/Discuss
Options and
tradeoffs to
create a plan

Plan accepted?

Contingency
Plan?

Attempt to
gather more
info?

High
Performance
(Crew 16)
Pilot,44Give
consideration to No.
1 restart.”
Pilot changes flight
path on approach to
avoid populated area
in case of ejection.
Still confident he can
land.
COTAC, “Things are
not looking good.”
Continue on shortest
route to field. Pilot
talks through options
related to restart.
COTAC (meta)
Takes a while for
starter to degenerate
(from own
experience).
Yes. Pilot to Tower,
“we’re going to do a
full stop landing.”
COTAC (metacog) —
weights probabilities
of fate if different
runways missed
If can’t make field to
land on numbersEject over water

Mid-Range
Performance
(Crew 3)
Does not report low
oil to COTAC until
transmission from
tower about white
smoke from No. 2.

Eject

COTAC to Pilot “I
recommend we don’t do a
wave-off.” COTAC (meta)
“keeping fingers crossed
hoping No.2 didn’t crap
out.”

No discussion

COTAC dismisses
Tower call about
white smoke from
starboard (#2) engine
as Tower’s probable
confusion with No. 1
engine.
Expedited Landing

No discussion

Pilot aware of No. 2
low oil pressure.
Wants to get down
ASAP for arrested
landing on 29 but may
have to shut down #2
and eject Tells
COTAC to “start in on
those checklists.”
Yes

Low
Performance (Crew 2)
Crew confused. Asks for
clarification on whether
smoke is from wing or
engine. Pilot associates
smoke with low oil and
takes radios. Tells ATC to
cancel EFR (Instrument
Flight Rules) and proceed
direct to field (visually)
for arrested landing.
Throttle to IDLE.

—

Yes. COTAC tells tower
“we’re going to bring it
down and remain on
deck.”
(table continues)

Efficient
Slow
Operational
pace
Note. A dashed line (— ) denotes no activity observed o r reported by the crew.
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Data in Table 10 represent actions and thoughts from the same three crews while
they are flying with one engine o f extremely questionable reliability on their final
approach.

The crews were informed that there was no arresting gear on the only

available runway.

Both NATOPS and standard operating procedures direct crews

conducting single-engine approaches to make arrested landings. An arrested landing
allows the aircraft's tail hook to engage the arresting cable strung across the runway.
Engaging this cable drastically reduces the aircraft's landing roll out and eliminates the
need to use aircraft systems that may be degraded or taken "off-line".
At this point in the flight Crew 16 generated a plan that forced resolution o f the
uncertainty issues. A vigilant execution o f a plan to achieve a strategic goal (i.e., “let’s
land”) with expert technical skills enabled Crew 16 to fly a precise final approach. The
crew achieved their goal by focusing their cognitive resources and eliminating irrelevant
issues and information. In other words, they decided to press ahead and land without
diverting their attention to non-priority issues. In actuality, this is an elegant and
extremely pragmatic solution to an exceedingly complex problem. This crew determined
that all their engine problems would become inconsequential (or irrelevant) if they simply
landed and stopped the jet on the available runway. Crew 16 provides an excellent
example o f an adaptive decision strategy called satisficing (Simon, 19SS). Satisficing is
an approach "for making a choice from a set o f alternatives encountered sequentially
when one does not know much about the possibilities ahead o f tim e. . . there may be no
optimum solution for when to stop searching for further alternatives. . . " (Gigerenzer &
Todd, 1999, p. 13). Crew 16 successfully uses a recognition process that obviates the
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need for further information and adopts a realistic option to land immediately and
foregoes an attempt to generate an optimum solution.
Table 10
Specific Examples o f Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions o f Uncertainty and
Critical Time Constraints during Final Approach with No Arresting Gear
Strategies
Used
Procedural
SOP/Checklists

High
Performance
(Crew 16)
All Checklists
completed.

Analvtical/WeiehineOptions
Operational Pace Quick/efficient

Situational
Awareness
Activity
Info (cue) use

Mid-Range
Performance
(Crew 3)
Did not complete
numerous checklists
(Approach, Single
Engine, Arrested
Landing). Landing
Gear still up.
Pilot senses
immediacy but does
not relay to COTAC

—

—

—

—

—

—

Weigh/Discuss
Options and
tradeoffs to
create a plan

Plan accepted?
—

—

Low
Performance
(Crew 2)
Pilot initiates Landing
Checklist at 3 miles.
Does not reset Fire Pull
Handle in No. 1 re-light
attempt (from memory).
Rushed-pilot attempts
restart from memory.
COTAC nonchalant
Pilot too high on first
attempt- goes around for
landing
Does not stress No. 2
engine. Utilizes time to
attempt No. 1 re-light
Pilot wants to attempt to
Re-start No.l at 800 ft on
3-mile approach (after
being talked out of it
earlier by COTAC).
COTAC wants to finish
landing checklist Pilot
wants to troubleshoot.
COTAC “We’re opening a
whole new can of worms.”
COTAC uncooperativerefuses to backup Pilot
with Checklists
(Table continues)
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Strategies
Used

High
Performance
(Crew 16)

Mid-Range
Performance
(Crew 3)

Contingency
Plan?
—

Adaptive/Satisficing
Operational pace Expedited
Approach.

Situational
Awareness
Activity
Info (cue) Use

Attempt to
gather/delay
more info?
Accept riskPress ahead with
focused plan

----Pilot more
"comfortable” with
Runway 29 than 36

Pilot actively
delays further info
from Tower
Pilot
(metacognition)
“The only thing T
wanted was an
arrested landing.”

No Contingency
Plan.
Accept situation
with no attempt
to act to effect
probable
outcome
Contingency
Plan?

-----

No

------

Low
Performance
(Crew 2)
COTAC to Tower-"We’re
going to bring it down... and
remain on deck if w e’re not
going to stop by the end o f
the runway w e’U get out
[eject]. A ll right?”

Sense o f urgency by pilot
but not COTAC until Pilot
shares info about No. 2
engine status.
Pilot informs COTAC he
has “30 seconds to
complete checklists”.
COTAC responds, “ That
No.2 engine?”(Still
unaware o f No. 2 engine
status)
Land i f no ejection
required prior
Tower told to "Stand- by"

-----

-----

-----

----Pilot (metacognition)
doubted his ability to stop
aircraft

COTAC informs pilot he’s
at 900 ft with 2.5-descent
rate. Pilot responds,“ We
have to get down with the
airplane.” Pilot: "We've
got 15 psi-on that right
engine so we’re going to
be getting out o f this Jet or
w e’re going to land."

-----

-----

No

-----

Y es
Yes
___
Plan accepted?
Note. A dashed line (— ) denotes no a ctiv ity observed or reported by the crew.
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Crews 2 and 3 are still dealing with issues o f uncertainty resulting from a lack o f
information, poor communications, and less than optimum task management which are
interfering with their ability to mentally “keep ahead” o f the aircraft. The Crew 3 pilot
has not communicated the low oil pressure problem to his COTAC. Now the decision
making process is slowed by the COTAC‘s need to re-sort and recognize internal and
external communications about uncertainties in information and time constraints.
Crew 2 is dysfunctional in terms o f their ability to achieve consensus internal to
the cockpit, let alone coordinate with the air traffic controllers to talk about further flight
clearances. The pilot is attempting to raise the probability o f sustaining controlled flight
by attempting an in-flight restart o f the No. I engine. The COTAC simply accepts the
uncertainty o f the situation (i.e., the possibility that the No. 2 engine may fail at any time)
and does not want the additional tasking (consulting the published checklists) affecting a
potentially better outcome. The COTAC asserts that the probabilities o f needing the
back-up engine are outweighed by the possibility o f a restart “explosion” over a
populated area. The pilot does not assert his positional leadership to order the COTAC to
initiate the Checklist "challenge and reply" routines. The pilot attempts to re-light the
No. I engine by himself from memory without the benefit o f the written procedures
(available only to the COTAC in the checklist). The timing o f this request was rejected
by the COTAC as more work than the COTAC could deal with at this stage o f the flight
relative to the impending final approach and landing, the aircraft’s mechanical state and
his own lack o f “mental reserves."
Although there are attempts at adaptive strategies, novice crews 2 and 3 take too
much time analyzing and creating options to effectively deal with the situation. They
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appear to be waiting for “someone” to provide them with direction or guidance (in this
case the airport tower) or for something to happen (perhaps the failure o f the No. 2
engine) to force them into a decision. Crew 3 attempts to increase the pace o f the cockpit
routines, as they perceive scant minutes available for them to complete the remaining
non-essential for safety o f flight procedural tasks normally associated with a landing
sequence. However, they stay in the analytical mode far too long while they attend to
unresolved issues concerning aircraft status. Similarly, Crew 2 COTAC does not adapt to
the situation; he spends valuable time relaying two plans to the control tower instead o f
backing up the pilot.
In comparison, high performing crew 16 continues at an efficient pace, employing
good technical skills for the approach and good information exchange in the cockpit.
There is no discussion o f contingencies. In contrast to the other crews, the pilot o f Crew
16 begins to focus the entirety o f his attention on landing and adopts a mindset that filters
out or eliminates all non-essential (i.e., non-landing) stimuli and influences. He commits
full concentration to completing an "arrested landing." The COTAC provides aggressive
pilot backup by minimizing external communications during this critical phase o f flight.
In the last most difficult and time constrained decision in the scenario the crews
are faced with a novel, dangerous situation that they must resolve while continuing to
sustain the high workloads, sustain potential energy to reach the runway, scan for other
aircraft, and configure the aircraft for landing. The aircrews’ strategies to deal with a
compounded novel set o f high-risk conditions in a dynamic environment are outlined in
Table 11 that follows.
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Table 11

Specific Examples o f Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions o f Uncertainty and
Severe Time Constraints during Final Approach Tower call about Truck at Runway
Intersection
Strategies Used

High
Performance
Crew (16)

Mid-Ranee Performance
Crew (3)

Low
Performance
Crew (2)

—

—

Rushed

Measured

—

-----

Procedural
SOP/Checklists Speed brakes
employed.
Flaps in Take
off position
Hook down.
Analytical/Weig lingOptions
Rapid
Operational
pace
Situational
----Awareness
Activity
Info (cue) use

Attempt to
gather more
info?
Weight/Discuss
Options and
tradeoffs to
create a plan

-----

—

-----

—

—

—

COTAC (meta)
"How am i
suppose to tell a
pilot what to do?”
(Previously crew
determined "No
wave-off.”)

-----

Plan accepted?

Contingency
Plan?

Pilot assumes
entire runway
fouled.

-----

-----

-----

—

Now plan
accepted.
Pilot waves off
and crew ejects
overrunway @ 50
feet.
Yes. Several if
they had landed.
(Table continues)
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Strategies Used

High
Performance
Crew (16)

AdaDtiVe/Satisffc ib £
Efficient but
Operational
hurried
pace
Situational
Awareness
—
Activity
Info (cue) Use
—

Attempt to
gather/ delay
more info?

Accept riskPress ahead
with focused
plan
No
Contingency
Plan. Accept
situation with
no attempt to
act to effect
best probable
outcome
Plan accepted?

Pilot
ignored/missed
call COTAC
acknowledges
transmission
and tells tower
to “Standby”
Crew lands on
numbers and
rolls to stop
before truck.

Low
Performance
Crew (2)

Mid-Ranee Performance
Crew (3)
'
Urgent

-r' — ■

-----

COTAC makes altitude calls. Pilot unsure
o f truck location (in middle o f runway or
intersection or end o f runway). Knew they
were heavy
Pilot does not verbally respond. COTAC
(meta) “Pilot righting the jet- maybe he
didn’t realize how low he was.” Pilot
unsure o f ability to stop aircraft before
truck. “We would have probably hit it.”
Pilot knew putting throttle to firewall
would not give them another attempt at
approach. Probability high for ejection
No

-----

---

-----

-----

-----

Pilot expected to eject. Pilot to control
tower. “Roger, w e’re just going around.”

-----

-----

-----

Yes. Ejected over water at 100 feet.
However, COTAC tried to get call out
after pilot calls for ejection over water.
COTAC is late to pull handle (attempts 2
tunes) to eject to ensure search and rescue
(SAR) effort gets underway.
C- Standby 701 is ejecting
P- Eject, eject, eject
C- Ready?

-----

Note. A dashed line (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by t ie crew.
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The strategies used by both Crews 2 and 3 to circumnavigate the uncertainty o f
the truck position on the runway and/or the ability to stop or eject prior to the truck led
them to wave-off on the final approach- The wave-off required full power to be applied
to the only remaining, but already degraded and poorly performing engine- This
application o f power resulted in an immediate, catastrophic failure o f the No- 2 engine.
As evidenced by crew processes up to this point, these novice crews have varying
difficulty with setting and maintaining goals, adjusting to requirements o f the operational
tempo, retrieving and applying basic systems knowledge, time management, and task
management skills.
The control tower transmission concerning the truck at the intersection o f the
runways was in effectfirewalled (i.e., a strategy used to intentionally delay or prevent
incoming information (S. K. Hunt, personal communication, February 2,2002)) by both
the pilot and the COTAC o f Crew 16. This very experienced crew had never flown
together. Yet, they developed a mutually shared mental model o f the desired result that
prompted both crewmembers to apply an apparent “non-receive” mode to some stimuli.
Crew 16 intentionally ignored the possibility that more information was available from
the tower to carry out their decision plan. (This crew ranked as the second highest
performers o f the sixteen crews in the outcome ranking, hi the debrief, the pilot indicated
that he was unaware o f the tower informing them o f the fouled runway condition.)
Although luck may have played a part in the successful outcome o f this crew, the
information delaying strategy played a significant role m their final outcome.
Appendix L presents the strategies used in the final scenario events by the highest
(Crew 13), mid-range (Crew 11), and lowest (Crew 6) crews in the outcome rankings.
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The findings from these crews, as well as the other thirteen crews, are presented below in
a composite overview o f crew characteristics related to decision-making strategies that
had the greatest bearing on overall performance in the study scenario.
Critical Characteristics and Factors that Define Most Successful Performance Outcomes
Findings related to the third research question show there are multiple
commonalties in the crew characteristics and functioning in a number o f areas o f
performance related to the most successful crews' decision-making strategies and
patterns. Among the higher performing crews, that is crews ranked in the top quadrant in
both sum process scores and outcome rankings (i.e., Crews 16, 15, and 13), the following
patterns were observed in the areas most directly related to overall performance in this
study scenario.
Decision planning. The most successful aircrews set up a focused strategic game
plan, with a firm commitment to land, immediately after their first in-flight emergency
presented itself and accelerated their activities in order to expedite their return to the
field. The most successful crews appeared to visualize or imagine their desired results
and worked backward to design the requirements to get there. The best performers
synthesized their experience and knowledge structures to meet the scenario requirements.
Information gathering and use. The best performing aircrews: (a) shared
responsibility for efficiently gathering and handling selective information, prioritized
incoming communication by immediate workload and its relevance to the strategic goal,
quickly executed Checklist memory items (e.g., selected portions o f a few checklists
were reviewed silently by COTAC's or intentionally skipped), and completed remaining
procedural items; (b) did not expend energy or time pursuing new, readily available, or
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irrelevant information unrelated to the desired outcome; (c) resolved ambiguous
information; (d) interwove task execution and communication with brief periods o f cross
talk to keep each other apprised o f aircraft configuration changes, position relative to the
field, checklist status, and upcoming actions; (e) used consensus building at each major
decision point; (f) expressed high confidence and comfort level with self and crewmate;
(g) did not verbalize a wave-off as part o f their contingency plan(s) as they had
determined early on that this was an unrealistic option.
Pace o f activities. The pace set by the highest performing crews was expedient
enough to “stay ahead o f the jet” but not rushed. There was no delay in the decision to
return to handle the existing emergency and configure the aircraft for immediate landing
at the field. Multitasking was also handled efficiently with a division o f labor, as was
“protection” and back up for the other crewmember as necessary to render assistance and
prevent task overload that might have led to slips and mistakes.
Time awareness o f communications and task requirements. High performing
crews were acutely aware o f tune elapsed (from the initial recognition o f loss of the No. 2
oil pressure) and time remaining in terms o f their perception o f how long an engine could
continue to operate in a low oil pressure condition. They mapped time available into
their perception o f current state of the environment (e.g., airspace, aircraft state, etc.).
They devoted cognitive resources to maintaining high levels o f situational awareness to
maintain focus on crucial existing and impending tasks. Better performing crews were
driven by this heightened cognitive state so they could allocate the appropriate amount o f
time to exchange information at any point in or phase o f the flight. There was a cadence
o f strategically timed cross talk throughout the flight. Conversely, they delayed acting on
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or receiving inbound information if they felt it would distract them from focusing on
crucial existing or impending tasks related to the accomplishment o f their clearly defined
strategic goals (or game plan). High performers remembered and stored data to share
during the occasional seconds between tasks or during periods o f low workload. This
was accomplished by anticipating opportunities to communicate or receive information
the next chance they got in the flight. Only a clear mutual vision o f all necessary tasks
allowed this synergistic exchange.
Crew coordination/cooperation. Teamwork and leadership were also keys to
successful overall performance, hi the S-3 community the pilot is designated as the
aircraft commander responsible for the overall safe conduct o f a flight. Crew
coordination reflects the notion that the crew is a team and a “we” mentality existed in
the most effective crews. For example, in several instances, the pilot o f Crew 16 gave
positive reinforcement to the COTAC's scan and back-up actions. In general,
crewmembers were responsive to the other’s judgment and requests. If a crewmember's
judgment was questioned or clarification was required, it was done in a professional
manner.
Risk assessment and management. Experienced crews rapidly and accurately
assessed both probability and severity o f the risk and made the strategic decision to land
as soon as possible. They continued to evaluate compounded risk as the variables
changed while effectively prioritizing a hierarchy o f hazards that allowed then to deal
with the most severe hazards first. High performing crews used correct application o f
systems knowledge in risk taking (e.g., awareness that the re-start o f the N o.l engine
would dramatically reduce the risk o f losing the aircraft). The most successful crews also
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determined that landing the aircraft with a fouled deck was a better option with less
inherent risk than attempting a wave-off and they did not take time to plan for
contingencies in their final decision to land.
Familiarity with the landing environment and aircraft performance capabilities.
The set up for approach (aircraft positioning) to land at the very beginning o f the runway
played a critical factor in the outcome o f this scenario. High performing crews used their
knowledge o f the distance to the runway, runway length, and intersection locations to
make strategic decisions. The most successful pilots/aircrews displayed an instinctive
ability to accurately perceive trends in aircraft’s airspeed, altitude and relative distance to
the intended point o f landing. The development of, and the reliance on, this sort o f
perceptual skill set is integral to precise, safe landings with any aircraft, let alone one
experiencing mechanical difficulties. Pilots that flew better-controlled approaches had
the ability (both in terms o f motor skills and highly developed perceptual skills) to
establish and maintain desired descent rates and approach speeds. This allowed them to
target the end o f the runway (versus the normal landing point some 700 feet beyond the
runway threshold) once informed that the arresting gear was out o f service.
Crews that were in a position to land and did so adapted the standard S-3
approach pattern and deviated from the primary landing aid (i.e., Fresnel lens) used to
guide pilots in for a simulated carrier approach on the landing field. This lens consists o f
five lighted cells that indicate the relative glide slope position (high, on target or low),
and is commonly referred to as the ball. The ball is used both on a carrier deck and on
landing fields (for training purposes) to guide pilots to the third o f four wires available to
catch the aircraft’s tailhook as it approaches the landing surface. Figure 9 roughly
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depicts the differences in aircraft carrier and field landing aircraft arrestment points using
the Fresnel lens. O n Runway 29, the lens provides vertical guidance to a point well
beyond the runway threshold.

AIRCRAFT-CARRIER

F resn el

lens
targets
trie No. 3
wire

Mock Carrier
Deck painted
on runway for
practice
landings

lens
targets a
landing
point well
beyond trie
arresting
gear

F resn el

\L
•

1

Arresting
Gear
Location

------► I !
i. j

Runway
Arresting Gear Location

Figure 9. Comparison o f target points from side and top perspectives o f landing
approach paths on an aircraft carrier and landing field using a Fresnel lens.
Generally, the more experienced pilots elected to disregard or make adjustments
to fly the ball low as soon as they recognized the need to touch down with the m axim um
amount o f pavement between the aircraft and the intersection. The better performing
pilots were then able to utilize the 720 feet o f otherwise “over flown” runway that was
typical o f an approach flown using the ball for vertical guidance. (S. K. Hunt, personal
communication, February 19, 2000).
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Summary
Data analysis revealed that individuals and teams who had the ability to use their
domain knowledge and experience to recognize the need to break away from procedural
and analytical process rules to cope with naturalistic contexts had better process scores
and outcome ranks. Both process and outcome rankings were good discriminators
between novice and experienced crews although process and outcome correlation seemed
to be limited to experienced crews. The study findings clearly reflect the skillful use of
advanced cognitive processes by high performing crews to adapt information gathering
and decision making strategies to dynamic situations. The quantitative analysis found
statistically significant differences in process performance in four scenario process
elements between the two levels o f flight experience represented in the groups. Based on
this finding the qualitative inquiry focused on identifying and understanding the
distinctions that characterized the varied performance levels.
The qualitative investigation found that there were indeed clearly different
approaches to decision-making strategies including risk perception and management in
better performing crews. Most experienced crews described adaptive strategies they used
to rapidly identify and prioritize relevant risk factors that required immediate response.
On the other hand, most novice crews continued to use procedural and analytical
decision-making strategies under real-time, dynamic situational demands and overlooked
the cognitive adjustments required to carry out their initial plan to land. Ultimately, the
crews' perception o f risk was predicated on their perception o f the circumstances.
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CHAPTERS
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In addition to a summary o f the study, this chapter synthesizes the cross-case
findings from the analysis o f the main study populations and discusses the consistency of
these findings with the theoretical frameworks o f naturalistic decision making
researchers. The chapter concludes with the researcher’s interpretation o f the study and
the potentially profound implications for aviation training advancements and
recommendations for further research.
Summary o f the Study
This empirical study examined five interrelated elements: (a) to investigate the
relationship o f experience on aircrew process ratings and decision results (outcome); (b)
to determine any relationship between process ratings and outcome rankings; (c) to
distinguish the decision-making strategies o f aircrews; (d) to determine i f decision
making strategy patterns o f successful and less than successful aircrews support or refute
theoretical concepts/models for naturalistic behavioral analysis; and (e) to identify crew
performance characteristics o f the most successful crews.
Summary o f the Methodology
The case study approach was selected to provide meaningful data to identify the
thought processes used by more and less effective aircrews. Case study comparisons
sharply defined how individual and aircrews management o f uncertainty differed under
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varying degrees o f event structure and time constraints. Data for this study consisted o f
instructor evaluations o f 8 novice and 8 experienced aircrews consisting o f one pilot and
one COTAC (co-pilot tactical coordinators). Aircrew performance in a flight simulator
scenario provided a realistic environment to observe and rate aircrew performance over
seven events o f increasing complexity and uncertainty. Digital files o f the flight event
were then used to cue retrospective verbal reports o f crewmembers' metacognitive
processes related to situational awareness and decision making. Crew outcome rankings
were generated from independent rater judgments o f optimum crew and aircraft
disposition at the end o f the scenario. The research into the underlying issues related to
differences in aircrew processes and outcome was guided by results o f the inferential and
descriptive statistical analyses o f process score and outcome ranking data.
Summary o f Key Findings
Study findings, from both the descriptive and inferential quantitative and
qualitative cross-case analyses, provide multiple lines o f evidence towards the same
conclusion and are summarized below. These findings confirm the findings o f other
researchers in naturalistic decision making and are interpreted as they relate to the study
hypotheses and research questions in the sections that follow.
■ The overall superiority o f process scores received by experienced crews was
statistically significant.
■ Scenario events with sequentially increased uncertainty and limited response time
served as good discriminators o f process ratings with statistically significant
differences between the groups in the last four more complex events.
■ The superior outcome rankings o f experienced crews were statistically significant.
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■ Strong indicators o f a positive relationship between process and outcome
(r = .64) was limited to the experienced group. There was no strong
process/outcome relationship found with novices (r= .16).
■ Debriefing/interview data provided specific instances o f thought protocols that
revealed differences in strategy selection and application between higher and low
performing aircrews.
■ Higher performing crews demonstrated better ability to use adaptive strategies to
identify relevant concerns, to evaluate risk, and to develop a practical solution
with no increase in effort within the time available.
■ Less experienced or poorer performing crews were driven by procedural and
analytical concerns at inappropriate times and did not make the cognitive
adjustments required to relinquish a linear systematic approach for flying when in
an extremis situation.
Hypothesis I: Experienced crews receive better process score ratings than novices in
handling a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty
Process ratings. Quantitative analysis centered on a two-factor (experiential)
multivariate analysis o f variance, with seven dependent measures (decision points). In
general, experienced crews demonstrated more consistent performance with less
deviation in mean and variance differences in process scores across all events compared
to less experienced crews. The last two event conditions (i.e., no arresting gear and
fouled deck) clearly illustrated the importance o f an aircrews’ ability to recognize the
need to modify their routine situational assessments and decision-making processes.
There were distinct differences between performance groups in dimensions such as
pattern matching, memory for domain-relevant facts, conflict resolution, risk assessment,
cockpit resource management, and decision strategy and execution. The most
experienced crews exhibit "clusters o f skills that tend to make their performance more
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stable, less error prone, and more efficient than novices or intermediates (Seamster,
Redding & Kaempf, 1997, p.29).
For example, the high performing crews executed a strategic game plan without
major re-analysis o f their plan every time the scenario context changed and engine time
remaining became more uncertain (i.e., low oil pressure in remaining engine, arresting
gear not available, and truck in runway intersection). In general, experienced crews were
able to draw on their experience and domain knowledge to intuitively recognize the need
for creative adaptive action and adjusted their flight paths to land without use o f arresting
gear. Seven o f the eight experienced crews deviated from procedural requirements for an
arrested landing and touched down at the closest possible point on the runway. This was
a risk tradeoff between eliminating “room for error” provided by a normal approach path
and giving the crews the use of additional runway to stop prior to the truck in the
intersection (i.e., fouled deck).
Experienced crews with hundreds o f carrier deck and airfield landings possess the
confidence and knowledge that with adjustments to the landing approach, the aircraft was
capable o f stopping prior to the intersection. Conversely, inexperienced crews tended to
fly less disciplined (i.e. less controlled) approaches with higher unintentional deviations
in airspeed, altitude and approach paths (not to be confused with glide paths) than their
experienced counterparts.
Seven out o f eight novice crews that had established a game plan to land elected
to wave-off. When the arresting gear was unavailable most novice crews could not
"break set" with the routine field arrestment landings they are required to execute in all
training events. Unlike the more experienced crews, most novice crews did not take into
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consideration the uncertainty o f the circumstances in their risk assessment and
management o f the situation. These crews subsequently planned their approach path
without considering there may not be an opportunity for a second chance to land. Four
out o f five novice pilots did not follow through with their intended plan to land, even
without the arresting gear, because they realized they had not flown a precisely controlled
approach pattern (i.e., did not have the automated basic domain skills (i.e., stick and
rudder skills) to make the last minute correction). Furthermore, the inexperienced crews
had problems retrieving and using information under stress about runway available until
the intersection, and/or lacked the confidence to follow through with their intentions (i.e.,
several o f the pilots took last second direction from the COTAC to wave-off).

Hypothesis 2: Decision results (outcomes) o f experienced aircrews are rated as higher
quality than those made by novice aircrews

Outcome rankings. The complexity o f the decision problem in the final decision
to land or eject was the major determinant o f outcome ratings. Inexperience with a
compound emergency in an unstable landing environment and inexperience in dealing
with time-critical situations prevented most novice crews from making the optimum
decision in this case. The interpretation o f the experiential factors and patterns that relate
to the required cognitive effort and time involved in this decision process is summarized
as follows: (a) experienced crews did not consider options to deviate from their original
strategic plan to land immediately, and (b) inexperienced crews more often proposed and
considered more than one option when landing gear was de-rigged and then again when
an obstacle was placed in the runway.

1
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Hypothesis 3: Aircrew process ratings are correlated with the decision outcome ratings
Process scores' inter-relationship with outcome rankings. Analysis o f process and
outcome scores showed a main statistical effect for flight experience. The study results
suggest that experience was a significant factor in aircrews that received higher scores in
the scenario's later decision points. The experienced crews generally achieved higher
process score totals as well as higher outcome scores from independent rankers. No
strong apparent relationships were found between novice process and outcome scores.
However, there was a positive correlation with experienced crews between outcome
ranking and two process events (no arresting gear game plan andfo u l deck game plan).
Process and outcome rating analysis revealed several important aspects related to overall
performance. The major findings from deconstructing performance attributes o f high and
low performing aircrews that support quantitative results in terms o f ability to predict
process and outcome performance are: (a) the most notable distinction in aircrew
performance occurred in less structured decisions under severe time pressure that
required an adaptive response to the decision problem to satisfy immediate safety o f
flight concerns, and (b) there exists a longitudinal effect o f an aircrew’s strategic, tactical,
and procedural planning and execution, beginning in the brief and continuing throughout
the flight.
The researcher used empirical generalizations made from quantitative analysis
beyond the significant effect size itself to guide the qualitative inquiry. Since the
difference in process scores between experienced and novice crews were expected, the
research questions focused on the reasons for these differences. Although rule-based
decisions were applied well by almost all crews throughout the scenario, the performance

i
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o f most novice crews deteriorated when unanticipated problems demanded creative
thinking during the latter stages o f the scenario.
The evidence clearly indicates that experience is a primary factor in the ability to:
(a) concisely recognize and assess risk in atypical situations; (b) apply domain
knowledge, skill and experiences to perceive time available to save the aircraft and crew;
(c) adjust a plan to respond to situational dynamics, and (d) consider only one option at a
time. These findings are supported by decision research findings: increases in task
complexity drive altered evaluation and choice strategies used to make both high and low
risk choices (Payne, 1985).

Research Question I: What adaptive recognitional/metacognitive decision-making
strategies emerge from aircrews?

Emergent recognitional/metacognitive strategies. Beyond domain knowledge,
expert performers use meta-recognitional skills that include rapid information search and
prediction o f option success to inform adaptive decision-making processes. Key research
findings throughout naturalistic decision research summarized by Means, Salas, Crandall
and Jacobs (1993) support the description o f the strategies reported by the aircrews to
simplify complex problems while maintaining flexibility in thought processes as well as
reactions to unfolding events. Adaptive recognitional/metacognitive strategies were used
to systematically search for information, and quickly identify, characterize and frame
problems.
Crew use o f adaptive strategies supports naturalistic decision making theory that
the most successful crews would have employed adaptive strategies as time pressure and
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need for more immediate action grew stronger as the scenario progressed. Interview
analysis revealed that adaptive "satisficing" or "good enough" (Simon, 1955) strategies
emerged in the more uncertain and time critical portions o f the study scenario to
effectively achieve immediate short-term and long-term goals. These decision-making
strategies characterized by the effort and accuracy trade-offs in the more progressively
uncertain decision-making environments in the study scenario were consistent with the
findings o f Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1988, 1990).
Data analysis yielded two multi-dimensional matrices to synthesize the decision
strategies employed by study aircrews under different levels o f uncertainty. The
conceptual categories used to develop the matrices were based on the ideas o f Klein,
1983; Payne, 1985; Humphreys & Berkeley, 1985; Endsley, 1995, 1997; Orasanu etal.,
1993; and Cohen, et al., 1996. These matrices proved useful in identifying critical links
in the crews’ performance in the study scenario during increasing time constraints and
uncertainty. Variations in the range o f adaptive strategies used by individuals/crews for
information gathering, processing and decision making are included in Tables Mi and M 2
o f Appendix M.
Figure 10 graphically portrays the range o f responses and crew interactions/
actions related to the cognitive efforts o f aircrews in a multi-crewed aircraft in the study
scenario. Process data used to develop this explanatory model evolved from the data
compiled for building the matrices in Appendix M. Data sum m arize d included a priori
crew explanations o f thought processes and actions regarding processes o f information
gathering, goal development, risk assessment, and subsequent technical, tactical and
strategic decision making under various conditions o f uncertainty and time pressure. The
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explanatory model captures the decision-making temporal, considerations and associated
level o f interaction between crewmembers and with external sources associated with
updating situational awareness, risk assessment, strategy revision and implementation.
Various strategies depicted in Figure 10 were used by aircrews to manage uncertainty and
are identified throughout the decision cycle starting in the top left comer with the label
new information.

Tempo
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Figure 10. Explanatory model o f the range o f responses associated with aircrew decision
making in a scenario involving naturalistic conditions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

The findings support that the effective use o f critical thinking skills and processes
as framed in the Recognition/Metacognition (R/M) model (Cohen, Adelman, Tolcott,
Bresnick, & Marvin, 1993; Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1994) resulted in superior
outcomes. The explanatory model created with study data, illustrated in Figure 10,
supports Cohen’s focus on “an integrated picture o f how knowledge structures are created
and adjusted in dynamic environments” (Cohen, 1993a, p. 49). The findings o f this study
support that success o f the processes used to manage uncertainty were dependent on the
complexity o f the problem “manipulated through variations in the number o f alternatives
in the choice set, the number o f dimensions o f information (attributes or outcomes) used
to define an alternative, and the amount o f time available for making the decision”
(Payne, 1985, p. 7). The next section will discuss the way in which the crew processes
identified for managing uncertainty influenced performance in the scenario.
Research Question 2 : In what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns
differ among successful and less than successful aircrews?
Differences in decision-making patterns o f high and low performing crews.
Interview analysis revealed that recognitional/metacognitive strategies were required in
the more uncertain and time critical portions o f the study scenario. Aircrews that could
quickly identify the first option in a sequence o f options that would immediately “satisfy”
requirements to make a safe landing had better outcomes. Aircrews that had problems
prioritizing and/or tried to justify their decision-making process (in several cases to
authorities rather than themselves) by falling back on standard operating procedures
and/or weighing multiple options (often using biased probabilities or logic) were not as
successful in optimizing their outcomes. For certain tasks in the scenario, as well as in
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operational settings, procedural and analytical strategies will result in better performance
(Klein, 1997a) but this scenario was designed to force the use o f adaptive decision
making for the best possible results.
Experienced aircrews were more often and better able to use past experience to
adapt interactions between crewmembers that resulted in quicker situational assessments
and better decision-making focus to achieve optimal results. As depicted in the
Recognition-Primed Decision Model (Klein et al., 1986) and used by experts in various
field studies (Klein, 1997b), this adaptive critical thinking process focuses on the
sequential evaluation o f options for immediate “best fit” in a dynamic situation rather
than a time-consuming weighing o f options for the best possible solution and/or
preparation to justify actions.
With regard to satisfying the immediate landing requirements in the scenario, the
core differences in performance between novice and experienced aircrew outcomes
included: (a) more experienced crews were better calibrated in the strategic outcome goal
and the closer they got to the threshold they focused narrowly and sharply on the
commitment to the landing option alone (i.e., only information pertinent or germane to a
accomplishing a safe landing was processed; (b) novice crews tended to
discuss/investigate non-landing options and even invented additional non-landing options
while on the final approach to land. Novice crews did not select o r correctly apply
appropriate decision strategies for this final event involving a truck on the runway during
final approach.
The rule-based decision strategies used by most novice crews were not flexible
enough to work in a novel situation. The procedural analytical, option-weighing
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strategies were too time consuming and/or inappropriate probabilities o f error/success
were placed on options. Interview analysis revealed that recognitional/metacognitive
strategies were employed by the more experienced crews to guide, limit and stop
information search in the final time-critical events that called for satisficing. This finding
supports the use o f critical thinking strategies for quick retrieval o f assumptions and
identification o f relevant information; that have been identified as: (I) critiquing or
accurately evaluating/characterizing the problem, (2) monitoring a course o f action to
assess whether the methods and results o f the decision process will be satisfactory, and
then (3) correcting or regulating the plan with a sequential evaluation of options with a
commitment to the first acceptable alternative rather than trying to optimize by waiting
for analytical results (Klein, 1993; Rouse & Valusek, 1993; Cohen et al., 1996).
Since a “vital element in all strategies is a specification o f both the amount and
order in which information is processed” (Maule, 1985, p.71) the information gathering
and use by aircrews was o f primary interest in the data analysis. The finding that the
individual/crews’ perception o f their circumstance had a major effect on their risk
perception o f a situation led to the investigation o f information processing strategies and
judgments. Errors in information gathering strategy or errors in use o f strategy to
evaluate and characterize the situation or problem were a major determinant o f the final
outcome in the scenario performance. Aircrew uses o f judgmental rules, known as
heuristics, were used to break down difficult tasks into simpler ones. Although the use o f
heuristics is “valid in some circumstances, in others they lead to large and persistent
biases with serious implications for decision making” (Slovic, Fischhofif & Lichtenstein,
1982).
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Lower performing crews were poor at information gathering to use for strategic
judgments- They commonly did not work at “staying ahead o f the jet” (i.e., planning and
identifying potential risks in light o f their strategic goals). Novice crews routinely
became involved in completing the tasks at hand (e.g., orbiting in the vicinity o f field to
complete troubleshooting drills/checklists) and attempted to make even more time
available (e.g., attempted to execute the full instrument approach procedure rather than
taking vectors or commencing a visual approach) for these relatively irrelevant tasks.
Novice crews also devoted cognitive capacity to inappropriate concerns and
demonstrated an over-reliance on and unfamiliarity with checklists. One o f the most
obvious differences between novice and experienced crews in this scenario seems to
hinge on their willingness, or lack thereof to abbreviate, deviate from, or in some cases
completely ignore checklists items. Once the experienced crews ascertained the need to
land immediately there was a relentless concentration on getting the jet "on deck."
Novice crews, on the other hand, never really seemed to recognize or generate the same
sense o f urgency "to get at least the important stuff done" that was repeatedly seen in the
experienced crews.
Although most novices displayed many attributes o f good performing crews they
were either not consistent and/or they were driven by procedural and analytical concerns
at inappropriate times. Applying rule-based solutions that they thought would help to
define and control the situation drove many novice crews. There were multiple examples
o f novice crews substituting dogmatic compliance o f checklist for the intent o f the
checklist (i.e., flight safety). For most novice crews, the regard for prolonging the flight
with “clean-up” issues outweighed the urgency to get the aircraft on the ground. For

I
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Crew 1, this mindset became extreme to the point o f substituting checklist compliance for
aircraft control. In the debrief the COT AC explained the crew’s priorities for “taking the
time to go through all the checklists” and remarked, “ ...w e just need to get through the
landing checklists and get them done otherwise this plane is not going to fly anymore.”
As the number o f competing, high priority tasks began to increase in both size and
importance experienced crews very clearly demonstrated a "triage-like" task management
mentality. There was a need to address everything at a satisificing level in the time
available. Accordingly, these crews relied upon their experience and well-developed
sense o f judgment to cut comers wherever and whenever appropriate as they performed
safety o f flight tasks such as checklists, systems monitoring, troubleshooting, navigation,
and coordinating with the control tower. Experienced Naval aviators recognized this
situation required a "gear, flaps, hook, land" mentality in which all other checklist items
become secondary. Their communications with the control tower became somewhat
terse directives (e.g., "We'll be taking a trap on 29" vs. the normal request for landing
advisories or clearances) and the general concern for their equipment became much more
"survivalist" vs. "maintenance friendly" in nature. The willingness o f experienced crews
to restart, and quite likely completely destroy a two million dollar engine in order to save
a $30 million aircraft is a perfect example o f this type o f "triage" task management.
Everything that was important received attention, obviously not as much attention as was
ideal, but at least enough to get the je t landed on the runway.
The process scores reflected a degree o f aircrew accuracy in identifying relevant
cues, organizing the information into a judgment and then using appropriate decision
making strategies over a series o f judgments. According to Arkes and Hammond’s

I
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model o f judgment analysis, “judgment is a cognitive process similar to inductive
inference” (1992, p. 7). Since high judgmental accuracy is considered an essential
attribute o f high performance it was expected that low judgmental accuracy would be
reflected in lower performance and scores. Sample quotes representing a crewmember's
use o f heuristics, developed as a result o f various studies in judgments o f probability, are
presented in Table 11.

Table U
Sample Heuristics used in Risk Assessment by Aircrews
Heuristic (rule)

Im aeinabilitv- n ovel
situation evaluated b y
im agining contin gen cies
(w ith no experience to use)
(T versky & Kahneman,
1973)
A vailability- ease o f
retrieving
instances/occurrences to
assess probability
(T versky & Kahneman,
1973)
Illusory Correlation- over
estim ate o f strength o f
associative bond
(Chapman & Chapman,
1969)
Evaluation o f C on iun ctivelikelihood plan w ill su cceed
through series o f events
(B ar-H fllel, 1973)

Crew
/position
C rew 2
P ilot

Waved-ofF
9/16 in

outcome
ranking
C r e w l2
P ilo t

Waved-off
15 o f 1dm
outcome
ranking
C rew 6
P ilot

Waved-off
16/16 m
outcome
ranking
C rew 11
P ilot
Landed
8/16 m

outcome
ranking

Example of Use in Predicting Risk
“ We didn’t have short field gear so that’s a factor. We
might have been able to stop; we might not. So they weren 't
going to get the truck moved so we would probably have hit
it if we landed. There’s no way Ecould have stopped it
there."

“I don’t think Ewould have stopped in time. 1think 1might
have been able to stop it. However, that’s not always the
case even when Eslam on the brakes. That was 50/50. E
would say from my experience landing in this jet that the
brakes aren’t what they ought to be. That would have been
a 50/50 chance of us plowing into the truck. So weight the
odds ofthatifthe other engine can keep going and both
those chances are real bad.”
“Well, Ewasn’t thinking about how far the intersection was.
All I heard was ‘intersection’ in my mind. Now sitting here
Ecan stop and think about how many times I’ve stopped the
jet before the intersection. But Ewas thinking along the
lines of conservatism, 1guess, and not sure whether it could
stop in time.”
“You know if we can’t stop by the time we get to the
intersection then most likely we’re not going to be able to
stop. There’s the long field gear but there’s some other kind
o f problem [involved]. So, this jet easily stops within 4,000
feet on runways. Efwe weren’t stopped by that point you’re
slow enough to go off or at that point you’re ejected.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118

In conclusion, the major issues related to poor performance included: (a)
unresolved issues in learning/training (systems knowledge, technical skills, crew
coordination, etc.), (b) inability to improvise when safety o f flight called for abbreviated
or expeditious handling o f checklists, (c) fear o f not being able to justify a decision to
deviate from published procedures or regulations when warranted by airborne
emergencies, (d) inability to strategize to keep the goal with the biggest payoff in focus,
(e) lack o f confidence in their technical skills, and (f) lack o f assertiveness as pilot in
command.
Crew characteristics and factors that defined the most successful crew outcomes.
The attempt to develop a stereotypical definition o f an effective crew by studying the
range o f performance between novice and experienced crews was more complex than
originally anticipated. A consolidated list o f attributes related to different performance
levels was revealed through various data sources in the study. Attributes o f high
performance were found in lower performing crews but not to the extent and consistency
found in better performing crews. Poor performance characteristics were also found
across all crews. In general, novice crews exhibited more o f these characteristics than
experienced crews as evidenced by the process and outcome rankings. A summary o f
specific crew characteristics related to performance levels is located in Appendix N.
Substantial flight tune alone was not a qualifying factor in distinguishing “expert”
performers in the study scenario. Two cases underscored that other factors may be
involved with flight performance beyond, or in spite o f an accumulation o f flight hours.
The crew with the least amount o f total flight time m the S-3 exhibited many o f the
characteristics o f expertise and team skills associated with aircrews at the other end o f the
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flight experience spectrum. The essential factor in successful performance by this novice
crew was the ability o f each crewmember to adjust his cognitive style as well as his
workload prioritization to meet emerging requirements. For work in a crew environment,
this meant that as context and task characteristics changed each crewmember
relinquished/adjusted his viewpoint or workload as necessary. Traditional teamwork
includes balancing positional duties in a “divide and conquer” approach with “back-up”
for procedural compliance and situational awareness (i.e., aircraft altitude, airspeed, and
positioning relative to an acceptable approach path profile). In the case o f the poor
performing experienced crew, the pilot’s overbearing attitude towards the COT AC whom
he outranked and complacency in verifying identification o f problems or procedures (e.g.,
started to shut down wrong engine, never associated smoke with low oil pressure, elected
to wave-off) were not representative o f an experienced fleet aviator.
The higher performing crews displayed more o f these traits and were more
consistent in demonstrating these expert capabilities than the average or lower
performing crews. The goal o f the cross-case study analysis was to find the extremes o f
performance and create a stereotypical definition o f a good crew. Therefore, case studies
o f aircrews ranked highest, mid-point and lowest on the process and outcome score
continuum were analyzed to reveal differences in areas found to be primary determinants
o f process and outcomes. Performance differences that grew progressively greater as the
difficulty level o f the scenario increased were found in the following areas: (a)
knowledge and skills involving aircraft control, (b) leadership, (c) cue recognition,
identification and response, and (d) strategic focus aligned with tactical and procedural
focus during each phase o f flight or during an abnormal event with competing issues.

j

j

1
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The experienced crews reacted differently to apparent inconsistencies in the
situation and did not deviate from their original strategic plan as the novice crews did on
the final decision. As reflected in the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model, a
comparison o f options was typically not done by experienced personnel in the final
scenario events. Once they entered the “end stage’ they remained with their original plan
to return to base and land as soon as possible regardless o f the distractions presented to
them in the scenario. Inexperienced crews more often created options when informed
that the landing gear was de-rigged and then again when informed that there was an
obstacle on the runway. This supports the notion that novice crews’ prior training and
inexperience in landing at the field under extremis situations was a major factor in their
inability to make a choice from dynamic sequential options. As one novice pilot
explained, his reliance on procedural responses remains consistent in the transition from a
training command single-seat jet, where "pretty much if things don’t work perfectlyeject" to piloting a multi-seat jet where "you definitely change how you handle
emergencies

to improve crew coordination, taking more time with your procedures to

make sure you get them right, and not place yourself in more extremis can make a big
difference.”
The study findings support that flight experience is the major determinant in a
crew's ability to react more quickly and more accurately to complex situations involving
uncertainty and severe time constraints. This conclusion is supported by previous
research findings using gambling predictions (Payne, 1985; Payne, Bettman, and
Johnson, 1988) that a decision-maker has a multitude o f strategies to select from to
predict outcomes depending on the trade-off between costs and accuracy given

i
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constraints o f the situation. The metacognitive processes shared by the crews during the
debrief interview suggest that a crewmember’s personal sense o f confidence as well as
his comfort level with the other crewmember’s ability to back-up and carry out the
specific tasking requested is important to effective team performance. This required
crewmembers to deal with some “distracting” concerns by internalizing concerns,
alternate options, etc. O f equal importance was communicating succinctly and clearly at
appropriate times. In one case, an experienced COTAC internalized his processing o f the
probabilities o f missing different runways at the field. He then continued to use
metacognitive processes to plan contingencies as a means to allow the pilot to focus on
making final adjustments to land the aircraft. With poorer performing crews, there were
many instances o f a crewmember relaying concerns in inappropriate ways and times that
negatively affected strategy processes and resultant outcomes.
Implications for Training
This study context reflected a realistic context to investigate the use o f
adaptive/recognitional strategies that approximate the accuracy o f normative rules with
substantial savings in effort. Study findings supported that the use o f well-defined
behavioral and cognitive constructs provide a more robust approach to aircrew evaluation
and training feedback than skill-based training guided by post-hoc analysis o f mishap
data. More defined decision problem representations allow for identification o f the
aircrew attributes that really matter in performance at both the novice and expert levels
and capture conditions conducive to human error.
Cognitive dimensions added to observable evaluation criteria created both a
multi-dimensional evaluation and a crew self-assessment tool. Technical skills were
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complemented by metacognitive attributes such as goal identification, ability to assess
effort and accuracy required o f various strategies, and consequences o f actions or options
not selected. Fleet crews exposed to the challenging study scenario as a part o f their
NATOPS qualification all agreed that the scenario, in concert with the more in-depth
debrief, provided a better learning experience than provided by routine qualification
evaluations. With this multi-faceted approach to evaluation, training objectives can be
improved to reflect better-defined essential behaviors and processes for both individuals
and teams. Improve and standardize events and performance evaluations focused on
critical thinking skills will promote solution-oriented interactive briefs, focusing on
specific behaviors keyed to training goals.
Metacognitive and meta-recognitional focused verbal protocols are a great
addition to the debrief as well as the classroom discussion and “provide accurate record
o f how an individual internally represents ideas, and in certain situations provide an
appropriate measure o f information processing” (Simon, 1979, p.69). Use o f cognitive
oriented questions by the instructor involves asking the crewmembers about the potential
as well as the actual impact o f their thoughts and actions so they can generalize lessons
learned beyond a particular scenario. The debriefing protocol, including the study
cognitive probes, is now routinely used by instructors at the S-3 Fleet Replacement
Squadron (i.e., training command). Instructors have found that these types o f questions
provide both them and the aircrew with a better understanding o f the crewmember(s)
underlying processing activity.
Scenario-based training with cross-case analysis is also useful, as in this case, to
identify possible improvements in operational performance. Additionally, decision trees
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built from crew performance data can be a useful format to ensure correct and rapid
execution o f immediate action and non-normal procedures in flight manuals and
checklists.
Recommendations for Future Research
There has been considerable research in the area o f multi-crew/team training yet
cognitive approaches to team training have received very little empirical attention. The
adaptation o f available empirical data for practical use and in training warrants further
study. For example, in this study the variables in the data collection instrument were
sufficient to measure the constructs o f the study but findings reveal that there are more
defined constructs available to capture team requirements for decision-making processes
in naturalistic contexts. Although traditional training data collection and evaluation
practices identify the behaviors and outcomes associated with performance issues they do
not commonly seek out efficacy and accuracy o f the underlying thought processes.
The generation o f more complete data on attitudes, cognitive processes, and skills
in a realistic, challenging context will result in identification o f data categories that are
more significant to aircrew performance assessment and feedback for all levels o f
training and operations. Further research using naturalistic decision making models and
theories incorporated in the research design, using both quantitative and qualitative
comparisons o f domain experts/novices m realistic real-time events, will add relevant
details and issues related to the process o f decision making for both individuals and
aircrews. To date, cognitive task analysis to study expert/novice differences has been
generally limited to elicitation o f past events with experts in a domain (Hoffman,
Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998).
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The use o f a realistic context to study decision making in the field provides
opportunities to elicit memories immediately after an event rather than days, months or
years after an experience. For example, the inclusion o f novices in a task analysis can
generate data to better define problems to be addressed in training. Probing questions
that engage the novice to think about his inferences, motivations, attitudes, and
coordination responsibilities related to the decision-making process highlighted areas not
routinely addressed in the curriculum (e.g., different mental representations and
assumptions o f the problem that led to opposing problem solving strategies, overt or
covert deliberate disregard for the other crewmember’s rationale for a plan o f action,
inability to behave adaptively to trade-off standard requirements for an effective level o f
effort to satisfy immediate operational requirements, etc.).
Employing a digital simulator data collection, debrief and data analysis device to
capture events by time or category is an invaluable aviation-research tool that combines
"real-time" aircrew and aircraft performance data. Immediate retrospective recall by
participants provides more opportunities for participants to verify the timing and context
o f events. The timeliness and availability o f details o f this approach to data collection
provide more opportunities for an aviator's robust reflections on decision thought
protocol and/or insight into a particular cue, judgment, use o f analogues, plans, options,
etc. as well as unrecognized potentially dangerous precursors to those events (Klein et al.,
1986).
Summary
This chapter provided a final synthesis and summary o f findings related to the
hypotheses and related research questions and discussed the consistency o f these findings
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with the theoretical frameworks o f naturalistic decision making researchers. The focus o f
this type o f decision-making analysis follows on Cohen’s (1993b) argument that formal
decision making models do not capture the adaptive characteristics o f real-world
behavior and that "improvements in decision making need not require imposing
analytical methods" (p. 99). Although lack o f comparable studies prohibits precise
comparisons, this interpretation o f both the statistical and qualitative data supports the
data and theories o f other investigators studying novice and expert performance in
aviation and other domains. Naval aviation has proved a useful area for studying the
relationship between experience and how an individual selects a strategy based on the
problem context. The study o f aircrew performance process and outcome differences in
terms o f their operational decision-making abilities provided insight into the essential
structure o f various motivations, acts, choices, and decisions made by aircrews that both
reflect and contribute to decision-making theories. Multiple methods o f analysis provide
better prospects for greater understanding o f aircrew decision making, judgment, and
problem solving skills (e.g., considerations o f feasibility, constraints and relevant
tradeoffs) and is a distinctive approach to gain insight and understanding o f adaptive
approaches to decision making from multiple perspectives.
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Table Ai
Participant Demographics

Crew 1

PILOT

COTAC

25
M

25
M

Combined S-3 Sim and FliahtHrs

1
3
45
370
415
35
80

12
1
45
145
190
35
80

Crew 2

Pilot

COTAC

24
M

25
M

Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

21
3
38
532
570
62
100

2
1
50
180
230
80
130

Crew 3

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

29
M

28
M

2M

2
7
40
146
186
80
120

52

26

Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

8
11
12
350
362
45
54

496
548
125
174

248
274
62.5
87

Crew 4

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

Crew Mean

27
M

24
M

7
1
40
260
300
30
70

16
13
30
130
160
30
60

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours
Combined S-3 Sim And FliahtHrs

Crew Total

Crew Mean
25

2M
4

90

45

515
605
70
160

Crew Total

#

257.5
302.5
35
80

Crew Mean
24.5

2M
8
88
712
800
142
230

44
356
400
71
115

Crew Mean
28.5

1

25.5
2M
1

70

35

390
460
60
130

195
230
30
65
(table continues)
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Crew 5

Pilot

COTAC

26
M

26
M

26
9
105
245
350
75
180

24
16
78
100
178
73
151

183
345
528
148
331

172.5
264
74
165.5

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

Crew Mean

27
M
0
23
9
100
100
200
100
200

180

90

Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

25
M
0
4
3
80
275
355
100
180

375
555
200
380

187.5
277.5
100
190

Crew 7

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

Crew Mean

27
M

24
M
4
0
50
100
150
100
150

130

65

Combined S-3B Sim And Fliaht Hrs

26
6
80
378
458
100
180

478
608
200
330

239
304
100
165

Crew 8

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

Crew Mean

26
M

24
M

10
14
30
340
370
40
70

3
17
24
110
134
40
64

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Stnce Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

Crew Total

26
2M
3

Crew 6
Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours
Combined S-3B Sim And FliahtHrs

Crew Mean

91.5

26
2M
0

25.5
2M
0

25
2M
4
13
31

54
450
504
80
134
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27
225
252
40
67
(tabie continue
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Crew 9

Pilot

COTAC

27
M

34
M
13
5
2100
400
2500
120*
2220

3050

1525

Combined S-3 Sim And Flight Hrs

4
3
950
250
1200
100*
1050

650
3700
220
3270

325
1850
110
1635

Crew 10

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

36
M

40
M

0
127
2200
1600
3800
250*
2450

337
338
2000
100
2100
120*
2120

Pilot 11

COTAC 11

30
M

28
M

5
15
1000
240
1240
100
1100

11
36
570
152
722
100
670

Pilot 12

COTAC12

28
M

27
M

4
6
900
265
1165
85
985

4
26
730
160
890
150
880

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3A/B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3A/B Sim Hours
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

Crew 11
Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

Crew 12
Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Right
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours
Combined S-3B Sim And Fliaht Hrs

Crew Total

Crew Mean
30.5

2M
20

Crew Me;
38

2M
2
232.5

4200

2100

1700
5900
370
4570

850
2950
185
2285

Crew 11 Total

Crew 11 I
29

2M
8

1570

785

392
1962
200
1770

196
981
100
885

Crew 12 Total

Crew 12 Mean
27.5

2M
5
1630
425
2055
235
1865

815
212.5
1027.5
117.5
932.5
(table continues)
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Crew 13

PILOT 13

COTAC 13

41
M

34
M

2
210
2500
1340
3840
300
2800

15
19
2100
280
2380
400
2500

Pilot 14

COTAC 14

32
M

27
M
1
7
950
90
1040
120
125

1600

800

Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

2
7
650
2150
2800
150
800

2240
3840
270
925

1120
1920
135
462.5

Crew 15

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

Crew Mean

36
M

33
M
55
76
1000
150
1150
125
1125

1650

825

Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

0
14
650
290
940
150
800

440
2090
275
1925

220
1045
137.5
962.5

Crew 16

Pilot

COTAC

Crew Total

Crew Mean

41
M

38
M

385
1342
3700
300
4000
200
3900

4
125
1950
120
2070
200
2150

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3A/B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3A/B Sim Hours
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs

Crew 14
Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours

Age
Gender
Crewed Events Together
Days Since Last Flight
Days Since Last Sim
S-3B Flight Hours
Other Flight Hours
Combined Flight Hours
S-3B Sim Hours
Combined S-3 Sim And FliahtHrs

CREW 13
TOTAL

CREW 13
MEAN
37.5

2M
5

4600

2300

1620
6220
700
5300

810
3110
350
2650

Crew Total

Crew Mean
29.5

2M
15
7

34.5
2M
25
27.5
45

39.5
2M
0
194.5
733

5650

2825

420
6070
400
6050

210
3035
200
3025
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Table A:
Process Score Rater Demographics

Rater
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Designator//
Affiliation
Pilot/Civ
Pilot/Civ
Pilot/Civ
NFO/Civ
NFO/CIv
NFO/Civ
NFO/Civ
NFO/Mil

Age
59
54
54
36
36
40
39
38

Years as S-3
Instructor
7.5
4
5
3
4
11
9
7

S-3 Flight Hours
1900
1100
1100
1200
2350
2100
1005
2760

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Other Flight
Hours
2100
4000
17,000
750
250
7000
1400
500

APPENDIX B
APPROVAL TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITH NAVAL AVIATORS
APPROVAL TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITH NAVAL AVIATORS ASSIGNED
TO VS-41 AND SEA CONTROL WING, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET SQUADRONS
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DEPARTMENT O F THE NAVY
COMMANDER NAVAL AM FORCE
UNTTEO STATES FACOTC FLEET
F.O. BOX 3S70S1
SAN OIEOO. CAUFONNU U llS I O S t

1542
Sec N45/ y.fr 5

MAY 2 2 2000
University of San Diego
Office of the Provost
5898 Alcala Parte
San Diego, CA 82110
Attention: Human Subjects Committee
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Ms. Constance Gillan has discussed with me her proposal to conduct flight-training research involving
North Island based personnel under my command’s cognizancei Her proposed comparative study of
novice versus expert decision-making and situational awareness will require full access to S-3 aircraft
flight simulator data as well as personal interviews and observation of involved subjects. I fully support
this endeavor.
Research of this precise nature into cognitive aircrew processes in the time-critical cockpit environment
is sorely needed. As a member of the Naval Aviation Human Factors Quality Management Board since
1897,1have closely monitored Department of Defense, academic and commercial efforts in this area as
partof our charter to significantly reduce human error aviation fnishaps. Ms. Gillan's proposed research
could provide data and conclusions directly applicable to that effort.
I stand by to enable and assist Ms. Gillan in her research in every way possible. For questions, I maybe
contacted at (619) 545-2788. or e-mail to keeooer robert.hflcnap.navv.mil.
Sincerely,

R. H. KEEPPEFf
Captain, U.S. Navy
Force Safety Officer
By dftectkxi of the Commander
Copy to:
-COMSEACONW1NGPAC (N013)
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DEPARTMENT OFTHE NAVY
COMMANDER. SEA CONTROL WING. U S. PACIFIC FLEET (92135-713 1)
COMMANDING OFFICER. SEA CONTROL SQUADRON FOUR ONE (92135 7098)
NAVAL AIR STATION. NORTH ISLAND. CA

1542
S e rN O O / 108
21 JUNE 2 0 0 0

1542
Ser NOW 0444
21 JUNE 2000

University o f San Diego
Office o f the Provost
Attn: Human Subjects Committee
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego. CA 92110
Gentlemen.
Ms. Constance Gillian has approached the Commanding Officer o f Sea Control Squadron
FOUR ONE and me about conducting flight-training research using students at the Sea
Control Squadron FOUR O N E training command and fleet aviators assigned to Sea
Control operational fleet squadrons located at Naval Air Station North Island. She ha>
proposed to collect observational data related to situational awareness and decision
making from novice and more experienced flight crew performance in a full flight
simulator scenario followed In debrief interviews with study participants
Both the Commanding O fficer o f Sea Control Squadron FOUR ONE and I have reviewed
Ms. Gi!lan‘s doctoral disscitation study proposal. We believe that her research will
provide significant benefit to the advancement o f human factors initiatives and conduct *»i
training both at Sea Control Squadron FOUR ONE and throughout naval aviation
training. We fully support her research effort and will stand by to assist her in a n v w.iv
we can. If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to call me at (619) 545 -5 JL5»»

Sincerely.

Commander. U. S. Navy
Commanding Officer

Captain. U. S.
Commander
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Sample Participant Consent Form
Constance (Connie) Gillan is conducting research toward a doctorate in Leadership Studies at the
University of San Diego under the direction of Dr. Mary Woods Scherr. You have been asked to
participate in this study because you are in a full-time training status or a fleet aviator. Connie is
conducting an investigation into how aircrews with varying levels of experience in the same aircraft model
may differ in their use of decision-making strategies and how they process decisions.
Your participation will involve permitting Connie and two instructors to remain in the event brief and
debrief as well as observe and evaluate your actions in a 20-minute simulator event from the instructor
console. The researcher and instructors will make video and audio recordings using the Computer
Assisted Debriefing System (CADS). The researcher and instructors may also make written notes
during the simulator event and associated briefs, debriefs, and interviews with your crew as necessary
and may photocopy the evaluation sheet for the observed event. To ensure you remain anonymous no
names will be used on the observation/evaluation sheet or anywhere in the data collection, analysis or
final research paper. Your crew will have a code associated with it for all purposes of the study data
collection, analysis, and reporting/publishing of the study. You may view all notes and evaluations
associated with your study event as well as the transcripts of the debrief/interview. No one other than
the researcher and observer/evaluators will have access to the raw data. There may be persons outside
the command that will assist in transcribing the interviews and compiling the raw scores for analysis.
Participation in this study is voluntary and data collected will be used for training purposes only. You may
refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty. You may request that video and digital
recording be stopped at any time and files/tapes erased. You may refuse to have files/tapes viewed by other
persons other than the researcher and instructors) for your event. Approximately one hour of additional
time beyond the scheduled event time will be required to respond to a series of open-ended questions about
your situational assessment and decision making processes in the simulator event
There may be no direct benefit to you from these procedures although you may gain experience and
feedback in a scenario that you may or may not have been exposed to previously. The results of this study
may help in the advancement of decision making research, design of aircrew training and operational
procedures in aviation.
If you choose to participate in the scenario you must pledge not to discuss it with other crews until
informed that the data collection and analysis phases of this study are complete so the integrity of the study
is not compromised.
You may call the University of San Diego Human Subjects Committee Office at (619) 260-6889 to inquire
about your rights as a research subject and/or report research related problems to your Commanding
Officer.
Connie has explained this study to you and answered your questions. If you have other questions or
research related problems, you may reach Connie at 545-1823 or send her e-mail at cgillan@adnc.com.
Research records will be kept anonymous and confidential and will be destroyed after three years
(requirement for research purposes).
You have received a copy of this consent document to keep.
I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and on that basis, I give consent to my voluntary
participation in this research.
Signature o f Subject
Naval Air Station North Island. San Diego, CA

Date

Signature o f Principal Researcher

Date

Signature o f Witness

Date
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SCENARIO SYNOPSIS WITH NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING ELEMENTS
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Scenario Synopsis and Naturalistic Decision Making Elements for each Event
Event 1; Takeoff and Departure
Synopsis: No abnormal indications were presented during this segment o f the scenario.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
Action / feedback loops
Time stress
High stakes
Multiple players
Organizational goals and norms
Difficulty Level:

No
No
No
Yes
Low
Low
Yes (internal)
Yes

Low

Cues: Normal Take-off and Departure
Appropriate Response: Perform in accordance with normal procedures and operations.

Event 2: Starter Light No.l Engine
Synopsis: Significant safety o f flight related event—flight manual procedures require the
engine to be secured and for the crew to return for a landing while exercising single
engine approach and recovery procedures. Depending upon the circumstances, it would
not be unusual for a crew to declare an in-flight emergency if the situation deteriorated or
became more complicated than a simple single engine approach.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
Action / feedback loops
Time stress
High stakes
Multiple players
Organizational goals and norms

No —well defined procedures
Middling
No —checklists and recovery
Yes
High
Middling
Yes (internal)
Yes
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Difficulty Level:

Low

Cues: The flashing red Master Warning Light which is located in an exceedingly
prominent spot on the instrument glare shield (directly in front o f each crewmember’s
seat and dead center in their forward line o f view) will illuminate as will the slightly less
commanding Starter Caution Light on the systems annunciator panel.

Appropriate Response:
Procedural:

Immediately execute the “boldface” steps (those procedures which have
been committed to memory) associated with the Starter Caution Light InFlight procedures. Then complete the remaining steps o f the Starter
Caution Light In-Flight emergency procedure using the Pocket Checklist
(PCL) as a reference.

Tactical:

Initiate a turn towards a suitable airport

Strategic:

Start planning for a single engine recovery

Event 3: Checklist Interruption (Other aircraft inbound)
Synopsis: While the crew was engaged in completing a checklist associated with the
Starter Caution Light procedure they were informed o f another aircraft proceeding to the
same airfield with its own emergency.
Naturalistic DM Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
Action / feedback loops
Time stress
High stakes
Multiple players
Organizational goals and norms
Difficulty Level:

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Moderate
Yes
Yes (internal and external)
Yes

Relatively straightforward and simple

Cues: The information associated with another aircraft inbound to the field with the
potential to cause a delayed recovery for the scenario crew was very clearly provided by
Air Traffic Control (ATC). The cues associated with particulars o f the emergency
declared by the crew o f the other aircraft in close vicinity were curtly com m u n icated by
ATC.
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Appropriate Response:
Procedural:

Acknowledge the information related by ATC that references the other
aircraft with an emergency inbound.

Tactical:

Crews should announce their intentions to continue inbound for an
arrested landing in advance o f the other emergency aircraft.

Strategic:

Crews should-emphasize their desire and intentions to get on the deck as
soon as possible without becoming distracted by the other emergency
aircraft.

Event 4: Low Oil No. 2 Engine
Synopsis: significant safety o f flight related event on par with a Starter Caution Light in
flight. The biggest difference between the two Emergency Procedures was the issue o f
immediacy in terms o f how quickly the offending engine would need to be secured. In
the case o f the Starter Caution Light in flight, continued operation o f the engine with the
light illuminated could result in a catastrophic and potentially explosive engine failure.
In the case o f the Low Oil pressure indication the Emergency Procedures require the crew
to retard the engine’s throttle to “IDLE” and then wait to see how the engine responds. If
the Low Oil indication persists, the procedure requires the engine to be secured (shut
down) to preclude the engine from seizing which would most likely cause an engine fire
and quite possibly a catastrophic failure o f associated systems.
In this scenario, the crew is presented with a very real dilemma. With one engine
secured, the remaining engine presents a condition that would normally require the only
remaining engine to be secured as well. (Note the S-3B is incapable o f gliding without
engine thrust. Furthermore, NATOPS specifically prohibits S-3 crews from attempting
un-powered landings following a dual engine failure/flameout.)
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
Action / feedback loops
Time stress
High stakes
Multiple players
Organizational goals and norms

Yes
Yes
Yes
Multiple and conflicting
Yes, significant
Yes
Yes (internal and external)
Yes

Difficulty level:
Simple; only two options (either secure the failing engine o r not),
but a greatly complicated decision making process due to the unprecedented nature o f the
compounded emergencies and the lack o f documented decision making guidance
associated with this type o f challenge.
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Cues: Under normal circumstances, the Master Caution Light would illuminate and then
flash as the engine oil pressure decreased below a predetermined level. However, in this
particular scenario there would have been no apparent “attention getting” warnings (no
flashing lights, no aural warnings, etc.) associated with the decreasing oil pressure.
Instead, the only cues available to the crew would have been an obscure indication o f
decreasing engine oil pressure on a small, less than prominent, quarter-size, analog style
engine oil pressure gage.
Appropriate Response:
Procedural:

In this scenario, the crew would be force to apply a line o f rationale in
apparent conflict with the “standard” emergency procedures (i.e., even
though the procedures for an isolated Low Oil Pressure indication require
the engine to be secured; in this instance, a deviation from the procedure
was necessary to keep at least one operating engine on line.)

Tactical:

Expedite the recovery process by flying in the most direct manner to the
nearest airfield capable o f recovering an S-3. The significant caveat being
that consideration had to be given to the intended flight path and the risks
associated with the pending loss o f the only remaining engine (i.e., if the
engine quit prior to reaching the field would the aircraft be in a position to
inflict the least amount o f collateral damage to personnel and property on
the ground?)

Strategic:

Reprioritize any game plans to address the increasingly likely failure o f
the only remaining engine. If the crew had not previously declared an InFlight Emergency, it would have been appropriate to do so immediately
following the crew’s comprehension o f their Low Oil Pressure condition.

Event 5: Approach Priorities
Synopsis: In anticipation o f both a single engine approach and its inherent potential for a
single engine wave-off crews would normally dump fuel in order to both reduce their
gross weight (so as to not exceed the arresting gear limitations) and to improve their
single engine climb capabilities. Less weight implies more excess thrust available to
improve the climb gradient. Crews should have given consideration to contingencies
associated with single engine approach and go-around profiles.
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Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain, dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
Action / feedback loops
Time stress
High stakes
Multiple players
Organizational goals and norms
Difficulty Level:
progressed

Yes
Yes
No
Yes but poorly defined
High
Yes and increasing
Yes (internal and external)
Yes

Moderately difficult and increasingly difficult as the scenario

Cues: In Its capacity as a decision making guide the NATOPS Pocket Checklist (PCL)
specifically states that fuel should be dumped “as required.” When confronted with the
possibility o f a single engine approach and wave-off with only one marginally operative
engine crews should have recognized the need to reduce their gross weight by dumping
fuel.
Other cues such as the deteriorating condition o f the No. 2 engine, the likelihood that the
aircraft would be unable to safely clear Point Loma in the event o f a wave-off and the
need to determine the resultant direction o f turnout following the wave-off should have
all contributed the crew conducting contingency planning.
Appropriate Response:
Procedural:

Crews should dump fuel.

Tactical:

Crews should request an approach type appropriate to their level o f
extremes. A visual straight-in approach or vectors to the initial approach
point would most likely result in the most effective aircraft positioning.
Crews should brief hook skip contingencies and wave-off techniques.
Specifically, rudder application, rate o f throttle movement, and direction
o f turn following wave-off initiation.

Strategic:

Crews should declare an emergency and requested priority handling from
Air Traffic Control (ATC).
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Event 6: Game Plan for Sinnle Engine Recovery without Field Arresting Gear
Synopsis: Due to the overall deterioration in the aircraft’s mechanical condition and. the
crew’s selection o f a landing field located in close proximity to a major metropolitan area
contingency planning should have been discussed between the pilot and COTAC.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
Action / feedback loops
Time stress
High stakes
Multiple players
Organizational goals and norms

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Higher
Yes
Yes (internal and external)
Conflicted

Difficulty Level:
Difficult, given the number o f items either occupying or outright
demanding the crew’s attention finding time for contingency planning would have
become exponentially more difficult as the scenario progressed.
Cues: The overall extremis o f the situation should have provided the most unobservant
o f crews with a general idea that they should be developing a "Plan B".
Tower informed crew that arresting gear was unavailable; crews should have recognized
this as a departure from the normal emergency profile.
Tower informed crew that the landing environment was fouled; this should have triggered
an immediate discussion as to where they intended to position the jet in preparation for an
imminent initiation o f the ejection sequence.
Appropriate Response:
Procedural:

Continue to adjust the approach profile in order to accommodate the evershrinking runway availability.
Crews should discuss their emergency egress criteria once it became
apparent that they would be landing in a configuration with a large
potential for a runway departure (or excursion) during the landing roll out.

Tactical:

Continue to exercise all available options and discuss unacceptable safety
o f flight excursions that would necessitate an ejection.

Strategic:

Maintain awareness o f the “big picture” by communicating intentions both
internally to each other and externally to Air Traffic Control (ATC).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152
Event 7: Foul Deck Final Decision
Synopsis: Under normal conditions, any sort o f fouled deck condition would necessitate
a wave-off even under single engine conditions. In this scenario, the opportunity to
execute a single engine wave-off was negated due to the progressively worsening
condition o f the only operative motor. In other words, given the engine’s low oil
condition the probability o f inducing an engine failure due to the low oil condition by
advancing the throttle, as was required by executing a single-engine go-around, was a
very real likelihood.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals
Action / feedback loops
Time stress
High stakes
Multiple players
Organizational goals and norms
Difficulty Level:

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Extreme
Yes
Yes (internal and external)
Unclear

Extremely difficult

Cues: Verbal communication from Tower. Conceivably there was the possibility o f this
being a somewhat ambiguous cue due to a very terse report from the Tower during a
period o f high workload for the crew (i.e., presence o f other factors competing for the
crews' attention such as aircraft control, awareness or monitoring o f the dying engine,
amount o f mental faculties devoted to contingency planning, etc.)
Appropriate Response:
Procedural:

Either continue with the landing or initiate a wave-off.

Tactical:

The generally accepted “approved response” for this scenario was for the
crew to either: (a) disregard the normal implications associated with a
fouled deck (i.e., wave-off) and modify their profile and land anyway
while attempting to stop well short o f the intersection or (b) wave-off and
purposefully position the aircraft over the runway in a safe ejection
envelope.

Strategic:

Scenario end game.
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Outcome Data
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APPENDIX F
INSTRUCTOR GUIDE WITH SCENARIO PROTOCOL, TIMELINE, AND RATING
CRITERIA
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Scenario Instructor Guide with Scenario Protocol, Timeline, and Rating Criteria
Time Allotted:
•
•
•

Crew Brief (10 minutes)
Event (20 minutes)
Debrief (40-60 minutes)

Prerequisites:

NATOPS qualification and completion of the FRS Familiarization Phase.

Event Ob jective: Perform within acceptable standards for safety of flight and coordination for flight operations required to
takeoff from NASNI to W291 and return to NASNI under normal and emergency conditions.
Evaluation:

Instructors will use evaluation criteria set forth in the evaluation document attached to conduct process and
outcome evaluations. One set of instructors will evaluate and score aircrew process performance and another set of
instructors will evaluate and score aircrew outcome performance. Standards are set in accordance with NATOPS, SOP, and
best practices.
Video and data files may he used to reconstruct and evaluate aircrew performance in the scenario
The Debrief/Interview will be recorded with a tape player.

Consent Forms/Research Brief:
•

Researcher will explain the purpose of this scenario event and its conduct prior to the event. Consent forms shall be
obtained and any research-related questions answered prior to the brief.
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Trainer/Debriefing System Set-up:
•
•
•
•

The OFT will be conducted with the Pilot and COT AC positions, CADS is required.
The aircrew will control the aircraft during the entire period,
The aircrew will make all the required radio calls to the appropriate agency on the correct frequency
If equipment malfunctions during the first five minutes of thescenario event the trainer will be reset and the event will be
restarted from the initial conditions. If the trainer malfunctions after the first five minutes another scenario will be
substituted for training purposes but will not be included in the research study.

•
•
•
•
•

Environmental Settings:
Night, VMC Conditions at NAS North Island
Temp- 20 degrees C.
Winds 290/12
Landing and Departing Runways 29 and 36

•
•
•
•

Aircraft Configuration:
Load out: Clean
Weight: 40,000 LBS - (10,000 fuel/30,000 A/C)
Crew positions occupied: Pilot and COT AC (Co-pilot)
Initial position: Runway 29

Event Brief to Crew:
Takeoff position RWY 29 with both engines running. Complete Takeoff Checklist. Takeoff on Runway 29 NZY on NASNI HI
departure to W 291. Operate in W291 for 0+30. Return to NYZ for VFR entry full stop landing.
Instruct crew to conduct Safety Briefing (approx, 5 minutes) prior to trainer event.
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Directions for introducing Tower Comms/ Abnormalities:
•

Instructors will introduce Tower communications and aircraft abnormalities in accordance with scenario timeline/script.
Time stamp insertion of abnormal indications provided by instructor using the Computer Aided Debriefing System
(CADS) marker. Also, mark crew verbal response/action upon recognition and completed response to cue.

Evaluation: Combine general standards, level of thought considered, and specific event set criteria.
Debrief (recorded): instructors and/or researcher may ask Debrief questions.

Please remind crews that the
debrief/interview is being recorded and to project voices. CADS will be used as appropriate.

•

The following questions will be asked in this order with clarifications requested at the instructors’ /researcher's call.

1. How do you think you did?
2. What would you like to talk about first?
3. What were the difficult decisions for you?
4.

Why was each decision difficult?

. For each decision:
(a) What was your degree of confidence in your situational awareness (use a scale of 1-10, with 10 being the most confident)?
(b) What were the reasons for that level of confidence?
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(b) How many options were considered before you choose your course of action?
© Why did you choose that particular course of action?
(d) What other actions/tradeoffs did you consider?
(e) What did you think possible explanations were for conflicting or uncertain info?
(f) What one piece of missing information would have helped you most?
(g) What would you do differently if you were in this situation again?
5. As a crew, what were your biggest strengths? What could be improved? Would you change your brief?
6, What were some important “lessons learned” from this scenario exercise?

•

Please remind crew not to discuss scenario details with other crews.
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Process Score Considerations - General Rating Scale
Scale
i

Rating

Definition

POOR

2

BELOW STANDARD

3

STANDARD

4

ABOVE STANDARD

5

EXCEPTIONAL

Observed performance is unsafe and potentially
detrimental to the safe and orderly outcome o f the
event, This includes instances where necessary
behavior/procedures were not present and examples
o f inappropriate behavior that were/could be
detrimental to safety o f flight and/or flight
operational effectiveness,
Observed performance meets minimum
requirements, but there is room for much
improvement, This level o f performance is less
than desired for effective coordination and safety o f
flight and flight operations considerations,
Observed performance promotes and maintains
coordination and safety o f flight effectiveness,
This is the level o f performance that should
normally occur during flight operations,
Observed performance is significantly above
expectations. This includes instances where
necessary behaviors/skills were present, and
demonstrated performance was instrumental in
safety o f flight and flight operations.
Observed performance represents a high level o f
skill in the application o f certain behaviors and
serves as a model for coordination, teamwork, and
highly efficient flight operations,
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Process Score Considerations (Level of Thought Exhibited)
1. Systems Knowledge - cue/strategy associations; aircraft safety requirements
2. Aircrew Coordination - Cross talk / in-flight ORM
• Information Exchange - Articulate problem. Utilize all available sources of info, passing info without prompts, provide
periodic situation updates which summarize big picture, ask for status info/status as required
• Communication - Proper phraseology, completeness of reports, brevity, clarity
• Supporting Behavior- monitoring and correcting crew errors, discrepancies, avoiding task saturation/assisting with task
shedding.
• Initiative/ Leadership - Take appropriate action in task prioritization/organization.Provide guidance/suggestions to crew
or external agent. State clear and appropriate priorities. Work internal/external issues to alter or make plan work.
Challenge assumptions.

Process Scores-Specific Standards for each Event Set

Event
Time

Event/Tower Comms

0-6 min

Takeoff/Departure

SCENARIO- CREW #
Standard

/DATE

All checklist items completed

1 2 3 4 5 Eval Notes
1 2 3 4 5

Eval

Tower- Standard Departure Comms
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§ ll

Abnormal Indication; Established at
6000ft/Heading 240

min

5

Eval

1 2 3

4 5

Eval

Notes

1

2

3

4

5

Eval

Notes

1

2 3

4

5

Eval

Notes

Execution of NATOPS memory
items (TFI) followed by rest of
checklist

1

Complete Checklist

2 3

4

STARTER CAUTION LIGHT ON #1
ENGINE

8*9 min

Checklist Interruption
When crew is going through No. 1 engine
secure checklist:
TOWER; Be advised Viking aircraft at 30 miles
with a pending emergency. M

9min

Low Oil Pressure Light On
No. 2 Engine
Below 30 PSI
If crew does not notice -surging NG

10-12
min

Approach back to NASNI
If crew asks for arrested landing;
TOWER; " What is your weight for arrested
landing? "

Recognizes low oil pressure engine
only operating engine
Reduce throttle to save engine life
Internal//external com - need for
immediate landing. Verbalized.
Crew initiates/ completes the
following:
(1) Approach Checklist
(2) SE Landing Checklist
(3) Arrested Landing Checklist
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13 min

If crew does not recognize low oil
PS1 on final approach then:
TOWER:" Misty__you have white smoke
comingfrom your starboard engine,"

14 min

Approach Priorities: Aircrew coordination

Contingency internal cockpit brief:
loss of #2 Engine/waveoff,
application of max power on #2
ENG
Brief loss of #2 ENC/Waveoff/Hook skip

1 2 3

4

5

Eval

Notes

19-20

Foul Deck
TOWER: “Crash crew states the arresting gear
is derigged with a burnt out motor. State your
intentions.

Option 1- crew elects to wave- off.

l

2 3

4

5

Eval

Notes

Option 2- Crew acknowledges new
info. Lands anyway

1 2 3

4

5

Eval

Notes

Option 3- Other action by crew

1 2 3

4

5

Eval

min

Full Throttle = Failed Engine

If crew continues.'
TOWER; “Crash truck is stalled at intersection
o f Runways 29 and 36. w
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RETURN TO BRIEF/DEBRIEF ROOM

Reminder:

Please record tim es from
po in t/ or time,

CADS clips show n

in deb rief on this sheet below with reference to discussion

CADS CLIPS USED IN DEBRIEF
CADS File Start/Stop Times:
CADS File Start/Stop Times;
CADS File Start/Stop Times:
CADS File Start/Stop Times
CADS File Start/Stop Times

Topic;
Topic;
Topic:
Topic:
Topic:

Start/Stop debrief time:
Start/Stop debrief time;
Start/Stop debrief time:
Start/Stop debrief time:
Start/stop debrief time:
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APPENDIX G
RATERS’ INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CONSENSUS OUTCOME RANKINGS
OUTCOME RATER DEMOGRAPHICS

|
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Table Gi
Independent Performance Outcome Ratings by Individual Raters
R ater
Military
R ank
S-3 F it H rs
Designator
R ank O rd er
1 (Best)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

1
CDR

2
LCDR

3
LCDR

4
LT

2300
2900
2145
NFO
Pilot
NFO
of Crews by Individual Raters
13
13
13
16
16
16
14
14
14
15
15
15
17
17
17
5
5
5
18
18
18
11
11
11
2
7
6
4
7
7
1
I
4
3
4
2
2
3
I
8
12
3
12
8
8
6
6
12

850
NFO
13
16
14
15
17
5
18
11
2
7
1
4
3
12
8
6

Note. 1 is highest crew rank for outcome score.

Table Gz
Final Consensus Outcome R ank O rdering o f Study Crews by Outcome Raters

R ank O rd er
___________

1

2

Crew
N um ber

13

16 14 15 17 5

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

18

11 2

1

7

4

3

Note, 1 is highest crew ra n k for outcome score.
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APPENDIX H
CREW RAW PROCESS SCORES (INDIVIDUAL EVENT AND SUMMED)
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Crew Raw Process Scores

Crew 2

Crew 1
IP
Rater

INFO

IP

INFO

3

1

7

5

8

1

2

7

5

8

Event Deacrlptlon
1

Takeoff

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Starter Caution

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

4

3

3

3

2

1

2

(No, 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

3

3

2

3

2

1

1

1

1

1

5

Approach
Priorities

3

3

2

2

2

3

3

2

1

2

6

No Gear Plan

4

3

3

3

4

1

3

3

1

1

7

Foul Deck

4

3

2

2

3

2

2

2

2

3

23
Summed Scores
with total
Average Sum Score

21

18

20

20

16

17

15

12

15

102
20.4

Note. IP = Instructor Pilot, INFO = Instructor Naval Flight Officer (NFO)
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Crew 4

Crew 3
3

Rater

INFO

2

INFO
5
4

1

2

5

4

IP

ip

Event Description
1

Takeoff

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Starter Caution

3

3

3

4

3

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

1

3

(No, 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

2

3

2

2

2

2

2

2

5

Approach
Priorities

3

3

2

2

1

1

1

2

6

No Gear Plan

3

3

3

2

2

3

2

2

7

Foul Deck

2

3

2

2

3

3

2

2

Summed Scores
19
with total
Average Sum Score

21

18

18

17

17

13

16

63
15.75
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Crew 6

Crew 5
INFO

IP
Rater

INFO

ip

3

1

5

4

3

2

7

4

Event Description
1

TaKeoff

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Starter Caution

1

3

1

2

1

2

2

1

3

3

1

3

3

3

3

1

(No, 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

3

3

1

2

4

4

2

2

5

Approach
Priorities

3

2

2

2

3

2

1

1

6

No Gear Plan

3

4

3

4

3

2

3

1

7

Foul Deck

3

3

2

4

3

3

1

2

Summed Scores
19
with total
Average Sum Score

21

13

20

20

19

15

11

65
16,25
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Crew 8

Crew 7
3

2

INFO
7
4

IP
Rater

INFO

IP
1

2

7

2

Event Description
1

Takeoff

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Starter Caution

4

3

2

2

4

4

4

4

4

3

3

4

4

3

4

4

(No, 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

3

2

2

2

5

4

4

5

5

Approach
Priorities

4

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

6

No Gear Plan

3

2

2

1

3

2

4

3

7

Foul Deck

3

3

1

1

3

4

3

2

Summed Scores
24
with total
Average Sum Score

18

15

15

24

22

24

23

93
23.25
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Crew 10

Crew 9
Rater

INFO

IP

INFO

ip

3

1

7

6

1

3

7

8

Event Description
1

Takeoff

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Starter Caution

2

3

2

3

4

5

3

5

3

2

2

1

3

3

3

4

(No, 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

5

5

Approach
Priorities

1

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

6

No Gear Plan

2

4

3

2

4

4

4

4

7

Foul Deck

3

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

Summed Scores
18
with total
Average Sum Score

22

20

19

25

26

24

28
25,75
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Crew 12

Crew 11
Rater

INFO

INFO

IP
1

3

6

7

3

2

7

6

Event Deecriotion
1

Takeoff

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Starter Caution

3

3

3

3

2

2

3

2

3

3

4

4

3

3

3

3

(No. 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

4

3

4

4

2

3

3

2

5

Approach
Priorities

4

4

3

3

3

3

3

2

6

No Gear Plan

5

3

4

4

3

2

3

2

7

Foul Deck

3

4

4

4

3

3

2

2

Summed Scores
25
with total
Average Sum Score

23

25

25

19

19

20

16
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Crew 14

Crew 13
Rater

INFO

IP

INFO

IP
1

3

6

7

1

3

6

7

Event Description
1

Takeoff

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Starter Caution

3

4

3

3

3

3

3

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

3

3

(No, 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

4

4

4

4

2

3

3

4

5

Approach
Priorities

4

3

4

4

3

2

3

3

6

No Gear Plan

5

3

5

3

5

3

4

4

7

Foul Deck

4

3

3

3

5

4

4

4

Summed Scores
27
with total
Average Sum Score

23

26

23

25

21

23

24
23,25
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Crew 16

Crew 15
INFO

IP

INFO

IP

Rater

1

2

8

4

Event Description
1

Takeoff

3

4

3

3

2

Starter Caution

4

3

4

4

4

4

4

3

(No, 1 engine)

3

Interruption
during checklist
(External Comm)

4

Low Oil 2 Recce

5

2

4

4

5

Approach
Priorities

4

2

5

4

6

No Gear Plan

5

4

5

4

7

Foul Deck

4

4

4

4

29

23

29

26

Summed Scores
26
with total
Average Sum Score

25

25

25

27

128
25,6

107
26,75
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APPENDIX I
SUMMARY TABLE OF BETWEEN SUBJECTS TEST
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Summary Table of Tests of Between Subjects Effects
Type III

Df

Meau
Square

F

Sig.

Takeoff/Departure
Abnormal #L
Checklists
Low Oil Recognition
Approach Priorities
No Gear GamePlan
Final Decision
Process Sum Score
Outcome Rank
Ejection
Fuel State

Sum o f
Squares
.00
1.05
39
635
4.00
4.62
5.64
11539
13235
235
.72

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

.00
1.05
39
6.25
4.00
4.62
5.64
11539
132.25
2.25
.72

1.00

334
.182
371

Error

Takeoff/Departure
Abnormal #1
Checklists
Low Oil Recognition
Approach Priorities
No Gear GamePlan
Final Decision
Process Sum Score
Outcome Rank
Ejection
Fuel State

.055
7.469
4.159
10.164
4.629
6.227
3374
112.691
207.750
1.750
63.478

14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14

Total

Takeoff/Departure
Abnormal #1
Checklists
Low Oil Recognition
Approach Priorities
No Gear GamePlan
Final Decision
Process Sum Score
Outcome Rank
Ejection
Fuel State

145.563
142.500
153390
170.795
117310
170340
162.055
7231382
1496.000
8.000
1126.960

Corrected
Total

TakeoffTDeparture
Abnormal #1
Checklists
Low Oil Recognition
Approach Priorities
No Gear GamePlan
Final Decision
Process Sum Score
Outcome Rank
Ejection
Fuel State

5.859E-02
8.519
4.550
16.414
8.629
10.849
8.914
227.985
340.000
4.000
64300

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

Source
Crew
Experience

Dependent
Variable

Note. * p <■.05

137
1.31
8.61
12.10
1039
24.12
1432
8.91
18.00
.16

.004
.533
.297
.726
3 31
.445
.234
8.049
14.839
.125
4.534

* * p < .0 0 1
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.011*
.004*
.006*
.000**
.002*
.010*
.100

.001*

APPENDIX J
OIL PRESSURE DATASETS
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Temporal Data for Low Oil Pressure Recognition

CREW 1 CREW 2 CREW 3 CREW 4 CREW 5 CREWS CREW 7 CREWS CREWS CREW10 CREW11 CREW 12 CREW13 CREW14 CREW1S CREW1S
OIL PRESSURE # 2

........... _ ..........

Oil Press UQht ON

7:00

1S;05

6:57

6:23

11:12

6:15

3:15

10:26

14:21

14:37

8;55

11:31

8:35

8:41

11:02

12:39

Oil Press Light Recognition

NP

NO

11:06

11:50

13:03

6:58

NO

10:30

14:53

NO

NO

NO

9:12

NO

11:08

14:21

Engine Fluctuation Recce

NO

NO

NO

18:30

12:25

Eng Smoke Association

11:00

21:25

13:32

13:03
NO
ASSOC

Oil Press EP Recce Della

4:00

6:20

0:29

3:30

N/A

0:06

1:42

3:57

5:27

2:09

0:43

10:27

0:04

0:32

14:11

0:37

5:30
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APPENDIX K
CREW 6 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT DEPICTING DECISION MAKING WITH
OPPOSING MOTIVATIONS BETWEEN PILOT AND COTAC
CREW 6 FLIGHT SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION EVENTS
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Crew 6 Interview Transcript Depicting Decision Making with Opposing Motivations
Between Pilot and COTAC
Crew 6 Interview/Debrief Excerpt:
COTAC: [A difficult decision was] “an instantaneous decision when we were trying to
wave-off and started losing altitude. That instantaneous decision to eject, probably at that
point, there w e were still at 100, maybe 150 feet probably. I didn’t see the VSI. I don’t
know what we had on VSI...but if we were at about 100 feet.”
Pilot: “That second o f looking up, I wanted to see where we were in relation to the
runway. Because., i f we were...I saw that we were dropping and (inaudible)”.
Instructor: “Okay. Is this where you decided to wave-off?” (Instructor starts in-flight
recording file at point o f interest.)
Start Simulator Flight Recording
COTAC: "We’re going to land on 29."
Tower: "701. Roger."
COTAC: "I’m ready to go through the Landing Checklist."
Pilot: "Speed brakes are in."
COTAC: "Locked. Speed brakes are in."
Pilot: "Fuel is at 5.5. Hook is down. Wave the gear. Okay. Three down and locked. One
mile on speed."
Stop Simulator Recording Begin Debrief /Interview excerpt
COTAC: "Yes. We waved-off right there."
Instructor: "This is where we gave you the compressor stall."
Start Simulator Flight Recording (continued)
COTAC: Okay. Three down and locked
Pilot: Roger. Set to takeoff. Indicates 5%.
COTAC: No. 2 oil pressure is at 200. We just want to get down on deck now at this
point.
Pilot: OK, let me guard you. We’re at 20 PSI. You’re zero on the VSI. We’re level
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COTAC: "200 feet"
Tower: "701. This is tower. Be advised there is a crash truck stalled at the intersection o f
runways 18 and 29."
COTAC 701: "Get the crash truck o ff the runway. We’re coming on in."
Pilot: "We’re getting the jet pointed over towards the water. We’ll eject. Eject over the
water. I over shot."
COTAC: "You still have your hyd[hydraulics] pressure. Do you still have control?"
Pilot: "Negative."
COTAC: "Eject, eject, eject!"
— (End simulator recordings Debriefing/Interview continues.)
Instructor: “Well, you had a zero sink rate.”
Pilot: “I had to get it cleared out to the water.”
Instructor: “The water? You were on deck.”
COTAC: “You know, I don’t know if that would have changed but my point. That’s
what I’m saying I thought we were close enough to the deck that even if we would have
lost our engine we could land, get the brakes on even i f we would have ejected. We
could have ejected right before we hit the crash trucks. We had time to get that airplane
slowed down so that we could either have saved lives on deck or stopped it and we could
have ejected definitely later. Now, with an airplane with nobody in it going who knows
where at 100 knots...so, at that point, if we were with the aircraft, we should stay with
the aircraft.”

(End o f Debrief/interview transcript excerpt)
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Crew 6 Flight Summary of Major Decision Events
Starter Caution Light
(1) Flight Ops —Pilot: Announced light and then commenced bold face.
Situational Awareness (SA) - COTAC: Immediately reviews No. 2 engine indications
(2) Tactical: COTAC: Declared an emergency with ATC and then requested vectors back
to North Island while requesting to maintain current altitude.
(3) Flight Ops —Pilot: Instructs COTAC to break out the Pocket Checklist (PCL)
(4) Tactical —COTAC: Asks ATC to inform North Island that they will be needing the
arresting gear.
Pilot observes No. 2 Engine Low Oil Pressure
(5) Flight Ops - COTAC - Tells pilot to “keep me posted” on that
(6) Flight Ops - COTAC: Refers to PCL
Discussion on procedure identification
Vocalizes that they won’t be re-starting the No. I engine
[Instructor comment: COTAC is overbearing]
(7) Flight Ops —COTAC: Identifies need to dump fuel
Some mutual discussion on what fuel level to dump to
Crew appears to settle upon 3,000 lbs. as a workable
number
(8) Flight Ops —COTAC: Talks to Base and informs them o f the situation.
(9) Tactical —Pilot: Tells COTAC to ask for a turn [to give them some time?]
(10) Tactical—COTAC: Requests to delta overhead at 3,000’ in order to set up for single
engine landing
(11) Flight Ops —Pilot: Announces that he is maintaining his airspeed below landing gear
extension speed.
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(12) Tactical —COTAC: Mentions that the No. 2 Oil Pressure is fluctuating and advises
the pilot to head out over the water.
(13) Flight Ops —Pilot: "Dirty Up" [landing gear and flaps extended]
(14) Flight Ops —COTAC: Secures fuel dump “because we’re at 5,000 lbs.”
(15) Flight Ops / Tactical —COTAC: Briefs pilot tells him what to do in case o f a Hook
Skip.
(16) Flight Ops / Tactical - Pilot: “We’ll be keeping it on the deck.”
ATC informs crew that the short field gear is not available.
(17) Tactical - COTAC: Asked for availability o f long field gear.
Suggested to the pilot that once on deck they could “cut the
engines "as i f to coast into the long field gear.
(18) Tactical / Flight Ops —COTAC: drives the discussion on runway selection
(19) Flight Ops / Tactical - Pilot: Decides to head back over the water while doing the
checklists
(20) Flight Ops - Pilot: Aircraft motors around a large portion o f the pattern at 200’ AGL
while setting up for a second approach to the runway. [Instructor comment: This is
unconventional and unsafe-]
ATC informs crew that there is a crash truck stalled on the runway
(21) Flight Ops - COTAC: Tells tower to get the crash truck o ff the runway
Tower responds by saying that the truck can not be moved.
(22) Flight Ops - COTAC: Directs pilot to wave-off
End
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APPENDIX L
STRATEGIES USED BY REPRESENTATIVE HIGH, MID-RANGE AND LOW
OUTCOME RANK CREWS (13,11, AND 6)
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High, Mid-Range, and Low Outcome Ranking Crew Strategies
Table L l

Specific Examples o f Strategies used by Aircrews under Conditions o f
Uncertainty and Increasing Time Constraints during Loss o f No. 2 Engine/No Arresting
Gear
Strategies
Used
Procedural
SOP/Checklists

High
Outcome
(Crew 13)

Pilot: “Well, w e’re
not going to make an
arrestment so we
don’t need to go
through that
checklist. ”

Analytical/Weighing Options
Pilot: "L et’s try to
Situational
keep it on deck
Awareness
Activity
because we may be
losing No. 2 here. ”
Info (cue) use
COTAC: "Touch down
and go fo r (the) long
fie ld gear. ’’
Pilot: "18/26"
1Runway choices]
COTAC: 'Not
available"
Pilot: "Right"
[Acknowledgement]

Mid-Range
Outcome
(Crew 11)

Low
Outcome
(Crew 6)

No brief for an
arrested landing, or
hook skip, or waveoff contingencies.
Pilot appears to
advance the No. 2
engine throttle close
to MRT [Military
Rate o f Thrust —
Max Throttle/100%
power]

No Approach
Checklist. Did not do
most o f arrested
landing checklist.
Aircraft is observed to
motor around a large
portion o f the wave-off
pattern at 200’ AGL
while setting up for a
second approach to the
runway. [This is
unconventional and
unsafe].

—

COTAC asked fo r
availability o f landing
gear
COTAC drives the
discussion on runway
selection

—

(Table continues)
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Strategies Used
(Analytical)

Weigh/Discuss
Options and/or
tradeoffs to create
plan

High
Outcome
(Crew 13)

Mid-Range
Outcome
(Crew 11)

Low
Outcome
(Crew 6)

Pilot: I f we lose No.
2 we 're going to have
to punch out. I f the
EHP goes then I
might have to get the
je t going to the left
before we eject. ”
"Okay?"
COTAC: “Okay. ”
Pilot: "Out over the
w ater."

Crew looks for
other runway
options, finds
none and
decides to
press

COTAC asks for
availability o f long field
gear. Suggested to the
pilot that once on deck
they could “cut the
engines” [as if to coast
into the long field gear.

Plan accepted?

C- "I agree. ”

Contingency Plan?

No. Committed to
land.
COTAC: ” We can put
the hook down and
drag it down the
runway. ”

Pilot: “If we
can’t stop
we’ll have to
get out of the
airplane.”
Crew decides
to continue fo r
landing.

Discussed
ejection but
did not
complete a
formalized
ejection b rief

Attempt to gather
more info?
Expedited
Operational pace
Expedited
Adaptive/ Satisficing - NOT OBSERVED/NO DATA
—

Situational
Awareness Activity
Info (cue) use
Attempt to gather/delay
more info?
Accept risk- Press ahead
with focused plan
Contingency Plan?
Accept situation with
no attempt to act to
effect probable
outcome. No
contingency plan

—

Pilot decides to head
back over the water
while doing the
checklists
Did not coverall
contingencies when
completing Hook Skip
B rief

—

No sense o f urgency

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Note. A dashed line (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by the crew.
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Table h i

Specific Examples o f Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions o f Uncertainty and
Severe Time Constraints with Truck in Intersectioa

Strategies
Used

High
Outcome
(Crew 13)

Mid-Range
Outcome
(Crew 11)

Low
Outcome
(Crew 6)

Procedural
SOP/Checklists 1
Analytical/Weighing Options
Situational
Awareness
Activity
Info (cue) use
Weigh/Discuss
Options and/or
trade-offs to
create plan
Crew made decision
to land.
—

—

Plan accepted?

Contingency
Plan?
Attempt to
gather more
info?

Operational
pace
Plan carried out

Both pilot and
COTAC indicated
their willingness to
land during the
debrief.
Yes

Pilot knew stopping
parameters
—

Pilot considers
Lindbergh Field.
COTAC asks ATC
for options. Asks
about runway 36.
COTAC negotiates
landing on Runway
29 (Lindbergh not
available).
Pilot decides to land
with COTAC
concurrence
COTAC- Getting
stopped in time
and/or steering
around the truck:
Yes. From ATC

No

Accelerated but
still purposeful.
Yes, crew
proceeded with
approach.

““““
Crew lands. No
speed brake
extension.

—

—

—

—

—

COTAC tells tower
to get the crash truck
off the runway.
Tower responds by
saying that the truck
can’t be moved.
—— —

Crew ejects over
runway
(Table continues)
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Analytical/Weighing Options
Strategies
High
Used
Outcome
(Crew 13)
Pilot: "Knowing
Situational
where the
Awareness
intersection was, I
Activity
was comfortable
landingprior to that.
Knowing what the
winds were right
down the
runway...that helps
too. "[In debrief]
—
Info (cue) use
Attempt to
--------gather/delay
more info?
COTAC: "We need
Accept riskto land."
Press ahead
with focused
Pilot: " We '11have to
plan
land and stop it. “

Contingency
Plan?

Mid-Range
Outcome
(Crew 11)

Low
Outcome
(Crew 6)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Pilot: "We'llput it
down on the runway
and really get on the
brakes."
No.

Accept
situation with
no attempt to
act to effect
--------—
—
probable
outcome- No
contingency
plan
—
Yes.
Plan accepted?
—
—
Plan carried out Crew lands.
Note- A dashed ine (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by the crew.
—
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APPENDIX M
SUMMARY MATRICES OF ANALYTICAL AND ADAPTIVE STRATEGY
PROCESSES FOUND IN STUDY CREWS
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Summary Tables of Adaptive Strategy Processes Used by Study Aircrews

Table Ml
Range o f Adaptive Strategies used Under Uncertain Conditions with some Time Constraints in the Decision Making Process
Info/Cue Use

Info/Cue
Search
Active
Search

Accept with
reflection

Flatline

Rote Acceptance

Avoid

Ignore

Dismiss

Reject

Decision Making
(DM) Strategy
Press Ahead
regardless with
Procedural/Tactic
al and/or Strategic
Plan (s)
Create Game Plan
(Procedural,
Tactical and/or
Strategic)
If,,, then
Procedural,
Tactical and/or
Strategic Plan
Forced
Resolution
Procedural,
Tactical and/or
Strategic Plan

DM Plan
Communication
Verbalized by
Pilot
COTAC
agree/disagree

Operational
Tempo
Crew agreed upon Crew Maintains
existing pace
plan

Verbalized by
COTAC
Pilot
agree/disagree
Non-verbalized
by Pilot

Pilot plan

Crew Accelerate

Flatline

COTAC plan

Crew Delay

Avoid

No action

Crew Split

Dismiss

Non verbalized
by COTAC

Plan Action,

Info/Cue
SA/Search
Active Search

191
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Table M2 ,
Range o f Adaptive Strategies used for severe Uncertainty and severe Time Constraints
SA
A ctivity
Info
(C ue)
Active
Search
Flatline

Avoid

Info (C ue) Use

Accept & act
with reflection
Rote
acceptance &
action
Accept &
Firewall

Dismiss

Accept & not
process

Not done or
not
recognized

Accept
reject

&

Reject outright

Decision
M aking (DM )
Process
Non-vcrbalized
Pilot
(metacognitive)
Non-verbalized
COTAC (meta
cog)
Pilot Only

Decision
M aking
im plem entation
Press Ahead
regardless P/T/S
Create Game
Plan
P/T/S
If,, then
P/T/S

COTAC Only

Forced
Resolution
P/T/S

Mutual Crew
Effort

None

None

Decision M aking
C om m unication

Plan
M odification,

O p erational Tem po

Task
prioritization

Verbalized by Pilot
to COTAC
agree/disagree
Verbalized by
COTAC to
Pilot agree/disagree
Verbalized by Pilot
to Tower COTAC
concurrence/non
Verbalized by
COTAC to Tower
Pilot
concunence/nonconcurrcnce
None

Crew agreed
upon plan

Crew Maintains Pace

Cooperative team
orchestrated effort

Pilot plan
COTAC
agree/disagree
COTAC plan
Pilot
agree/disagree
No new action

Crew Accelerates

Mutually
exclusive agreed
upon efforts
Divergent efforts
(Disagreement)

Externally
accepted

Crew Delays

Crew Division
Agreement

None

Crew Division due to
disagreement

Accepted from
external source

Note, P/T/S denotes either or a combination o f Procedural/Tactical/Strategic processes used for planning and action.
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APPENDIX N
SUMMARY OF CREW CHARATERISTICS RELATED TO STUDY
PERFORMANCE LEVELS
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Summary o f Crew Characteristics Related to Study Performance Levels

Kev Attributes o f Successful/Optimum Performance;

Aircraft Control/ Safety
Ability to keep the big picture and accuracy o f ongoing /flight status/navigation
requirements/aircraft location
Systems/procedural knowledge (willingness to abandon/change routine procedure for
proper reasons)
Selectively choose strategic checklists and procedures within checklists as a safety trade
o ff for accelerated landing,
Knowledge o f aircraft capabilities and landing environment
Establish priorities
Focus on aircraft configuration/altitude/airspeed for phase o f flight and situation
Familiarity with flight/landing environment
Distance from field when commencing approach plan
Intentional deviation from lens to make field
Override/modify SOP/ Checklists for safety o f flight
Aviate for ejection contingency
Workload Management
Familiarity with Checklists (reliance on memory)
Error management/Self-correction
Knowing when backup for pilot is required
Knowing when back up by COTAC is required
Ability to task shed or delay new info
Attitude/Supporting Behavior
Confidence
Willingness to be assertive
Positive reinforcement o f crewmember actions
Willingness to discuss discrepancies
Willingness to hear other points o f view
Willingness to disagree
Situational Awareness
Systematic screening/ analysis o f info (past/current/future needs)
Recognize incompleteness o f info and still act under severe time constraints
Recognize need to gather more info
Sort, filter, and prioritize info quickly/efficiently
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Decision Making
Establish priorities
Willingness to troubleshoot
Resolve novel problem creatively
Circumvent problem
Comfort level with choices
Ability to assess when to override/dismiss other crewmember/extemal input
Communication
Continuous cross-talk to keep SA calibrated between pilot and COTAC
Adjustments to initial brief/plan/contingency plan based on changing situation
Proper weight/acceptance o f external communications
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Key Attributes o f Poor/Sub-Optimum Performance:

Aircraft Control/Safety
Allow aircraft to exceed limits o f safe ejection envelope
Lack o f aircraft systems knowledge- inappropriate actions under conditions, confused
reason for application, technically incorrect under condition/and or any condition
Unfamiliar with basic aviation/naval terminology (e.g., starboard)
Workload Management
Task avoidance
Careless/Hyperactive (e.g., almost shut down wrong engine)
Timing inappropriate for situation (too hasty or slow)
Verbalize but use wrong action for Checklist
Attitude/Supporting Behavior
Fatalistic
Arrogance in making routine aircraft control decisions
Desire for personal comfort overriding safety
Refusing Checklist back-up request
Undermining pilot’s authority
Situational Awareness
Unawareness or denial o f urgency o f situation
Consumed with irrelevant issues
Decision Making
Inflexibility -Use o f lens as landing aid when landing requires deviation to make runway
touchdown for shortest stopping distance
Lack o f intuition - land using sight o f runway in windshield
Poor use o f available time
No/poor strategic planning and/or strategic contingency planning (internal/external)
Limited comfort level
Mixed motivation between crewmembers
Communication
Not verbalizing issues
Use o f expletives that may be misinterpreted as call for ejection
Blind acceptance o f external communications/info
Inappropriate communication (e.g., “yadda, yadda, yadda”, “one potato, two potato” to
complete checklist)
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